Israel has engaged in three significant war with Hamas since withdrawing its troops from Gaza in 2005, in 2008, 2014, and 2021, excluding sporadic cross-border battles. Each involved brief floor intrusions, with Israeli soldiers spending about a month in Gaza.
In revenge for the Hamas cross-border attacks that killed about 1,400 Israelis on October 7, Israel has assembled a sizable power in the last few days to launch another ground war.
The entire armored corps, or more than 1, 000 tanks, of the Israel Defense Forces( IDF) have been recalled. Additionally, the force’s full-time personnel of approximately 170, 000 reservists may include about 360,000 of them.
Since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was intended to drive the Palestine Liberation Organization ( PLO ) from its base there, the operation is shaping up to be Israel’s largest. The Israelis were successful in achieving that.
But the growth of the Shia violent group Hezbollah was an unanticipated result of that warfare. Hezbollah has developed into a much more formidable foe for Israel thanks to Iran’s backing and guidance than the PLO had ever been.
It goes without saying that war have unintended effects. Additionally, it is unclear what Israel’s chances are in the present issue with Hamas.
The dangers of a surface war
The challenges of a surface rape in Gaza are obvious. Israel’s makes may find it incredibly challenging to engage in street-to-street combat in a small, densely populated area. Additionally, Hamas benefits from a vast hole system that is thought to be up to 500 km long, allowing its militants to launch attacks before dissipating.
Israel may use computers and robots to some extent to combat these difficulties. However, night vision systems won’t work in the complete darkness of tunnels because these products need dim ambient light to function.
Israel has also issued a warning to the roughly 1.1 million residents living in Gaza’s north quarter to relocate there. According to the UN, 1.4 million people have been displaced in Gaza so much as a result of the fight, with nearly 580, 000 taking refuge in UN homes.
How many people remain in the northwest is unknown. Israel has issued a warning that those who are still alive might be considered supporters of” a criminal business.”
There will unavoidably be horrifying human casualties. Although the IDF won’t always be at fault, Israel will be held accountable for the region’s definition stance and that of the international community as a whole.
The 200 victims that Hamas is thought to have taken during its foray into Israel present another obstacle. According to Hamas, it has dispersed them throughout Gaza. Some will almost certainly be in the northern combat zone.
According to Hamas, Israeli weapons have already killed 22 people. The Benjamin Netanyahu administration is being criticized by some of the hostages’ friends for no prioritizing the release of their loved ones enough.
a dozen favorable cases
It is unclear what Israel plans to do once it has taken control of Gaza’s north quarter. The UN reports that the humanitarian situation in the southern band is now” fatal.” There aren’t many good options for managing the country either.
1) As Israel did from 1967 to 2005, a military annexation of Gaza.
IDF personnel may be subject to murder and kidnapping as a result, which would add significantly to the military burden. Reoccupation would be a grave error, according to US President Joe Biden.
2) Remove Hamas’ top management, consider victory, and then depart.
Such a triumph would almost definitely been fleeting. Another low-level Hamas members would be proud to stand up and reassemble the group. Another organization, like the Arab Islamic Jihad, may step in. Israel wouldn’t be able to decide who or what might be that institution.
2 ) Request Gaza be taken over by the secular Fatah party, which currently controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.
That hardly makes sense. In 2007, Fatah lost a civil war to Hamas, and there is no reason why Palestinians in that country may accept the return of the Palestinian Authority. Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the authority, was also elected to a four-year word in 2005 and is still in that position. As a result, even in the West Bank, he lacks authenticity.
4 ) Non-aligned local officials are in charge of Gaza.
It’s a pipe vision, this. Even if such images were to be discovered, Gazans would almost definitely view them as working with the Israelis because it would be their responsibility to control the hardliners of the strip.
5. Gaza is run by a non-Palestinian Muslim power.
Once more, this is not possible. Prospective Muslim leaders of such a force, such as Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia, would not want to be perceived as policing Palestinians on Israel’s representative.
6) Gaza’s supervision by a non-Arab or UN pressure.
Given the significant challenges, it’s difficult to imagine any non-Arab nations adopting this concept. At a time when Russia and China hardly ever concur with the three continuous American people, the UN Security Council resolution would also need to be approved by Israel in order to maintain peace.
Israel also claims that Hezbollah has prevented the UN peacekeeping power in Lebanon from carrying out its mission and from putting an end to violent attacks. Israel may be unlikely to trust its protection to peacekeepers with much motivation to risk their lives for it after the Hamas attacks.
” Mowing the grass”
Israel has been convinced that the Gaza crisis can be stopped for far too much. This is no longer the case, though, as the population has increased significantly.
Its population is projected to reach three million by 2030, with a growth rate of just over 2 % annually.
Gaza is also very fresh, having a middle age of 19.6 as opposed to the 30.5-year-old global average. Palestinians in Gaza are four times more likely to live in poverty than those in the West Bank, and nearly half of the adult population is poor. Social tumult and militancy are on the horizon as a result of this.
The Israeli government describes its attack on Gaza as” mowing the grass,” acting to severely punish Hamas for its extreme actions and degrading its military functions, as two Israeli editors, Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, noted in a perceptive evaluation of Israel’s 2014 Gaza war.
The objective was to accomplish feasible and, as a result, constrained political and military objectives. It was a component of an overarching churn strategy that may temporarily deter people from moving along the border in order to establish quieter times.
The authors claimed that completely eliminating Hamas was not an” achievable defense purpose.”
Even if Hamas’ concept can be ended, there are still three options: chaos, Jewish rule, or the rule of more extreme groups.
Israel only needs to” mow the grass” occasionally to weaken the abilities of an unyielding, well-entrenched, non-state adversary like the Hamas.
This term is offensive from a charitable standpoint. Whether Netanyahu may try a different approach this time is the current problem. We’ll learn more in the upcoming month.
Research Scholar Ian Parmeter works at the Australian National University’s Center for Arab and Islamic Studies.
Under a Creative Commons license, this article is republished from The Conversation. Read the original publication.