On October 30, 2023, rumors started to circulate that Israel was missing from the mapping services offered by Chinese tech firms Baidu and Alibaba, effectively indicating — or so some thought — that Beijing was supporting Hamas in the ongoing conflict.
Within days, Chinese officials started to refute that claim, pointing out that the names do look on official maps of the nation and that Hamas’ attack on October 7 had never altered the maps provided by China’s software companies.
In fact, the Chinese Foreign Ministry seized the chance to emphasize that China was no siding with either side in the conflict. Instead, Beijing asserted that it upheld the right of the Arab people under international humanitarian law as well as Israel’s right to self-defense.
Nobody should have been surprised by this claim of harmony and even-handedness. For more than ten years, it has served as the cornerstone of China’s strategic approach to the Middle East. During that time, Beijing has worked to present itself as a friend to everyone in the area and an army of none.
However, the chart incident highlights a challenge Beijing is currently facing due to the crisis. Beijing’s tactical approach to the Middle East is becoming more and more challenging to maintain as a result of the fragmentation that has taken hold over this issue, both within China and around the world.
The Israel-Hamas war, which has so far been centered on the idea of” balanced diplomacy ,” is, in my opinion, the toughest test yet for President Xi Jinping’s Middle East strategy, according to a scholar who teaches classes on China foreign policy.
Growing pro-Palestinian opinion in China and the nation’s historical sentiments in the area imply that if Xi is forced off the impartiality path, he will support the Palestinians over the Israelis.
Beijing, however, would prefer not to make that decision for smart economical and foreign policy considerations. Making this decision, in my opinion, would effectively put an end to China’s ten-year effort to establish itself as a powerful” helpful plumber” in the area— an outside force that aims to mediate peace agreements and establish an incredibly diverse regional economic and security order.
Beijing’s goals and tactics
Since around 2012, there hasn’t been any consensus in political lines that China was not the country that invested in the Middle East. Since then, China has made significant political efforts to increase its influence in the area.
The entire corporate vision of Beijing for the Middle East is one in which China’s influence is greatly increased while the US is drastically reduced.
On the one hand, this is merely a geographical expression of the world vision as outlined in numerous Chinese foreign policy initiatives, including the Community of Common Destiny, International Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative. All of these initiatives are intended, at least in part, to charm to nations in the Global South that feel extremely cut off from the US-led rules-based global order.
This perception is based on worries that China’s access to Middle Eastern oil and gas exports would be jeopardized if the United States maintained its control there.
That does not imply that Beijing wants to overthrow the United States as the region’s dominant force. Given the strength of the money and the US’s long-standing ties to some of its largest economy, that is impossible.
Instead, China’s stated strategy is to encourage regional multi-alignment, which entails encouraging unique nations to cooperate with China in areas like infrastructure and trade. By doing this, China and other players in the area become more friendly, and any incentives to join unique US-led blocs are also undermined.
Through what are referred to in Chinese government documents as” balanced diplomacy” and” positive balancing ,” Beijing aims to encourage multi-alignment.
Healthy diplomacy entails no siding with one side in a number of issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian one, and not creating any enemies. Good managing focuses on pursuing closer assistance with one regional power, such as Iran, in the hope that this will encourage other nations to do the same, like the Arab Gulf nations.
China’s victory in the Middle East
Beijing’s approach was starting to pay off before the Hamas assault on Israel on October 7.
China and Saudi Arabia formed a complete corporate alliance in 2016, and Iran and China agreed to work together for 25 years in 2020. Beijing has strengthened its economic relations with a number of other Gulf nations during that time, including Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman.
China has strengthened its economic relations with Egypt outside of the Gulf, to the point where it is now the biggest investment in the Suez Canal Area Development Project. Additionally, it has made investments in restoration initiatives in Iraq and Syria.
China reached a deal earlier this year to re-establish diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which was both significant progress and established China as the region’s leading negotiator.
In fact, Beijing started to place itself as a possible mediator between Israel and the Palestinians after that victory.
Effects of the Israel-Has War
But, the Israel-Hamas conflict has complicated how China approaches the Middle East.
Beijing initially responded to the issue by maintaining a fair delicacy. China’s leaders did not condemn Hamas in the wake of the attack on October 7; instead, they urged both sides to” exercise restraint” and to accept a” two-state solution.”
This is in line with Beijing’s long-standing plan of” non-interfering” in internal affairs of other nations and its core strategic approach to the area.
However, the negative stance clashed with the United States’ and some European countries’ strategies, which pushed China to take a more assertive position.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s position that every nation has the right to self-defense in response to stress from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and people. He did, however, add a caveat, saying that Israel” if uphold international humanitarian law and safeguard civilians’ health.”
And that making reflects a change in Beijing’s tone, which has gradually shifted toward making claims that are critical of Israel and friendly to the Palestinians.
Due to its failure to urge Israel to end its battle on Gaza, China used its reject energy at the UN on October 25 to obstruct a US resolution that called for an emergency humanitarian pause.
Zhang Jun, the UN ambassador for China, stated that the choice was made in response to” powerful appeals of the entire world, in particular the Egyptian places.”
promoting the South of the world
Given Beijing’s financial problems and political ambitions, such a change is not surprising.
Compared to Israel, China is much more seriously reliant on commerce with the various nations it has forged economic ties with in the Middle East and North Africa.
Beijing has strong monetary incentives to support Israel if political pressures force China to choose between the Arab world and Israel.
However, China has yet another compelling reason to support the Palestinians. Beijing aspires to become regarded as the Global South’s savior. And by supporting Israel, you run the risk of alienating that growing segment.
The Palestinians’ struggle against Israel is viewed as akin to fighting invasion or resisting” segregation” in nations throughout Africa, Latin America, and above. Under that perspective, siding with Israel may put China on the colonial oppressor’s area.
The Belt and Road Initiative, China’s system development program, and its efforts to persuade more nations from the Global South to meet what is now the BRICS economic union run the risk of undermining the diplomatic and economic work China has done.
China’s officials may be considering its maps of the Middle East and pondering whether there is still room for fair geopolitics, even though they may not have changed them.
Professor of Political Science Andrew Latham teaches at Macalester College.
Under a Creative Commons license, this essay has been republished from The Conversation. Read the original publication.