Vladimir Putin, the former head of Russia, has two things in common.
Second, he will become reelected as president in the rigged election scheduled to run from March 15 to 17, 2024, by a spectacular – if false – ratio.
Next, he is not everlasting. He did pass away in one day, and he is more likely to do so while serving in business than by accepting his resignation. The world might want to take into account the power struggle that will start the day after Putin leaves, though we do n’t know when that day will come.
Putin has been perfecting the electoral fraud process to guarantee success possibly since he took office as president in 2000. Voting purchase, vote miscounting, supply of pre- filled ballots, tampering with ballot boxes, voter monitoring and intimidation, and ballot stuffing are all methods that Putin’s agents employ to ensure a positive result.
Additionally, he has imprisoned political opponents, exiled people, and denied but another person the right to challenge him in good elections. In the most severe cases, he has been involved in the deaths of opposition characters like Boris Nemtsov and, most recently, Alexei Navalny’s death in jail. There will be no upsets in this vote: Putin’s triumph may reaffirm his iron grip on Russia’s elections.
As a professor of Russian politicians and international policy who has followed Putin’s plan for the past 25 years, I have witnessed him create a dictatorship in Russia that rivals the oppressive Soviet Union in terms of both its cruelty and problem.
But, unfortunately, Putin is a slave of the social structure he has built around himself for the past 24 times. He was unable to leave the throne and enjoy a peaceful retirement, like some dictators, even if he had wanted to. He is also reliant on and attached to the incredible wealth and power he has accumulated while serving as a public servant.
Protection against challenges
There would be no guarantee of safety in retirement, even if Putin were to retain his houses and boats.
Putin’s leader may come after him if he relinquished power. Putin would always be a danger to his son as long as he was dead, a attractive target for the next ruler, and Putin knows it. His specific authority, charisma, and influence.
Another reason most dictators forbid their successors is that it could spark a contentious power battle even before the dictator retires or passes away. Imagine if Putin chose a successor. Those who were not chosen for the position would soon become the targets of the unsuccessful candidates.
There are harsh conflicts yet among Putin’s internal circle of friends. The Wagner rebel Yevgeny Prigozhin rebellion against the Ministry of Defense in 2023 shows how dangerous these tournaments can turn into. Typically, Putin can keep those struggles in test. Prigozhin was killed in an August 2023 helicopter crash whose true reason may never be known, but Putin’s side is frequently suspected.
A large network of dishonest cronies may stand to lose their power, money, and perhaps even freedom if a rival succeeded in capturing control of the world. Behind each of the powerful insiders who back Putin and his oligarchs is a complex network of dishonest cronies. Why did Putin’s resignation by naming his son risk a terrible power struggle any time it occurred?
Power over some
No house revolt is likely to bring down Putin. His power over Russia’s security service has allowed him to love rivals and manage the media, courts, local leaders, congress and neighborhood groups. He has also closely monitored threats from potential opposition figures inside and outside his regime, and he has” coup-proofed” it, as one academic has put it.
His propensity for anti-West Russian patriotism has benefited him from the fidelity of the military and the populace, at least for the moment.
Putin also uses his authority to control his elites ‘ interests in Russia’s money from natural resources. He decides which oligarchs are appointed to lead Russia’s main state- owned fuel, gas, mineral and professional producers.
These elites have the right to plunder the money that their businesses make as long as they remain faithful to Putin and assist his political and economic will.
The oligarchs ‘ wealth and independence are contingent on maintaining Putin’s great gifts. Cross him and they could lose all. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a imprisoned magnate, learned of this in 2003 when he was imprisoned and the state seized control of his Yukos oil company.
There’s another purpose none of the oligarchs mix Putin: For decades he has amassed a mine of affecting materials or “kompromat” with which to slander perhaps his closest advisers, just in case any of them did step out of line despite their dependence on his money.
In short, the entire Russian elite have nothing to gain and everything to lose by defecting from Putin’s coalition.
After death
If Putin ca n’t retire and probably wo n’t be deposed, what happens when he finally does die in office? When the president can or will not be in office, the prime minister automatically assumes the role of acting president, with limited authority under the Russian Constitution. Remember, that was Putin’s first step toward becoming president in 2000 when Boris Yeltsin resigned.
This time around, the transition would look much different. Mikhail Mishustin, a rather bland and uncharismatic former tax official without a strong power base of his own, is Russia’s current prime minister. Should he succeed Putin as acting president, it’s unlikely that he would become the permanent replacement.
Under the constitution, new presidential elections must be held within three months of the president’s death or incapacitation. However, the real struggle for power will occur behind the scenes rather than at the polls.
Before the election, the potentially violent power conflict might be resolved, but three months is not long enough for a successor to consolidate power and fill the void left by Putin. Additionally, it’s possible that a popular candidate will be permitted to win the election while the actual conflict between factions unfolds over the coming months and years.
Or, a loose coalition of leaders tries to rule allies while holding important positions of authority, such as the presidency, premiership, and security services. This kind of power-sharing arrangement has a historical precedent in Russia: coalitions proclaiming” collective leadership” were briefly in power after the deaths of Josef Stalin and Vladimir Lenin.
However, in each case, one coalition member was able to outmaneuver and get rid of their partners, firstly Stalin and then Khrushchev. These situations serve as reminders that autocratic succession is typically messy.
But the days, months and years after Putin’s departure may be even more turbulent than anyone expects. Never before has a single Russian leader’s level of personal authority been consolidated with the aid of such a flimsy transition of leadership.
Similar to the Romanovs, the last royal family to rule the nation, there is no monarchical succession. There are also no strong institutions in a single-party state to impose on rivals like in the Soviet era.
There is only Putin.
Robert Person is a West Point associate professor of international relations for the USMC. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policy of the US Army, Department of Defense, or any other government.
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