Why Russia ignored the CIA’s terror attack warning – Asia Times

Why Russia ignored the CIA's terror attack warning - Asia Times

The 137-person fatal attack at the Crocus City music hall in the Moscow suburbs has once more raised questions about how effective knowledge is in identifying and preventing large acts of terrorism.

Seldom is knowledge about these things accurate. It frequently consists of speculation or fragments of details that are dispersed throughout international borders as well as within policing and intelligence organizations. Intelligence analysis is how organizations combine all of these components to create a picture that is both logical and enables officials to listen.

Knowledge research depends on reliable, current knowledge, available heads, and leaders who use it in the right way. As a result, it should be surprising that more attacks do n’t occur.

The US issued a notice about the potential for a large-scale terrorist attack, including one that involved music, at the beginning of March, and instructed its members to stay away from such locations for the following 48 hours. According to Adrienne Watson, a spokeswoman for the US National Security Council, information about a similar organized attack had also been shared with Russian officials.

A warning from the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ), with its extensive access to communications and human intelligence, is highly credible. Although it was not for the exact same day, the reminder that the US issued is significant enough to be regarded as pertinent. Additionally, it mentioned target as Moscow and a nightclub.

Additionally, CNN reported that two sources had information from which it knew that ISIS-K had been gathering knowledge since November.

However, the Belarusian state feels conflicted with the West right now. They are also aware that the CIA is actively providing defense information to Ukrainians.

In this environment, it is difficult for the Kremlin to acquire US instructions significantly, and even to admit to having received them. Dimitri Peskov, a Kremlin official, argued that Russia does not need American knowledge. He told a press event:” Our protection providers are working on their own, no help is currently on the table”.

Better to have five sight than one

It might seem strange to learn that intelligence agencies frequently share secrets, given that knowledge is all about getting and keeping secrets. Within a state, police and intelligence agencies share knowledge about people, threats and risks.

The main issues with doing so are incompatible systems and procedures, secrecy laws, the protection of tradecraft ( how the information was obtained ), the source protection, and the risk of secret information being exposed in court ( known as disclosure ).

Friendly states also share knowledge, through established processes and procedures. The best known of these is the Five Vision empire, made up of the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. These are the main people, but there are now associate users who have limited access to shared knowledge.

These types of alliances function because they have established and reliable protocols, have some common education, have practical experience, and finally have faith. However, the new faith of Canadian detective chief Cameron Ortis for selling secrets to alleged criminals highlights how fragile systems are dependent on trust.

Countries with who do n’t have truly friendly relations also share secrets, on a selective basis. For instance, the UK and US have a long record of engaging in knowledge sharing with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Russia and the West have likewise shared intelligence with regard to criminal organizations, at least they did before the Ukrainian war in 2022.

International intellect has frequently created a horizontal political system where individuals can speak more freely and openly without being censored or deposed. Sharing crucial intelligence has also improved relationships between antagonistic countries or opened up a backchannel to begin discussing tensions more openly and kindly.

The CIA may have emailed a reminder about the theater plot as a way to express their desire to resume normalizing relations with Russia. They probably would have preferred to prevent having Ukraine held accountable for the attack, which has since occurred.

So, what possible motives does the Kremlin have for rejecting the evidence, at least at first, that a regional Islamic State ( IS ) group ( known as ISIS- K ) committed this atrocity? The continuing conflict in Ukraine serves as the key point of reference.

Moscow will have a legal argument that Ukraine helped with this harm, which is socially advantageous. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of the Russian Security Council, has stated that all those responsible for the tale “must been tracked down and executed without retribution, including state officials who committed for outrage.”

The notion that the assault was supported or sponsored by Ukraine serves as a launching point for the Kremlin‘s predominately anti-Kiev propaganda. Vladimir Putin has acknowledged IS’s position in the assault, but he also has accused Ukraine of being involved or perhaps ultimately to blame.

Focusing on what is present rather than what is desired is a valuable lesson in intellect. The simplest and most plausible argument that IS terrorists, who appear fixated by Russia, have mounted a large- risk, lower- probability- of- success attack on Moscow, and evaded Moscow’s surveillance state by arriving and attacking immediately.

In light of the nature of the conflict, it is reasonable to assume that Moscow’s surveillance equipment does have ignored any instructions from the CIA. However, it is still true that a city’s ability to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks is largely dependent on the successful cooperation and discussing of timely and accurate intelligence.

The most recent instance in point is the terrible Crocus City concert hall situation.

Robert M. Dover is Professor of Intelligence and National Security, University of Hull

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