Taiwan, which is already threatened by growing defense stress from the People’s Republic of China, is under increased pressure from US President Donald Trump’s risk to impose tariffs on imported semiconductors.  ,
Trump’s danger also points to the rise of unilateralism in the White House, at least for the time being, in place of trying to establish a social security bulwark against China.
On January 27, Trump , said , that “in the very near future” the US government would impose tariffs on foreign-produced semiconductors, explaining that the objective is to “return the production of these essential goods to the United States” . , He then specifically mentioned that chip-makers “left us and they went to Taiwan” . ,
Trump stated that he favors unusual device manufacturers setting up factories in the US.  , He pledged to accomplish this through tariffs, which he said might be “25, 50, or 100 %” . , As a basis for comparison, in recent years the average US tariff rate has been around 2 %.
This is a depressing development for Taiwan, which has already experienced the injustice of Trump saying on different situations that Taiwan” stole” America’s semiconductor fabrication industry.
In response to Washington’s need to reposition global supply chains away from China, Taiwan’s top chip manufacturer, TSMC, agreed during the first Trump Administration to set up semiconductor factory infrastructure in Arizona.
This is in spite of the fact that China may be more vulnerable to attack from China through offshoring of chip production, but because Beijing’s financial dependence on Taiwan-made chips dissuades Beijing from starting a conflict that may disrupt the chip supply.
The first of those Arizona factories is currently operational, with the first building slated to open in 2028. It appears that TSMC was compensated for moving significantly in the direction of Trump’s original requirement when there was a potential new US market risk of up to 100 % price.
Trump wouldn’t be able to fulfill one of his main campaign promises, which is lowering the cost of living for American, by imposing tariffs on Taiwan-made chips.
Usually, it takes five to eight years to build a semiconductor stock. Even if device manufacturers quickly decided to set up shop in the US after Trump’s announcement, they wouldn’t begin producing chips until Trump was in office.  , In the meantime, the charges Americans pay for consumer devices had likely , increase rapidly.
According to a 2023 , research, British firms import 44 percentage of their reasoning chips and 24 percent of their memory cards from Taiwan.
Trump’s abuse of Taiwan is a concern for the Lai Ching-te state.  , Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) puts relatively heavy emphasis on the US as Taiwan’s security guarantor.
The opposition Kuomintang ( KMT ), on the other hand, questions US dependability, echoing a similar , theme , found in PRC propaganda.  , A KMT-affiliated consider tank , said , in January, for instance, that Taiwan could certainly depend on military aid from the Trump Administration and may seek to improve relations with China.
The political divide is reflected in the 2024 model of a , survey , administrated by Taiwan’s Academia Sinica and Soochow University.  , Among survey respondents who identified as DPP citizens, 71 % said they consider the US reliable.  , But only 16 % of KMT voters held that view. Trump might influence Taiwan’s votes to prefer policies that are more in line with Beijing’s demands.
The new tariff risk relates to Taiwan-made semiconductors in a wider sense of US foreign policy. The following Trump Administration makes hints about two potential US grand methods as it takes office.
Blunt unliateralism
The first is a direct unilateralism in which America unapologetically looks out for number one and only engages in global cooperation, including alliances, if it is quickly and clearly successful.
This is Trump’s favored method. When it comes to taxes, one of the international policy instruments most extolled by Trump and counselors for as , Robert Lighthizer , and , Peter Navarro, both friends and foes get much the same care. Trump has threatened tariffs on China, Mexico, and his country’s alliance, Denmark, as well as its cool foes.
China-focused social safety
US-led social safety with a focus on battling China might be the second great strategy for the US.
In this perspective, US security and prosperity are bolstered by both the US’s ability to control the world and implicitly. It seeks to use alliances and security alliances as pressure ratios that can help the US influence world politics to its advantage. Friends and allies who will support America’s international agenda have a lot of value because China and its allies, the Authoritarian Bloc, and other Authoritarian Bloc members, are critical to the country’s agenda.
This viewpoint is best represented by Marco Rubio, the novel secretary of state. Rubio believes that good alliances advance the US nationwide interest despite repeating the new celebration belief that US allies may improve their defense spending to prevent them from overpaying for US protection.  , In his assurance reading, Rubio affirmed the effectiveness of relationships.  , He , met with , his Quad ( US, Japan, India and Australia ) counterparts during his first full day on the job.
Cost-benefit
These two methods differ on whether or not America’s security alliances with other countries produce a profit – in Rubio’s thoughts, making America” safer” – that justifies the prices the US pays to keep these alliances.  , For Trump, the answer is no, while Rubio would probably answer well.
Taiwan is a front-line position with both political and strategic significance. Even though Taiwan enjoys a trade deficit with the US and controls some of the business share in some sectors that US businesses adore, its continued ability to resist spontaneous and violent invasion by the PRC is advantageous to the US.
Taiwan’s angry neighbor across the Taiwan Strait even seriously overpowers its economically and physically.  , Taiwan pays for the arms the US provides, and the US pays Taiwan no charges for military foundations.  , Taiwan is a net contribution to the US-sponsored democratic local order.
For these reasons, it is unsatisfactory that Trump sees Taiwan as a destination for a US mattress.  , As in other Trump claims about Taiwan, unilateralism has prevailed over social stability.  , The idea of just imposing a large US tariff on semiconductor imports has a cursory logic, but the functional impact may be diplomatically, economically and carefully destructive.  , Maybe Rubio did persuade Trump never to follow through.
Denny Roy is a senior colleague at the East-West Center, Honolulu.