When Donald Trump secured his returning to the White House – not only in the state-by-state Electoral College matter but also, if just, in the common ballot count – America’s East Asian allies were rattled not only by the results itself but by the signified seismic shifts forward. Having experienced the storm of Trump’s first career, Japan and South Korea knew all too well the shifts his second term may bring.
Their fears are clearly placed. The president-elect’s previous and current remarks glimpse at a more honest and uncertain method to the area than he took in his first term.
In an October meeting, Trump described South Korea as a “money system, ” asserting, “We saved them during the Korean War and protected them for years, but we got everything in return. ” Trump was alluding to the fact that Seoul may bear a considerably larger percentage of its own security problem. In May, Time magazine reported that Trump suggested the US may withdraw its troops from South Korea if the land may refuse to provide more support for those soldiers ’ goal.
South Korea is not alone. During his first name, Trump usually accused Japan of free-riding on American security guarantees, insisting that Tokyo pay more for the US bases in Japan that number some 54,000 US army. In an interview in 2019, Trump grumbled over the lack of cooperation in the diplomatic relationship, saying, “If Japan is attacked, we may struggle World War II I…. But if we are attacked, Japan does n’t have to aid us at all. ” It’s even been reported that Trump at one place mused over pulling out of the post-war security treaty with Japan.
Beyond the security realm, Trump has openly proposed slapping tariffs of between 10 % and 20 % on most imports ( even from close East Asian allies ) and 60 % on goods imported from China. The president-elect has also strongly criticized the Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act, raising the possibility of delaying these plans on which export-driven firms in East Asia have come to depend since their passing in 2022.
While President Biden and the leaders of Japan and South Korea have taken steps to “Trump-proof” existing security and economic frameworks, policymakers understand well that many of these measures could easily be altered or even reversed at Trump’s discretion.
Amid such uncertain prospects, American allies in the Far East must recognize that while Trump may leave after a four-year tenure, MAGA ideology is here to stay. Trump’s historic return to the Oval Office, along with Republican control of both houses of Congress, is a mandate bestowed by the American voters. It’s a mandate for fundamental change, as many Americans are fed up with Washington itself and are seeking an exit from the traditional political landscape.
To that end, if Trump delivers on his rhetoric, he will usher the nation into an era of “strategic engagement. ” The US would operate strictly in line with core MAGA principles, scrutinizing every decision — be it domestic or international — through the lens of its potential to further America’s national interests. Indeed, Trump’s series of unconventional cabinet picks reflects his resolve to finish what he failed to in his first term.
Early signs of this shift are already becoming evident to U. S. partners in East Asia. In a rather surprising move, Trump declined requests for pre-inauguration meetings from South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, opting instead to meet Argentinian President Javier Milei. The decision likely signals a realignment in US diplomatic priorities. Japan and South Korea – long considered bulwarks to America’s Asia-Pacific strategy – may now occupy diminished roles in Washington ’s broader agenda.
The question is how the two East Asian democratic states, now confronting new realities, should navigate the MAGA world order to their advantage. The answer is that officials in Seoul and Tokyo must reassess and recalibrate their strategies toward Washington and the region.
First, values-driven diplomacy, the staple of the rules-based international order, is unlikely to resonate with the new president. While the Biden administration helped elevate the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship to the status of a quasi-alliance and fostered close coordination with its partners on pressing issues, this kind of broad, working-level ideological consistency may soon be a thing of the past.
On the other side of the Eurasian landmass, Trump has threatened to leave NATO if the alliance members don’t pay their fair share for Europe’s defense. Similar upheavals can be expected in East Asia. Besides pushing for greater burden-sharing, Trump could, for instance, insist that Seoul and Tokyo cover the cost of trilateral military drills or else risk discontinuing the exercise altogether. He may also seek to downgrade the Quad partnership or withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
But love him or hate him, Trump is, at his core, a dealmaker — one who rarely sees the world as a zero-sum game. When a deal is on the table and America stands to gain, Trump is unlikely to walk away. For Japan and South Korea, this means negotiators must approach him not as traditional diplomats but as savvy businessmen. They must not only highlight the values underpinning their policies but also frame them as clear contributions to advancing Trump’s MAGA agenda.
Second, Trump’s return offers Japan and South Korea an opportunity to further overhaul and expand their military capabilities. The lessons from NATO’s struggles in times of crisis — marked by ill-preparedness and over-reliance on US military support — should serve as a cautionary tale. More resilient and self-sufficient armed forces are demanded to manage an increasingly unstable regional environment. A good starting point would be to increase military budgets and continue revitalizing defense industries.
Along these lines, the reviving discussions among South Korean politicians over potentially acquiring nuclear weapons or developing nuclear latency are both timely and necessary. Similarly, in Japan, the newly elected prime minister has floated the idea of an Asian version of NATO and potentially revisiting the country ’s long-standing three non-nuclear principles. Of course, this is not to suggest that these ideas are entirely realistic or that the American military presence will no longer be welcomed. However, discussions about Japan and South Korea charting a path forward free from external constraints as sovereign states are long overdue.
Finally, Japan and South Korea should leverage Trump’s unorthodox diplomatic style as a template for rekindling ties with Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. While both East Asian democracies should continue to champion and defend liberal democracy when possible, the threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon. Moreover, the geopolitical disposition makes it impossible for the two countries to fully decouple or detach from what Washington dubs the “new axis of evil. ”
With the war in Ukraine edging closer to becoming a proxy conflict between the two Koreas, South Korea has ample reasons to reopen serious dialogues with the so-called Axis countries. As for Japan, the government there has yet to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea and Russia, with the latter of which Japan remains embroiled in a territorial dispute. Reaching out to unpalatable neighbors would also be an opportunity for Japan and South Korea to restore diplomacy on the North Korean abduction issue, which has stalled for far too long due in part to over-dependence on Washington.
Whether Japan and South Korea share political rapport or common values with these or other nations is irrelevant. What matters is finding a modus vivendi in a rapidly changing, geopolitically flattening world. Besides, if Trump, who seems to have an affinity for strongmen, seeks to engage in one-on-one dialogues with the authoritarians of East Asia, Japan and South Korea could find themselves caught off guard. By then, it may be too late to initiate a meaningful exchange.
America’s confidantes in East Asia will be in for a bumpy ride for sure. But as long as they adapt and navigate wisely, the turbulence of MAGA could be turned into tailwinds of opportunity.
Kenji Yoshida is a translator and a Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward.
Jason Morgan is a historian and an associate professor at Reitaku University.