Last month, Polititico  reported that some EU nations might capture Russia’s” shadow ship” in the Baltic Sea under the pretext of adhering to global climate and piracy laws.
They might even pass novel national laws to validate this, too. The arrest of one of these ships in Finland last December under the excuse that it was engaged in cutting an underground cable reportedly prompted them to do so frequently. The goal would be to reduce the Kremlin’s international revenue flow from Asia-based sales of reduced oil.
Stopping them from operating in the Baltic Sea may have a significant financial impact on the Kremlin because roughly 40 % of its” dark ship” transits through the Baltic Sea, or a little less than 350 warships, whose entire business was roughly comparable to one-third of Russia’s monthly defense budget.
However, these plans have a lot more difficulties in them than policymakers may suppose, issues that were raised in Politico’s statement.
First of all, the seizure of even a solitary ship could result in big political and legal costs due to international law and the ownership of some” shadow fleet” vessels, something that Finland is only just starting to learn after the dramatic incident in December.
If they can’t rely on the EU as a whole to support them, let alone NATO’s head, they may decide to reconsider the intelligence of seizing any more boats, particularly if they need to reconsider this.
In the event that Russia sends naval tankers to escort its” shadow submarine” through the Baltics, the last-mentioned problem leads to the second level about the potential for anescalation.
The deputy chairman of Russia’s political security committee , warned , that “any assault on our ships may be regarded as an assault on our place, even if the ship is under a foreign flag”. Trump doesn’t favor escalation against Russia, at least at this time, so he might not extend Article 5 guarantees to allies that seize such vessels.
And finally, all of this might simply be too little, too late. Russia and the US have already started backchannel discussions with Ukraine, putting an end to their proxy war when the stereotypically slow EU decides to support the US’s” shadow fleet “‘s capture of the Baltic Sea.
Moreover, this wasn’t hitherto seriously considered due to the two aforesaid reasons, which remain relevant. It’s, therefore, unlikely that the bloc will suddenly change its calculations.
The questions that are being addressed by the previous points are as simple as those in which some EU nations, like the hawkish Baltic States, want to appear as though they haven’t yet exhausted their policy options against Russia.
The realization that there isn’t anything they can do to stop Russia’s on-the-ground advance or collapse its economy as they anticipated could lead to a lot of demoralization because everything they’ve already done hasn’t stopped its on-the-ground advance.
The other two reasons might be even simpler because they could have already persuaded themselves that discussing this alone might deter Russia’s” shadow fleet” from operating in the Baltic and/or spur Trump’s aggression in Ukraine.
No matter how unlikely either outcome is, it doesn’t mean they still sincerely believe they’re possible. These political fantasies could quickly become dangerous, however, if any of the associated states try to unilaterally bring them to fruition.
A major incident at sea could instantly spark a , New Cold War , crisis that brings the , Baltic front , of this competition to the center of global attention.
It’s highly unlikely that Trump will turn his back on Russia if this occurs while Trump is still in talks with Putin because it is clear that this is a “deep state” provocation meant to sabotage a peace deal. However, if those discussions go wrong and he decides to “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for the US, his strategy might change.
That could backfire though if Putin authorizes the navy to defend his” shadow fleet” as a reciprocal escalation , following the precedent , that he established last November.
Back then, he authorized the first-ever use of the hypersonic Oreshniks in response to Ukraine using long-range Western missiles against targets within Russia’s pre-2014 borders, which signaled that the days of his backing down were over. He used to be self-assured to avoid World War III, but that only unintentionally led to more hostility.
Putin is, therefore, expected to strongly respond to the scenario of European countries seizing his” shadow fleet” in the Baltic, which could lead to a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that might easily spiral out of control.
Trump would likely either decline to support such a provocation or would abandon whichever ally unilaterally engages in defiance of his warnings because he doesn’t appear to be willing to risk World War III by cutting off the Kremlin’s foreign revenue flow.
Russia’s” shadow fleet” shouldn’t have anything to worry about because the odds of European nations seizing its vessels are low, even though some of them might still attempt to capture a few ships under false pretenses like last December’s.
Russia might not escalate as it did less than two months ago as long as this is extraordinarily rare. However, any expansion of that policy almost certainly would result in a strong response from Russia.
This , article , was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , here.