China and Russia have developed a more significant relationship that goes beyond their conventional military and economic ties as Moscow’s loneliness from the West grows and Beijing’s great power rivalry with Washington intensifies.
While both powers maintain that they are not formal allies, their proclamation of a” no limits” partnership with” no forbidden areas” has crystallized into what Western observers view as a de facto alliance, particularly in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The evolving China-Russia relationship encompasses wide-ranging collaboration that encompasses many cross-cutting areas. Climate change is cited as the defining issue of the 21st century among which both nations have pledged to address it up.
Russia adopted a National Security Strategy in 2021 that directly addresses climate change and incorporates the idea of natural protection. This commitment to climate change has been strengthened by following diplomatic announcements, with particular emphasis on plans to improve cooperation in renewables and weather action.
In a joint statement signed by China and Russia in 2024, it was committed to intensify bilateral investment in low-carbon areas, including solar power and carbon markets.
Some critics point out that meaningful collaboration is somewhat excluded from their bilateral agenda despite their linguistic commitments to weather collaborations. The 2024 China-Russia Joint Statement tellingly emphasizes “deepening” participation in conventional power areas, such as natural gas, petroleum, and oil refining, while simply suggesting the possibility of “developing” cooperation in emerging areas like carbon markets and solar power.
This gap is more evidenced in the 2024 book on diplomatic opportunities, published by the Russia-China Investment Collaboration Committee. While references to regular “power generation” appear sixteen times, specifically in the framework of natural gas projects, terms like “green” and “low carbon” collect only brief mention.
Beyond reasonable proposals for gas and acid development, the handbook’s power and miners section is generally devoted to fossil fuel projects. However, 2024 customs statistics shows that Russia has become China’s top crude oil and natural gas provider, with fossil fuel surpassing climate-related merchandise exports.
The slow progress in China and Russia’s bilateral climate cooperation is alarming. As the world’s largest and fourth largest carbon emitters, both nations have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060.
However, they continue to invest in infrastructure that uses fossil fuels, which could undermine global confidence. It detracts economic resources from incentives for renewable energy and sustainable infrastructure, and it prevents the transition to net zero from other developed nations.
Other significant emitters are required to uphold their commitments, as evidenced by the US’ stunning withdrawal from multilateral climate agreements under the second Trump administration. China and Russia have a chance to take a bigger part in shaping the global climate transition in this leadership vacuum.
Both nations must, however, turn diplomatic rhetoric into concrete action, set forth precise deadlines for climate projects, and reduce their extensive fossil fuel collaboration in order to gain credibility as leaders of the world.
Several sectors offer promising pathways for meaningful climate cooperation between the two nations, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical minerals partnerships.
Hydrogen infrastructure development
In a wide range of applications, from transportation fuel sources and energy storage medium to feedstock in industrial processes like steelmaking, hydrogen has enormous potential as a clean alternative to fossil fuels.
In contrast to fossil fuels, hydrogen does not release carbon dioxide when burned. However, its climate benefits are reliant on low-emission production techniques. Hydrogen produced with water electrolysis using renewable power can be completely emission-free, but its exorbitant costs remain a significant hurdle for large-scale commercialization.
Blue hydrogen refers to hydrogen that has been produced from natural gas and has carbon capture and storage facilities. Although blue hydrogen is currently receiving criticism, it has been viewed as a less expensive, more acceptable compromise before the costs of green hydrogen start tolerable.
Enhancing joint investment in the hydrogen industry aligns with China’s and Russia’s strategic advantages. Russia is well-suited for producing and transporting blue hydrogen due to its abundant natural gas reserves and extensive pipeline infrastructure.
Gazprom’s current pipelines already have up to 20 % hydrogen in them, with upgraded infrastructure capable of up to 70 %. This potential is essential to Russia’s ambitious strategy of capturing 20 % of the global hydrogen market by 2035. Europe is undoubtedly a major source of Russian hydrogen, but European sanctions against Russian exports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made this adversity unlikely.
Along with its position as the world’s top producer of renewable energy, China adds its technological expertise in hydrogen production and storage to these assets. The two nations should make joint R&, D and investment in CCS technologies in their national hydrogen industry strategies in order to increase the benefits of blue hydrogen’s emission reduction.
Beyond the contentious blue hydrogen, the partnership could use China’s renewable capacity to produce green hydrogen for transportation via Russia’s extensive pipeline network, potentially lowering production costs significantly.
Hydrogen is notoriously challenging to transport and store. Russia needs to develop its energy infrastructure along their shared border to attract China’s hydrogen exports. New dedicated pipelines for hydrogen and ammonia would be necessary in addition to the already existing natural gas pipelines.
The expansive, underdeveloped regions along the Sino-Russian border offer ideal testing grounds for innovative hydrogen infrastructure. These areas could host integrated hydrogen hubs combining production, storage, and diverse end-use applications, establishing replicable models for hydrogen ecosystem development.
The partnership might have the power to influence global standards beyond just physical infrastructure. Joint research into pipeline materials that are best suited for hydrogen transport and advanced liquefaction techniques could establish new standards for safety and effectiveness.
Such technical cooperation would advance both nations ‘ positions in the developing global hydrogen market while accelerating the development of technology.
Carbon market integration
Another area with strong potential for collaboration is the carbon market. Sinopec and SIBUR’s involvement in China’s Carbon Trading Market is a recent illustration of potential collaboration. Sinopec, the largest integrated petrochemicals company in Russia, is a shareholder of Sinopec, which also has the second-largest carbon emissions reduction projects in the nation.
SIBUR will become the first Russian company to issue carbon units in an international system since the creation of Russia’s carbon trading system as a result of the project’s registration with the Global Carbon Council system. Five climate projects have been added to the Russian carbon emissions registry system thanks to SIBUR.
On top of that, these projects are anticipated to reduce total CO2 emissions by 7.5 million tons over the course of ten years. As long as appropriate validation systems and high standards are established, SIBUR’s relationship to Sinopec opens up opportunities for entry into the Chinese carbon trading market.
The potential for further collaboration in carbon markets is still largely untapped despite these initial efforts to promote cross-border carbon trading. China and Russia could develop novel methodologies for carbon valuation that better reflect their national idiosyncrasies rather than simply linking existing systems.
For instance, they could jointly develop new methodologies for valuing natural carbon sequestration, such as Russia’s vast Siberian forest. It is a significant carbon sink hub, and the Russian government is expressing its growing support for monetization through carbon offset. The two countries could also develop novel financial instruments that combine clean technology transfer and carbon credits, making them more appealing investment vehicles for foreign investors.
A second untapped opportunity is the creation of joint carbon accounting standards specifically for international industrial projects. This might include establishing specialized carbon credit categories for emissions reductions achieved through Sino-Russian technological collaboration, particularly in difficult-abating industries like steel and cement production.
These standards could later serve as a model for other developing nations trying to strike a balance between industrial growth and emissions reduction.
Critical minerals
China is rapidly ascending as a global hub for clean technology R&, D and manufacturing, particularly in the “new big three” sectors: solar, electric vehicles ( EVs ), and batteries. These important minerals are strategically important because Russia has these key points of China’s clean energy initiative.
Russia is one of the largest copper and nickel reserves in the world, ranking among the top ten for both metals globally. These resources are fundamental to the clean energy transition, especially in transportation.
Copper serves multiple functions in EVs, from battery components and motor windings to charging infrastructure, while nickel is essential for high-energy-density batteries and corrosion-resistant components in wind turbines and solar cells.
As an example of Russia-China collaboration in critical minerals, Nornickel, Russia’s leading metals and mining company, produces 15 % of the world’s best high-grade nickel and is also a global leader in copper production.
The company is pivoting toward the Chinese market to reduce the sanction’s impacts. The company made plans to significantly increase the supply of metals to China and establish joint ventures in copper refinery and battery materials processing in 2024.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and UK introduced a ban on imports of Russian aluminum, copper, and nickel. Russian metals can no longer be exchanged on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and London Metals Exchange.
Russian minerals are increasingly important to China’s supply chains, which is partly fueled by growing pressure from the West. Cooperation with Russian producers allows Beijing to diversify its supply chain while allowing Moscow to gain capital and technical expertise for production expansion as the United States pressures allies like Indonesia to impose restrictions on mineral exports to China.
The Shanghai Futures Exchange could become famous as a result of this partnership, which could reshape global metals markets: Western exchanges are currently closed to Russian metals, and it will gain more visibility for setting international benchmarks and encouraging yuan-denominated trading.
Copper and nickel are prominent in current bilateral agreements, but the deepening global climate transition implies that demand for these metals will increase exponentially. Both nations have the potential to quickly increase their mining and refining capacities, potentially outpacing the industry’s traditionally slow-moving one.
The partnership could extend to other strategic minerals, notably palladium, where Russia dominates global production. It is used to connect chips to circuit boards using metal connections. Russia is the world’s largest palladium producer. Through just two projects, Russia controls 40 % of world palladium output, a metal crucial for semiconductor manufacturing.
Climate cooperation leadership
Climate cooperation remains underdeveloped in the ever-growing China-Russia partnership. Some areas, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical mineral collaboration, offer transformative potential.
The success of their climate collaboration will depend on a number of crucial elements. First, both nations must implement their diplomatic agreements through actionable plans, established procedures, and measurable outcomes.
Second, their cooperation in important minerals and hydrogen infrastructure must go beyond bilateral benefits to contribute to global climate change. Third, their efforts to integrate the carbon market must shift from sporadic initiatives to coordinated efforts that can inspire other developing nations.
Strong Sino-Russian leadership in climate policy could significantly affect the trajectory of global emissions reduction efforts, but only if both countries place long-term climate gains preceding short-term fossil fuel interests.
Chris Zou works for the World Resources Institute ( wri ) as a climate policy researcher. org ) based in Washington DC.