Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has had a cyclone year. He was seated with President Joe Biden in the White House on November 9 while he was negotiating with Taiwanese leader Xi Jinping. Subianto contacted Donald Trump to thank him on his success in the US election while he was at it.
Subianto’s two-week international trip includes visits to Peru, Brazil, the UK, and a number of Middle Eastern nations as well as the trips to the United States and China.
The itinerary suggests the president of Southeast Asia’s largest economy’s new administration’s political priorities, which are balancing Indonesia’s relations with key West and global South allies, and pursuing a more forceful leadership position in Southeast Asia.
The position Indonesia tries to play in ensuring local stability and security in the Indo-Pacific is highlighted by Subianto’s back-to-back discussions with Xi and Biden.
A US-Indian aquatic workout is currently being conducted off the Indonesian area of Batam at the time of the sessions. Similar maneuvers between US and Southeast Asian companions have tended to be framed as a deterrent to China’s aggressiveness in the disputed waters of the South China Sea in the next quarterly military workout of its kind.
Subianto and Xi were making nice-nature promises to increase coastal cooperation between the two nations while the US and Indonesian troops carried out maneuvers. The big question is now how Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific safety balance will be affected by a Trump White House.
Trump’s Indo-Pacific plan
Trump’s first term as president provides some insight into how his Indo-Pacific scheme might change in the future. The , 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report , issued by the Trump presidency marked China as a “revisionist” power—that is, one that is dissatisfied with the latest status quo—and an aspiring local superpower.
To counter this, Trump adopted an “offshore balancing” plan – in consequence utilizing local friends to stay China in check. Security agreements with conventional allies and joint military training exercises with nations like Indonesia and the Philippines were used as part of this strategy.
Additionally, it included providing military technology to regional partners and sporadically-performed “freedom of navigation” businesses by the US Navy.
But there was another side to Trump’s Indo-Pacific plan.
Trump was open to escalation with China in the South China Sea in exchange for Beijing’s assistance in battling North Korea, one of the region’s biggest threats to stability, despite the US’s lack of direct security interests there ( no US territories are threatened ), but worried about a military conflict if Beijing agreed to cooperate in addressing one of the region’s biggest security threats, including North Korea.
Under Trump’s second management, Indonesia received a challenge and possibility by easing the pressure on Beijing in the South China Sea and providing local security to Washington’s Indo-Pacific friends.
In order to fulfill its crucial political responsibilities to preserve regional security, Indonesia was required to lead the dialogue of the South China Sea code of conduct as Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous country.
Subianto tilts toward China
Indonesia has much shown a willingness to take on the safety of the region. Subsequent leaders have taken the responsibility seriously, especially given the country’s constitutional authority to do an “independent and lively” foreign plan.
In order to improve their standing as an independent professional, Indonesian leaders have generally avoided getting too close to the US or China.
However, Indonesia’s foreign policy has begun to change significantly since Subianto became chairman of Indonesia in October 2024.
Weeks after his opening, Subianto sent his new foreign secretary to Kazan, Russia, to attend the meeting of BRICS countries and show Indonesia’s desire to join the expanding alliance of non-Western markets.
China is the group’s largest representative, and it aims to be an alternative to European security and economic structures. This conventional expression of intention to meet BRICS marks a change from coverage under Subianto’s forerunner, Joko Widodo.
Additionally, a joint declaration made during Subianto’s attend to Beijing suggests that Indonesia is beginning to consider South China Sea maritime claims made by Beijing.
For years, Indonesia refused to acknowledge Beijing’s says on rocks and reefs within Indonesia’s special economic zone in the waters around Natuna – an Indian island that connects with China’s “nine-dash line” denoting the region Beijing sees as Chinese.
However, the joint statement from Subianto’s visit to Beijing stated that the two nations had reached” an essential typical understanding on mutual growth in areas of intersecting says” that was in line with “respective prevalent laws and regulations.”
Speak of “overlapping says” is a departure for Indonesia and suggests that Subianto is more open to embracing Beijing’s restrictions in the South China Sea.
OECD or BRICS? Or both?
This does n’t mean Indonesia is restricting its options for greater cooperation with the West either. During the White House leg of Subianto’s visit, Biden signaled the US’s strong support for Indonesia’s push to join the Western-dominated Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ).
With the business establishing international standards and supporting Indonesia, the organization may act as a benchmarking body for Indonesia to help it get higher-quality foreign investment.
BRICS account, however, would reflect more of a political and economic shift that would position Indonesia alongside other states seeking an alternative to the U. S. dominated international organizations.
If Trump’s plan to impose high tariffs on foreign goods is implemented, Indonesia’s interest may only grow.
Providing cover for Subianto
In response to a Trump White House, Indonesia certainly seems to have the potential to adopt a more pro-Beijing stance under Subianto.
Trump’s immediate attention is likely to be heavily influenced by conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, pushing security concerns in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region in particular further down the list.
The Chinese government continues to maintain its policy of limiting South China Sea trade and exerting economic influence on all of Southeast Asia’s countries.
Some observers are already questioning whether Indonesia’s change in the South China Sea’s disputed territory is related to China’s economic cooperation, which includes the US$ 10 billion in deals signed during Subianto’s visit to Beijing.
And a more secretive, anti-interventionist White House under Trump might give Subian the opportunity to aide Indonesia in advancing its position as a regional leader while strengthening its economic and strategic ties to China and the Global South.
Idil Syawfi is an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Katolik Parahyangan, and Angguntari Ceria Sari is a lecturer there.
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