The US$$ 2 trillion F-35 stealth jet fighter program, which is plagued by delays, software glitches, and cybersecurity flaws, is expected to face criticism when the Department of Government Efficiency ( DOGE ), under the leadership of Elon Musk, launches an investigation into the Pentagon’s books.  ,
Actually before his Depends investigators have begun, Musk has called the essential protection program a “flop” and its creators “idiots.” At least one US Air Force head disputes that Musk is overestimating the use of robots to remove fighter planes in true warfighting.
To be sure, Musk’s accusations have significance. A declassified February 2024 assessment by the US Director of Operational Test and Evaluation ( DOT&, E) revealed that the F-35 program faces significant challenges despite its promise of tech-driven, cutting-edge capabilities.
According to the publicly accessible evaluation review, the F-35’s so-called” Block 4″ growth and functional testing has identified several pressing problems that have hindered the project’s performance and suitability.
For one, the Continuous Capability Development and Delivery ( C2D2 ) process, which was intended to provide incremental Block 4 capabilities every six months, has not met expectations, leading to significant delays, according to the report.
The Tech Refresh 3 ( TR-3 ) avionics upgrade aims to provide enough computing power for Block 4 capabilities, including new sensor suites, long-range weapons, electronic warfare, data fusion and cross-platform interoperability.
However, the TR-3 program version 30R08 remains inadequate after over two years of development, with deficits introduced into recently delivered features.
Due to insufficient modeling and simulation solutions, the evolutionary process relies heavily on a fly-fix-fly method, which has exacerbated difficulties. Those failures mean dedicated functional testing of TR-3 upgraded F-35s does not occur until 2026, two decades after TR-3 was immediately delivered.
Unresolved vulnerabilities have been found in the updated software versions of the Autonomic Logistics Information System ( ALIS), while the transition to a new cloud-based Operational Data Integrated Network ( ODIN ) has not yet resolved many persistent issues.
ODIN’s components deployment has increased in speed, but it still runs on ALIS software, putting off the anticipated advantages of intermodal applications and regular updates.
Maintenance standards for all F-35 variants are still below the Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF ) Operational Requirements Document ( ORD ) thresholds, with critical failures requiring twice the anticipated repair time. Reliability measures, such as Mean Flight Hours Between Essential Problems, are constantly below specifications.
Operational supply prices for the F-35 ships are even below target, as a result of high maintenance requirements and spare parts shortages. At a time when China is tremendously upgrading its air ships, these problems have delayed full-rate creation and hampered the plane’s eagerness for battle scenarios.
These issues may reveal Musk’s pre-emptive censure of the F-35, including the billionaire tech baron’s chastising of its designers, lambasting its architecture, and questioning of its cunning capabilities and power compared to drones.
But, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall argues that Musk’s perception is that of an expert, not a interceptor, saying that his perception of helicopter superiority is nevertheless many years ahead.
Kendall claims that his goal with the F-35 is to work with drones in tandem, but it won’t be replaced in the near future. He insists that the F-35 will remain in service until the Next Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) platform is operational, which is in every way superior to the fourth-generation fighter jet.
Considering the F-35’s myriad issues, Musk isn’t off the mark in his critiques. A US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from December 2024 reveals that C2D2’s software modifications frequently caused stability issues and other system functions to be hampered.
Further, in a May 2024 Air &, Space Forces Magazine article, John Tirpak says that F-35 pilots rebooted the TR-3 program multiple times in the air and on the ground during tests.
According to Tirpak, even if the TR-3 upgrade is fully approved, an F-35 Joint Program Office ( JPO ) spokesperson mentions that frequent patches and updates may still be needed to correct deficiencies.
In a November 2024 Project for Government Oversight ( POGO ) article, Greg William points out ALIS shortcomings. The software, supposed to be the backbone of F-35 maintenance, has shown poor reliability and high false alarm rates due to new aircraft hardware or software updates, impeding rather than facilitating maintenance.
In an article for Global Defense Technology, Grant Turnbull discusses ALIS ‘ vulnerability to cyberattack. Turnbull claims that the system’s widespread interconnectivity and reliance on data sharing across various nodes presents numerous entry points for hackers, putting them at risk.
Turnbull mentions that successful cyberattacks could disrupt maintenance schedules by preventing crucial software updates or parts orders, effectively grounding aircraft. Additionally, he points out that malware could inject false information into ALIS, causing an unnecessary grounding of serviceable aircraft.
He points out that ALIS’s complexity, compounded by single points of failure, such as Central Points of Entry ( CPE ) and the Autonomous Logistics Operating Unit ( ALOU), further exacerbates the vulnerability. Additionally, he states that cyber adversaries could potentially extract critical performance data, compromising operational security.
Compounding the F-35’s software woes, a September 2023 US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) report mentions that the aircraft suffers from multiple maintenance issues, such as overreliance on contractors limiting government influence and decision-making ability, inadequate training for F-35 maintenance, lack of access to technical data, deprioritized funding for maintenance facilities, and lack of spare parts.
The F-35’s operational readiness rates have also plummeted. A January 2024 DOT&, E report mentions that the F-35 fleet’s average availability stood at 51 %, far below the 65 % target.
The Full Mission Capable ( FMC) rate was only 30 % across the US fleet and 9 % for the operational test fleet, the report said. Combat-coded aircraft fared better, achieving 61 % availability and 48 % FMC, though are still short of expectations.
Critical reliability and maintainability standards are also unsatisfied, particularly for the F-35C, which failed to meet any ORD ( operational requirements ) thresholds.
The F-35A and F-35B met some reliability goals, but they experienced noticeably longer corrective maintenance intervals that were over 278 %. Rising Not Mission Capable for Supply ( NMC-S) rates at 27 % indicate worsening logistics. These issues are further complicated by persistent software instability and engine parts shortages.
Despite improvements in maintenance and supply chains, the F-35’s ability to meet operational demands is undermined by these readiness gaps, according to the report, which call for immediate remediation.
In an article this month, Military Watch mentions that China’s J-20 stealth fighter has more stable software integrated into its development and that its progressing without any signs of any issues.
However, China’s military modernization is opaque compared to the US, so such matters may not be made public. The F-22 and F-35 may be the only aircraft in the world that can match China’s growing fleet of 5th-generation stealth aircraft in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, but the effects may be significant.