Jens Stoltenberg,  , the 13th director general of NATO, says that the empire is in talks to build more nuclear weapons and upgrade their distribution systems.  , Stoltenberg told the , Telegraph , in the UK:  ,” I wo n’t go into operational details about how many nuclear warheads , should be operational and which should be stored, but we need to consult on these issues. That’s exactly what we’re doing” . , Stoltenberg emphasized that NATO is a “nuclear alliance”.
He explained:” NATO’s goal is, of course, a world without nuclear arms. However, because a universe where Russia, China, and North Korea have nuclear weapons and N ATO does not, we will continue to be a nuclear empire.
The Russians say that Stoltenberg’s atomic weapons pronouncement was  , “bully techniques”.
Without extensive collaboration with the United States, Stoltenberg was unable to take action against NATO’s radioactive barrier. Consequently, the Biden administration’s plan and software must be the NATO enlargement of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear sharing in NATO
NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on radioactive sharing agreements.  , As , described publicly,
NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy also depends on the skills and system provided by friends and the United States ‘ forward-deploying nuclear weapons in Europe. A number of NATO member nations provide a dual-capable aircraft (DCA ) capability to the Alliance. These aircraft are essential to NATO’s nuclear deterrence vision, and they are available for nuclear functions at several readiness levels. In their radioactive part, the aircraft are equipped to take nuclear weapons in a discord, and staff are trained appropriately.  ,
While Supporters provide military aid for the DCA vision using conventional forces and capabilities, the United States maintains complete control and custody of their atomic weapons forward-deploying in Europe.
While NATO’s atomic weapons are American, the UK and France have nuclear arms also.
Nuclear weight weapons that the US has stored in Europe are nuclear weapons that can be launched both by NATO plane or by the US working independently of NATO.
Essentially, atomic weight weapons fall into the category of tactical nuclear weapons.  , The US, UK and France likewise deploy tactical nuclear weapons in and around Europe.  , The UK has around 225 nuclear weapons ( more than half in store ) for its Trident nuclear submarine system. The European nuclear capacity requires US coordination.
France is the only NATO member to possess a nuclear arsenal that is entirely separate. It includes a small number of cruise missiles with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile ships.  , The French , have floated the idea of replacing the US atomic deterrent , with a French one and there have been conversations with Germany about the idea.
Stoltenberg’s decision to strengthen NATO’s nuclear empire might be seen as a counterweight to European force to turn away from the US-led barrier in Europe.
Due to the possibility of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States, there has long been a skepticism in Europe regarding the US’s decision to not build nuclear weapons to defend Western territory. The US’s use of tactical nuclear weapons ( under US control ) is intended to reduce the risk of a strategic nuclear exchange with Russia, to an unknown extent.
However, it is undoubtedly true that Stoltenberg’s reliance on NATO as a nuclear ally was generally intended to quell concerns that Russia might use nuclear weapons to resolve the Ukraine issue.  , Compared with the US, Russia has a huge army of tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, many of its military weapons have nuclear warheads in them. In fact, the Ukrainians have warned Europe that this is exactly what Russia may do.
Russians claim to have deposited nuclear weapons in Belarus, but none have been discovered there as of yet. They have been conducting nuclear exercises it.  , Also the US has been flying its tactical bombers close to Russia’s territories, as a US notice.
Additionally, Ukraine has attacked two highly vulnerable sensor points, which are crucial components of Russia’s early warning system. Why these goals were chosen by Ukraine or NATO, which provides these attacks with intellect and weapons, is unclear.  ,
NATO relies on nuclear weight weapons for punishment. NATO aircraft would be used to deliver these weapons to Russian goals.  ,  , About 150 weapons are stored at six foundations:  , Kleine Brogel , in Belgium,  , Büchel Air Base , in Germany,  , Aviano , and , Ghedi Air Base , in Italy,  , Volkel Air Base , in the Netherlands and , Incirlik , in Turkey.  , These are part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement.
In contrast, the US announced in January that it was upgrading elements of the , RAF Airbase at Lakenheath, Surrey, in the UK. There a particular regiment, the 48th Security Force, of F- 35s may be capable of carrying B- 61 weight weapons. To protect workers at the bottom, the US is installing unique mechanical loading ramps, upgrading storage facilities, and installing a atomic” shield.”
These F-35s will be flown entirely by US pilots and are not permitted to participate in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, which means that their mission may be related to NATO’s security and deterrence but may also be used outside of any common NATO agreement.
A modernization program ( Mod 12 ) for US B-61 gravity bombs is about to be finished. The B- 61 is a “dial- a- offer” weapons, meaning that the weapon produce can be adjusted to meet certain targets.  , The US even may keep some Mod 11 B- 61 weapons.
The Mod 11 B- 61 is regarded as a basement buster weapon and is not , “dial a offer” . , It has a special 400 megawatt weapon. About 30 of these weapons were manufactured.  , It is not obvious if they are deployed in Europe.
The Mod 12 B- 61 can select yields , ( in kilotons ) from.3, 1.5, 10 or 50 kt.  , For assessment functions, the Hiroshima weapon was between 11 and 16 gigawatts.
The development of the B- 61 requires the development of the shipping techniques, including changes in the airplane’s electronics. There is very little information available about how fast improvements and modifications may be made.  , New F- 35s may have B- 61 weapons if they are equipped to do so.  , It is n’t known how many of the F- 35’s delivered to Europe are nuclear capable.
Some unanswered issues
It is important to point out that neither the US nor NATO has any agreement obligation, or any other duty, to defend Ukraine from a nuclear attack.  , So NATO punishment, at least inasmuch as it is understood, does not use to Ukraine in any conventional manner.  , But that does not imply that Stoltenberg, and by proxy the United States, is never shifting the alliance to extending a nuclear umbrella over Ukraine.
The NATO-US decision to unleash long-range weapons in Ukraine on Russian country is one reason to think that there may be a change in strategy being considered.
Prior to the surrogate war in which case Ukraine was involved, the US and Russia have been careful to avoid attacking each other immediately. Truman argued that this is why he opposed US troops entering the Yalu River in Korea, why neither China nor Russia were attacked in the Vietnam War, and why President John F. Kennedy refused to launch a nuclear strike on Cuba and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis.
However, there were instances when hostilities increased to the point where they reached nuclear boundary. That was particularly true in 1973 when Russia threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Yom Kippur war and when the US issued a DEFCON- 3 notice.
NATO-approved attacks on Russian country appear to cross a dangerous red column in the context of power competitions, proxy wars, and other issues ( the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a substitute issue but a direct clash between the US and USSR ).
When combined with the no- negotiations, no- talks, no- peace posture of the US and most of Europe regarding Ukraine, the danger of an expanding conflict – even one involving nuclear weapons – is increasing. In that context, upgrading nuclear arsenals adds fuel to the fire.
Stephen Bryen served as the Near East Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee  and as the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.  ,
This , article was first published on his , Weapons and Strategy , Substack and is republished with permission.