The” China Dream”, President Xi Jinping’s perspective to restore China’s great power status, was the main topic of Xi’s 75th National Day statement.
Many , important individuals , and , policymakers , in Washington agree as a matter of fact that the one of the China Dream’s aims is to remove the US-led global order and so Washington’s international leadership and power.
As exemplified by the lack of problem for international politics in Xi’s subsequent remarks, they’re wrong. Beijing is willing and—more importantly—unable to change America on the international level. To prioritize British interests, US policy must adjust to this fact.
Xi ‘s , 2017 talk to the 19th National Party Congress , is , often , cited , as proof of Beijing’s intention to reject America’s role in the world. In that speech, Xi envisions China as” a global leader” having “mov]ed ] closer to the center stage”.
If Washington is to get Xi at his term, as , some are wont , to recommend, therefore China simply seeks a greater say in the world buy commensurate with its rise in power – no world domination.
When assessing Xi’s remarks at the 20th National Party Congress in 2022, he had even less to say about global leadership – only that China should aim to have the , most” comprehensive national strength” and “international influence”  , by mid-century.
Although it is a stronger speech than it was in 2017, it is based on incredibly personal factors. The Chinese concept of” Comprehensive National Power,” which seeks to assess power through both qualitative and quantitative factors, is the foundation of comprehensive national power.
Various sources produce different output. With China ‘s , low efficiency,  , making socioeconomic crisis and , limited natural resources, it is difficult to see how Beijing claims the best energy place by 2050.
Equally, given the , decline in China’s favorability , in the United States, Europe and US-allied Asian countries and , growth of” tough on China” policies, China has a long road ahead to reverse its influence fortunes.
Even if one were to read the worst into Xi’s and other Chinese Communist Party leaders ‘ speeches, Beijing’s three major foreign policy visions – the , Global Development,  , Global Security,  , and Global Civilization Initiatives , – do n’t call for an overthrow of” American leadership” or the international order.
At worst, they all point to a multipolar order in which China is the most admired great power in East Asia.
Outside of China’s words and ideas, the People’s Republic’s actions show that it is not willing or capable of displacing the United States ‘ global role.
While Beijing has established and expanded various international institutions, such as , BRICS , and the , Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, these have been opened to new members who will likely dilute China’s influence.
By virtue of their more limited scopes, Chinese-created institutions cannot replace the UN system, which even Beijing , acknowledges is the premier representative of international order.
Militarily, China cannot project power globally. It has only , one formal military alliance , with its neighbor North Korea compared to the United States’ , 51 treaty allies , across the Americas, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, thereby limiting the scope of its military activities.
So far, China has n’t sought additional treaty alliances – including its “better than an alliance” with Russia, which has not seen Chinese troops join Russia’s in Ukraine.
Beijing also lacks the world’s largest base system, which is essential for power projection. While US intelligence asserts China is working to establish bases in eight other countries outside of existing arrangements in , Djibouti , and , Cambodia, this would be a far cry from Washington ‘s , over 750 military bases , in 80 countries.
If successful, Beijing’s facilities would be limited to countries along its global trade routes.
China does seek global economic and cultural influence, but this is likely to fail, in contrast to the world’s military power. De-risking, reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring are the , commerce terms of the day , with countries and companies seeking alternative sources to China.
Beijing is unlikely to buck these global trends as it seeks to , produce more at home , while its , economic coercion fails abroad. Similarly, Chinese cultural exports have not taken off and improved views of China, a striking contrast with its neighbor , South Korea.
Due to China’s more traditional culture, difficult language, and censorship concerns, American levels of global cultural status appear out of reach.
Finally, China probably feels that the cost of removing the United States as the only global leader is too high. Historically, overextension has led to the , fall of states. From a contemporary standpoint, the , multitrillion-dollar price tag , of US-style global leadership is astronomical.
Beijing must acknowledge that East Asian and domestic resources could be better utilized.
Washington would make sense of Beijing’s understanding that it does not and cannot not attempt to replace America as a global superpower. Policymakers should prioritize the real American interests rather than wasting resources on preventing something that China does n’t want.
This means maintaining dominance of the Western Hemisphere, bolstering economic security, deterring threats to the homeland and adhering to Constitutional principles. Only then can the US’s position of power and security be increased.
 , Quinn Marschik is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.