The People’s Liberation Army, after the frontrunner of Chinese politics, is once again being purged following the sacking of the defense minister last year, at least nine generals, and many senior military industry executives.
President Xi Jinping has pledged to “enhance the tool for punishing new types of corruption and buried problem” and to improve top army guidance.
In a statement reported by China’s position broadcast on June 19, Xi said:” Cadre at all levels, particularly older army, had show unity and have the courage to set aside their fame and introduce their deficiencies. They must greatly personal- reflect”. They had “make honest rectifications, and resolve issues at the root of their thinking”.
Xi introduced a significant transformation that significantly altered the PLA’s structure in 2015 to improve its conflict capability shortly after taking office. The control system was flattened and reorganized, giving more power to the group.
The number of military regions ( dividing PLA command over China ) was reduced from seven to five” theater commands” with joint rule over the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This change sought to improve offensive air and naval capabilities by shifting the concept of operations from generally ground-oriented defense to cellular, coordinated movements.
Soldiers and tactical and commissioned officers were dispersed around to tear loyalty links in the chain of control and increase the PLA’s rely on its top management. Models were dismantled and reassembled.
Nevertheless, it appears that this reform did not work preferably. Rumor has it that an investigation started last season following a bubble fight study found that a lot of the corporate jet technology did not work well or at all.
A Chinese spy balloon was spotted above a US military base in early 2023, igniting a strong sense of suspicion in the country about a potential Chinese surprise attack. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken canceled a trip to Beijing as a result of this incident. China later began an investigation, possibly leading to the dismissals of Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu, after initially underestimating the alarm.
The three-day conference that ended on June 19 marked the first of its kind since 2014, when Xi held a military-political work conference in Gutian on the anniversary of the December 1929 meeting that consolidated Mao’s influence over the Red Army, the PLA’s precursor, in the same year.
In the following decade, Mao seized control of the Party through his influence over the Red Army. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, the Chinese Communist Party was primarily an army spin- off. After the Soviets gained control of Moscow, they had to establish an army to combat the loyalists of the Czar. The Chinese party struggled to gain control from the countryside after its urban insurrection.
The 2014 conference provided the first framework for the 2015 military reform. There are similarities and differences between PLA ties from previous parties here.
During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was mainly protected from Mao’s political upheavals. The army was not punished and purged, as the majority of civil servants were. It remained the savior of Chinese politics for decades. The head of the military, Marshal Ye Jianying, engineered the coup to arrest the radical” Gang of Four” in 1976 after Mao’s death. That paved the way for Deng Xiaoping’s return to power.
Failed reform?
The 2015 PLA restructuring was in line with some reformer generals ‘ ideas. In exchange for a transformative change and a modern, combat-ready apparatus, the army relinquished its old political authority. It was also meant to alter the party- military’s relationship.
Xi Jinping is the chairman of the PLA Central Commission, and his first public career job was as assistant to Geng Biao, head of military intelligence and a close friend of his father, Xi Zhongxun, then minister of defense.
The most recent purge demonstrates that the reform did not succeed as planned. Still, last year’s dismissals and this conference demonstrate Xi’s clout over the military. Both events took place without any public outcry.
This may indicate that Xi has succeeded in overthrowing the People’s Republic of China as the first leader to overthrow the party’s rule over the military, changing the course of history.
Even so, the PLA still has political duties. The military’s duties extend to the entire Chinese territory, which is divided into five geographically distinct regions, creating additional political cohesion alongside civilian administration.
Moreover, Xi is the one person who sits at the top of the military commission, the party and the civil government. That allows him, in theory, to play the military against the party or the party against the military if necessary.
Therefore, a new power structure appears to be emerging in which Xi serves as the sole supporter of the entire architecture.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the meeting took place just days before the party plenum, which had been delayed for a while, in July. The plenum is said to focus on economic reforms, but it might have broader implications given the military conference.
The long-running and brutal war in Ukraine, combined with rising regional tensions and US-related tensions, may have been a wake-up call for China, indicating that a conflict may not be in vain and that Beijing should be prepared.
A conflict could completely or partially stymie Chinese exports to G7 nations, which are currently a major source of surplus, and have an impact on its sprawling middle class. The Ukraine fighting also showed the new importance of hybrid warfare, with propaganda, espionage, and firing cannons all part of one scheme.
Since the end of the conflict with Vietnam, the PLA has n’t engaged in a war in 45 years. Dong Jun, the new defense minister, is a member of the navy, which is the only PLA branch with extensive active experience and is known for its global missions and patrols in the South China Sea.
Francesco Sisci, an analyst and commentator on politics with over 30 years of experience in Asia, is the director of Appia Institute, which originally published this article. It is republished with permission.