As tensions rise over a possible Taiwan war, the US only demonstrated its ability to shoot down nuclear missiles from Guam. This sends a strong message to China.
The US Missile Defense Agency ( MDA ) conducted its first live intercept of a ballistic missile from Guam on Tuesday ( December 10 ), according to The War Zone, marking a significant milestone in the development of the Aegis Guam System.
The War Zone mentions that the test, known as Flight Experiment Mission-02 ( FEM-02 ), successfully saw a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA intercept a mock medium-range ballistic missile over 200 nautical miles northeast of the island. It notes that the test is an important step in ensuring Guam, a geopolitical island in the Indo-Pacific region, receives 360-degree protection.
According to the report, Aegis Guam’s method, which has a leaning Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), offers more freedom for missile launch points than another Aegis Ashore systems. It makes note of the AN/TPY-6 sensor, which demonstrates the Guam’s incorporated air and missile defence capabilities.
The program is a part of a wider effort to strengthen Guam’s threats against potential risks from China, which has been swiftly expanding its nuclear weapon army. In the event of a discord, it makes note of the MDA’s continuous expansion of the Guam Defense System, which aims to establish a strong, multi-layered defense network involving regional allies and members of the US military.
Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD), Typhon, and Patriot systems are integrated into Guam’s wider Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense ( EIAMD) system for 360-degree protection, according to Asia Times.
Guam will also make use of the Integrated Battle Command System ( IBCS) to unite various radar and missile assets into a single network, addressing flaws in US missile defense kill chains.
Yet, significant barriers remain. The complexity of integrating various systems and the limited land area of Guam cause risks of clumsy responses when combined with nuclear, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, while the country’s limited land space and hilly terrain complicate the development of infrastructure.
Additionally, over-reliance on set sensor-to-shooter links does limit adaptability against next-generation risks. China’s possible use of multi-domain attacks—combining cyber, electrical, and dynamic strikes—threatens the dignity of US destroy chains.
Apart from these challenges, a finite number of interceptors per system ( Aegis, THAAD and Patriot ) means that if a large-scale, multi-axis attack occurs, the inventory of available interceptors could be depleted quickly.
In line with that, Megan Eckstein mentions in a February 2024 Defense News content that the US Navy faces significant challenges as a result of supply chain bottlenecks and antiquated manufacturing capabilities.
Eckstein claims that despite dramatically increasing weapons costs, the US Navy struggles with insufficient stockpiles of crucial weapons, including the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM), MK 48 torpedoes and Standard Missile varieties.
She mentions that vital suppliers of elements like jet motors and electronics are unable to meet the growing demand while big defense contractors have expanded their facilities and modified processes. She notes that while the US Navy’s FY24 funds includes US$ 380 million to address these obstacles, business professionals warn that it will take time to discover changes.
Eckstein points out that efforts to increase productivity are further hampered by the US Navy’s reliance on a select few eligible rocket engine manufacturers.
Further, Mackenzie Eaglen mentions in a July 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI ) that the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) decision to terminate SM-3 Block IB production in favor of the newer SM-3 Block IIA has not been matched with adequate increases in the latter’s procurement, leading to a shortfall in interceptor stockpiles.
Eaglen notes the FY 2025 defence budget reduces planned purchasing of SM-3 Block IB from 153 to zero over the next five years, saving US$ 1.9 billion but no reinvesting these benefits into SM-3 Block IIA output, which remains stagnated at 12 weapons annually.
He points out that despite a projected increase in SM-6 purchasing, total missile production is still insufficient to meet the US Navy’s requirements.
Eaglen says that efforts to increase output are further hampered by the persistent preference for smaller purchasing quantities and the reliance on a small number of skilled rocket motor manufacturers.
To address those challenges, the US Navy released an industry Request for Information ( RFI ) in July 2024 to assess the production capabilities for SM-6 rocket motors, specifically the MK72 booster and MK104 dual thrust rocket motor, to enhance fleet defense.
In its July 2024 RFI, the US Navy seeks details on these creation efforts ‘ value and professional preparation, aiming for merger in the FY26-FY27 timeframe or faster.
Additionally, the supplies of missiles, energy and extra parts for interceptors, sensor systems and communications technology is logistically difficult. Guam may experience resupply delays as a result of a protracted conflict due to the disruption of seafaring supply lines.
China has been constantly expanding its appearance in the South Pacific in an effort to do so. Some experts suggest that threatens to minimize entry between Guam, Australia, New Zealand and the US.
In Asia Times, Grant Newsham mentions how China is encroaching on the South Pacific through a comprehensive plan of social, economic, and military invasion.
According to Newsham, China is using political conflict to undermine US presence while the US is focused on reestablishing airfields and dispersing forces under the Agile Combat Employment (ACE ) strategy.
He mentions that China is funding Kiribati aircraft repairs and has built dual-use infrastructure, including games and ships, in US states like the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
He says that in the Federated States of Micronesia, China is constructing airports that mirror US work, while China aims to influence Palau’s political authority in its pursuit through purchases.
Newsham points out that Huawei’s buildings and harbor restoration in the Solomon Islands support the latter’s China-friendly program. He claims that an East Timor airport constructed with US cash might ultimately be a “gift” for China.
Newsham says China’s approach to these South Pacific says includes corruption, political offers and misinformation, usually outmatching US attempts.