The US has strategic interests in Taiwan, in part because of its geopolitical location in the center of the First Island Chain; in part because it is a bulwark against a potentially expansionist China, a country with multiple territorial claims over many islands in the region that belong to other countries such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam; in part because China has already illegally grabbed territory in the South China Sea; and in part because Taiwan is important economically.
How, then to defend the island and, better yet, deter any attack? My answer is that the best way to do this is to plant the American flag as firmly as we can on the island.
A straightforward way to do this is to encourage high-tech American companies to locate in Taiwan and partner with high-tech Taiwanese companies wherever possible. The idea is that China would have to pause before ramping up any attack that would directly threaten US assets in the country.
US companies flocked to China and only now realize that China has turned inhospitable to US industry. US industry is looking for other places to be, and Taiwan is an ideal choice. It has technological know-how that is vital to the future of the US economy and to US national security. It is extremely friendly and open to Americans. And we can benefit while helping Taiwan.
The US is not directly obliged by any treaty or law to support Taiwan if it is attacked.
Some claim that the Taiwan Relations Act supports the idea that the United States is obliged to support Taiwan if it is under attack, but that claim is only partly supported by the Act.
What the Act does say is that the United States will support Taiwan with armaments. By extension many suppose that obligation includes active defense by the United States, but the Act does not say that and it is up to US policy makers to decide how and when to act, if at all, in case of an attack by China.
Other countries, most notably Japan, have said that, if China attacks Taiwan, Japan will regard that as an attack on Japan. That ought to trigger a military response by Japan, but it is not so clear that it will, nor is there any clear idea of what form such a response might take if there is one.
Officially the United States has adhered to a policy of what Washington calls “strategic ambiguity.” As a policy, strategic ambiguity is an excuse for Washington to pretend it neither supports nor declines to support Taiwan.
China today is concerned that the US is really supporting, sub rosa, Taiwan independence, something the Chinese say violates the understandings it has with the United States. The Chinese point to arms sales by the US to Taiwan, and also to US freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea and Taiwan straits.
China also is concerned about the buildup of US airpower as far away as Guam, particularly the introduction of the F-22 stealth fighter and the B-2 stealth bomber.
Additionally, China sees the forthcoming Camp David Meeting with Korea, Japan and the United States as part of US attempts to constrain China and enhance regional defenses against it.
President Biden has said that, if China attacks Taiwan, the US will defend the island. But the White House walked back his remarks and claimed that nothing had changed in US policy.
Clearly the US, in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, will have to make a decision quickly – in fact, very quickly – whether to intervene. If the US does not act right away, then a belated entry won’t save Taiwan from Chinese attack and may not be adequate to save the island.
US support for Taiwan is based partly on maintaining regional security and partly on the political, economic and strategic importance of Taiwan itself.
Beyond the broader picture of the US wanting to protect against Chinese expansion and threats to allies such as Japan, there is the question of Taiwan’s strategic importance.
The jewel in Taiwan’s strategic crown is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company – called TSMC or Taiwan Semi. Today, Taiwan Semi is the key to the realization of new technology vital to American national security, particularly specialized artificial intelligence integrated circuits. These chips will power the US economy in the future, and will wind up in American weapons – both new and upgraded older platforms.
China understands its own chips vulnerability but has less prospect in the immediate future of breaking out and producing its own AI products. It is trying to do so, and throwing resources at the problem, but it faces significant engineering and manufacturing challenges and a US embargo on very high-end manufacturing equipment.
Taiwan Semi is building two foundries in Arizona, but these will depend completely on Taiwan Semi know how and long term support. It is also unlikely that the top Taiwan Semi technology will make it to the United States.
Understanding the importance of Taiwan Semi, it would make sense for the US to step up partnerships with the company in Taiwan, physically as close to Taiwan Semi as feasible.
Taiwan Semi is headquartered, and many of its manufacturing facilities concentrated, in Science Park Number 2 in northern Taiwan, known as Hsinchu Park #2.
The US needs urgently to invest in manufacturing in Taiwan and create a strategic economic and political presence.
It is one thing for China to think about invading Taiwan. It is another if a Chinese attack would be a direct attack on American assets. It would be a game changer for the US to up its manufacturing and scientific presence in Taiwan.
It is a truism that business follows the flag. If the US government encourages open American industrial investment in Taiwan, American companies will take action to invest in Taiwan and enhance partnerships with leading Taiwan companies.
This will make it clear that in the future if China wants US companies in China then it needs to back off from threats to Taiwan and understand that the US won’t any longer invest there unless China changes its course.
Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. This article was originally published on Weapons and Strategy, his Substack, and a podcast version is also available there. Asia Times is republishing the article with permission.