Joe Biden, the president of the United States, and Xi Jinping, the president of China, spoke on April 2 for the first time since meeting in November. The phone also highlights the significant international and national challenges Beijing and Washington experience, even though it indicates that both sides are interested in stabilizing their partnership.
Xi and Biden are believed to possess covered Taiwan, the conceivable US TikTok restrictions, tariffs and Chinese aid for Russia, in the 105- second call.
This telephone call builds on the agreement reached between the two leaders at their face-to-face conference in San Francisco in November to maintain communication channels. Additionally, it points to a potential return to the 2021 and 2022’s more numerous direct relations as well as a temporary cooling of the relationship between the two nations.
The phone is a part of what appears to be a revival of the art of diplomacy, along with an increase in interactions among senior officials. New noteworthy gatherings include those of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, both of whom met in Bangkok at the end of January and in Munich in February, as well as Janet Yellen’s most recent visit to Beijing.
Both the Chinese and US claims have emphasized the” sincere and creative” character of the Biden- Xi visit.
The sincerity is visible from the numerous disagreements between them, from trade tariffs to Taiwan’s future status, to name just two. What makes the current relationship more beneficial is that Beijing and Washington appear to be willing to put the February 2023 weather balloon event behind them and promote face-to-face politics over the loudspeaker range. But, it’s not clear how far this will help to repair a relationship that is still deeply divided over each team’s ultimate objectives.
The US’s proposed cast of tariffs on Chinese products and US concerns about security issues tied to Chinese technology are two of the biggest problems facing China. Donald Trump, president of 2018, slapped 25 % on Chinese goods in an extraordinary trade war against China. These steps, Beijing suspects, are devices the US is using to” control China’s commerce and technology growth”.
When Biden stated that the United States would continue to take necessary steps to prevent advanced US technologies from being used to destroy… national security, without excessively restricting trade and investment, Biden’s hands are partially tied by strong and republican anti-Chinese mood in the US Congress. Trump, for his element, is promising to go even farther if are- elected.
Flashpoint Taiwan
Both Washington’s scheme on Taiwan and Beijing’s significance have not shown any significant change. The Taiwan issue is the first dark line in China-U.S. relations, according to a Chinese speech made during the Biden-Xi phone call. With the opening of Taiwan’s innovative leader in May, both sides ‘ posts will be tested in the coming months.
The conditioning of US military ties with its colleagues in Aukus, the US-Australian and UK partners ‘ joint security partnership, is another important factor. Japan and the Philippines does play a role in the tense safety position in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific more widely, according to the US.
Popular international ground?
Although certainly important, the diplomatic dimension is not the only element of the US- China relationship. Washington and Beijing have a number of other possible flashpoints on their agenda that they will need to control properly given the overturning of the existing global order, which was first and foremost caused by the conflict in Ukraine and now the Middle East.
The US and its friends in Asia are undoubtedly concerned by North Korea’s growing antagonism. A full-fledged conflict on the Vietnamese Peninsula is unlikely to be in China’s interests, even though China does see Pyongyang as a useful ally in its fight against military invasion. At the end of March, Beijing’s more subtle approach to the problem became clear as a result of its abstention from a resolution authorizing sanctions against North Korea, while Russia vetoed the draft US solution on the subject.
No more Middle East escalation is likely to be a priority for Washington or Beijing. On March 22, 2024, China and Russia voted in favor of a previous US-sponsored resolution requesting a peace for Gaza, but a subsequent vote ended with China voting in favor and the US abstinence. This does not in any way suggest a convergent of interests between Beijing and Washington, but it does indicate that there is a bargaining space where the two powers could find plenty common ground to resolve conflicts using existing international organizations like the UN.
However, there are plausible restrictions on Beijing and Washington’s ability to cooperate more in terms of global security. They might be more concerned with limiting friends than with their own needs. As likely to be a test situation in this regard as is Russia’s ongoing anger in Ukraine, the new Israeli assault on the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The Biden presidency has so far proven afraid, and apparently unable, to use its entire leverage over Israel. Putin has been under no illusions about his intentions, and Xi is doubtful to permit humiliation of Russia in Ukraine.
This implies that Beijing and Washington will be able to view their shared but never utterly contradictory goals in global security at best by managing volatility. There is a good chance that this most important relationship wo n’t fall into the Thucydides trap of an unavoidable military conflict if they both find a way to prevent their bilateral disagreements from becoming more and more content.
The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of global stability.
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