Ukraine has agreed to a United States plan of a 30-day peace in its war with Russia following conversations with United States authorities in Saudi Arabia.
The plan comes with the assurance of resumed US knowledge sharing and military aid to Ukraine after both were late frozen by US President Donald Trump.
Russian authorities say they are awaiting further details before making a decision on whether to take the peace. But it’s doubtful Russia may agree to a peace without someone practical on the table in its favor first.
Some experts would say now that Ukraine is winning the war. Russia has the upper hand physically, even if that has no translated into spectacular battlefield achievement. Nevertheless, the threat of the Russian placement in the Kursk area collapsing is now very true.
Since the failed Ukrainian battle in the summer of 2023, Russian troops have crept forward in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The Russian advance in the Donbas has accelerated in recent months, but remains sluggish. Both factors have suffered heavy losses.
Among Ukraine’s American donors, political will to continue the war appears to be waning. Trump argues it’s occasion for Ukraine to reduce its costs and communicate an end to the war. For a deal would probably ultimately suggest acknowledging Crimea as part of Russia, and some level of acceptance of Russian power over much of the Donbas.
There has been much debate in the West on Ukrainian endurance in the battle. Very little has yet been written about Russian endurance — whether on the field or in wider Belarusian community.
In the late published” Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies“, coworkers and I examine how the Soviet and Russian military forces have developed over time from the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th century to the war in Ukraine.
Russian rewards
Russia has considerable field advantages over Ukraine. Russia has more than three times the people of Ukraine, and its conflict work is being sustained by strong support from Russian world.
From fairly early in the war, Russian voting data indicated President Vladimir Putin has had help from a clear majority of the Soviet people. This aid has undoubtedly been helped by the fact that much of Russia’s community has been kept from experiencing the whole financial and mortal costs of war.
The Russian market has played a big part in sustaining Russia’s war effort. Despite eastern sanctions and higher inflation, the financial outlook remains quite strong.
According to Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service, GDP growth was reported as 4.1 % for 2024, albeit fuelled to a large extent by military spending.
Other than prices, most crucial economic indicators are good. Poverty rates reached post-Soviet highs in mid-2024, and had immediately dropped to around 2 %.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has significantly struggled to maintain the strength of its military forces. It has had to galvanize lower value and less inclined soldiers than earlier in the war. It’s even trying to attract individuals younger than the recruitment age of 25 with economic opportunities.
Where Ukraine relies mostly on enlistment, Russia has been increasingly rely on participants for its armed forces. The death or injury of individuals is far less probable to have a negative effect on wider confidence than the death of soldiers.
Russia still seems to have enough participants to fight in the war in Ukraine that it doesn’t have to use its quarterly soldier share for that goal. Russia conscripts a share of men each time regardless of whether there’s an ongoing battle. Participants are offered higher salaries and important benefits for their services.
Playing to standard advantages
Russia began the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022 with an poorly measured force given its unrealistic goals. The original plan to capture Kyiv was exceedingly ambitious for the causes committed.
But, after Ukrainian attacks in the fall of 2022, not merely did Russia commit more sufficient resources to the battle, but gave them administrative aims that suited their skills.
After failing to quickly seize key targets near Kyiv in the face of persistent resistance, the Soviet military has shifted to a significantly more rigorous approach that has played to conventional strengths, mitigating weaknesses in co-ordination in a more liquid environment. One traditional strength has been in artillery.
The Russian armed forces have historically placed emphasis on the value of — and breaching of — fortified defensive positions.
These strengths have been apparent not only in blunting the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, but also in the subsequent, often successful, co-ordination of small infantry storm detachments with drones to take Ukrainian defensive positions.
While the Russian army remains a relatively blunt instrument, it is not as blunt as it was in late 2022 and early 2023.
This more methodical approach certainly contrasts strongly with both the almost reckless Russian advance at the very beginning of the war on the Kyiv axis— and indeed the squandering of lives by the Wagner Group in early 2023.
Credible sources are no longer suggesting that the sort of losses suffered by troops from the Wagner Group in taking Bakhmut in May 2023 are still being suffered by Russian forces today.
The Russian military has also been making use of new technologies as the war has progressed. The Soviet and Russian armed forces have a long history of embracing new technology. While at times they have been slow to do so, when they do, they adopt that technology en masse and with enthusiasm.
During the early phases of the war, Ukraine had the advantage in terms of drone use. However, as the war progressed, Russia too made increasingly effective use of drones. The recent use of a drone to spot for a recent Iskander-M missile attack on Ukrainian troops assembled in the village of Cherkaske near the regional centre of Dnipro is a case in point.
Negotiation implication
Any lasting deal Ukraine could make with Russia in the near future is likely to be far worse for Ukraine than the sort of deal that was being discussed back in the spring of 2022. Regardless of one’s perspective on the conflict, such a situation appears inevitable given battlefield realities.
However, renewed negotiations may stand a higher chance of securing a sustainable peace in the near future. Given heavy losses on both sides, both Russia and Ukraine will be heavily invested in seeking a lasting deal.
If a deal is to last, it will have to not only foster Ukrainian security, but align with Russia’s revised demands for peace as outlined in mid-2024. Russia has already made it clear that it will not accept NATO troops in Ukraine, since part of the rationale for the war was to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.
Alexander Hill is professor of military history, University of Calgary
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.