By their own entrance, the Ukrainians urgently need air mechanisms. The majority of the high-end devices that were previously delivered from the US and Europe were either destroyed or out of interceptor missiles.
NATO is looking for parts and replacement rockets for the Patriot air defense system. Germany, along with others in Europe, says there are  , no available fighter missiles , for the Patriot networks in Ukraine. However,  , Norway has promised more NASAMS, but they need to be built.  , Europe has handed over its inventory of , IRIS- T , weapons and , fresh ones does n’t get available , at least until 2025
The US has just announced that it will sell Eagle air defense systems in an emergency for$ 38 million to keep and fix them, which was recently provided to Ukraine.
There is little possibility that Ukraine will actually pay for the deal because of an urgent sale taking place on a credit card. It’s possible that the enormous$ 60 billion Ukraine aid program, which is pending approval by the House of Representatives, will eventually cover its costs.
Improved HAWK Phase III is available in Ukraine. The US contacted Taiwan and Israel for I- HAWK ( stands for increased HAWK).  , Taiwan , decided to scrap , its HAWKS.  , Israel said its HAWKS were in , really poor maintenance and not operating.  , Spain second provided its HAWK Phase III method to Ukraine and , eventually agreed to offer six more techniques.
Reading between the lines, it seems as though either the Spanish-originating HAWKS sent to Ukraine have been damaged or destroyed, or the majority of them have been discovered to be no more functional.  , Then the State Department would not be urging an “emergency” sales of inspection, parts and weapons to Ukraine. ( Keep in mind that “used” parts will be billed at bargain basement pricing. )
A semi-mobile air defense system called the HAWK times up to the 1950s. Utilizing vacuum tubes and analogue computers, the original HAWK. Modernized HAWKS have largely updated scanners and modern computers.  ,  ,
HAWK requires three radars: a security sensor to identify coming threats, an lighting radar to halt a particular danger, and an onboard semi-active radar to guide a missile to its target.  , Each fighter has a huge polarization weapon.
The US retired its next I- HAWK, used by the Marines, in 2003. Taiwan recently decommissioned its HAWK Phase III system, replacing it with an indigenous air defense system called Sky Bow III ( Tien Kung ).  , Israel is replacing HAWK with David’s Strap.
According to the State Department, Ukraine’s HAWK methods require renovation and repair. The department also mentions that either innovative parts and replacement missiles will need to be produced or parts and replacement parts will be purchased from outdated stocks in the US and worldwide.
Many of the silicon components in Eagle date back to the 1980s, which means that the majority of the components are medium-scale integrated circuits that are largely out of manufacturing.  , There is little prospect any factory had been willing to make handfuls of these parts, so the computers, advice components, fire control system, radars and onboard electronics could be hazardous to the process of restoring these older systems to service.  , It may be that some parts may be scavenged from non- functioning techniques.
In a battle, the US always actually fired an I-HAWK or HAWK system.  , But, crucial allies and friends have used them.  , Even Iran, which has HAWK ( sent there during the time of the Shah ) and has built its own version, has used them. Kuwait even used them against Iraq, but Iraq either seized Kuwait’s systems or destroyed them.  , Israel even has used HAWK in battle.
It’s unclear how effective HAWK is against contemporary challenges. The Pentagon claims that the HAWK is required to combat drone-related low-flying challenges. While HAWK’s radars were improved to make them less susceptible to surface noise that is unclear a small flying aircraft ‘s , sensor signature, no one can say whether the system can accurately detect and record “plastic” drones.  ,  ,
Beyond the problem of dealing with distinct threats, HAWK’s capability against swarms of drones, or mingled threats that include drones, cruise missiles, fly bombs and ultra- strong missile threats is never clear.
HAWK’s kill ability against aircraft is generally thought to be higher than 85 % if fired in tandem ( two missiles per target ).  , However, how HAWK would perform against tactical ballistic missiles or drones is unclear.
Modernized HAWK missiles have a range of between 28 and 31 miles, making this a “medium range” system. Russian guided glide bombs ( UMPK) have a range of about 25 miles ( 40 kilometers ), so they can launch them in multiples against HAWK batteries with a chance of success. HAWK is unlikely to survive if Russia uses a hypersonic missile.
The majority of Ukrainians are concerned about protecting important cities, particularly Kiev.  , If Russian aerial attacks on other cities are any guide ( Odessa, Kharkiv), there are no effective air defenses at those locations. The Ukrainians used Patriots in their counter-offensive last summer, but according to reports, at least one of the Patriots was killed, if not two.  , More recently, at least one Patriot system , was knocked out around Kiev.
Air defenses are required to guard crucial infrastructure and prevent air attacks on the battlefield. Even if the HAWK system in Ukraine is being renovated in the upcoming months, it wo n’t suffice to protect important installations and fortified fortifications on the battlefield.  ,  ,
Bottom line: Ukraine no longer has effective air defenses that can stop Russian aircraft from flying on or near the battlefield or protect critical infrastructure.  , Ukraine will be getting old, used , F- 16s by July, but whether these can really make a difference or evade Russian air defense systems is open to doubt.  , Without effective air defenses, Russia dominates Ukraine’s airspace.
Stephen Bryen served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.  ,
This article , was first published on his , Weapons and Strategy , Substack and is republished with permission.