China’s October 14″ Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise, the fourth large exercise near Taiwan in the last two years, reconfirmed Beijing’s vow to use force if necessary to compel Taiwan to join the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) against the will of Taiwan’s people.
According to PRC officials and the media, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s alleged controversial statement on the Republic of China National Day was the subject of the exercise.  , That declare was evidently false.  ,
Lai’s conversation was comparatively slight toward China. Some of his Democratic Progressive Party colleagues who prefer to call their nation the” Republic of Taiwan” are irritated by the fact that he even said he is comfortable with the brand” Republic of China.”
However, Beijing called a previous big practice in May, after Lai’s commencement,” Joint Sword 2024A”, indicating there was already a strategy for another one before the end of this year. So it now appears that big PLA exercises are no longer responses to new ways by Taiwan or the US toward , de jure , Taiwan freedom.  , More, they follow a plan set by Beijing.
Joint Sword 2024B may have a good flicker, which means that the exercise appeared to be primarily a rehearsal for a siege.  , The Chinese Coast Guard’s (CCG) membership was important and significant promoted by PRC representatives and the press.  , The CCG would be a big person, as important as the PLA Navy, in a siege situation.
Gwent warships sailed close to two little Taiwan-held islands close to the island of China’s coast and took positions on all sides of the main area of Taiwan.  ,
PRC state media organ , Global Times , said,” This indicates that the CCG, as a sea law enforcement power, will enhance and increase the frequency of its activities around Taiwan”, foretelling a larger responsibility for the CCG in future Chinese efforts to force Taiwan toward unity.
To hammer home the information, China dispatched CCG vehicle 2901 to join in the practice.  , This fleet, the largest beach protect vehicle in the world, is heavier and longer than a US , Arleigh Burke-class battleship.  ,
Big Chinese vessels would have an edge in a situation where ships bump and block each other, as has become common in the South China Sea, as Beijing wants to remind Taiwan.
One Chinese military spokesperson , said , the purpose of the drill was to “form a situation where the island is pinned down from both sides” . , Another , said , the exercise scenario included cutting off Taiwan’s imports and setting up a picket line to prevent “foreign” —spelled US—intervention from the east.  ,
Because the PLA was using the defense to compel unification in a blockade scenario is significant, it was used in a different way than when they attempted to seize Taiwan by sending troops to literally conquer the island.
Researchers have long been at odds with whether China would impose a siege or launch an invasion. Many , have  , argued , that war is Beijing’s chosen method.
Brandon Weichert , wrote , in The National Interest , in June 2024 that” Most Western observers believe that China will pursue a bolt-from-the-blue attack on Taiwan… because it would get the globe by surprise” and help Beijing to directly achieve its goal of “decapitating Taiwan’s leadership” . ,
To be sure, plenty of , others , have  , contended , that from China’s standpoint, a blockade is a better strategy than an invasion.  ,  ,  ,
The most recent exercise, Joint Sword 2024B, and the highlighted operations related to a blockade, may indicate that PRC military planners believe they would prefer a blockade over an invasion if China decides to invade Taiwan.  ,
If Xi’s government came to the same conclusion as many others, it would not surprise them if they predicted that a failed invasion of Taiwan would also be disastrous for China.  ,
There are several reasons why a blockade might seem to the Chinese government more appealing than an invasion.
An invasion would be an all-or-nothing gamble that would either succeed or fail in its initial attempt to appoint PRC military commanders to take control of Taiwan’s government, infrastructure, and key industries. ( Longer-term objectives, such as effectively governing Taiwan’s people, are a different matter. )  ,
A blockade, on the other hand, is a flexible strategy. It could include firing missiles into the waters close to Taiwan’s main ports, demanding “inspections” of some kinds of vessels, or firing at ships trying to enter pre-declared restricted areas.
Depending on how Taipei and other governments were reacting to it, China could impose a blockade strictly or loosely, intensify it or put it on hold at any time.  ,
A blockade would make it possible for Taiwan to abide by Beijing’s wishes without suffering a ton of casualties as a result of an amphibious assault followed by a ton of massive bombardment.
China and America’s formidable armed forces would likely face off immediately in an invasion.  , A blockade, on the other hand, would pit a Chinese strength, gray zone tactics, against an American weakness, impatience.  ,
Chinese ships could keep the US captains locked up in a state of rules-of-engagement limbo for months or even years until the Americans decide to withdraw if American ships arrive to help Taiwan deal with the blockade.  ,  ,
From Beijing’s standpoint, Taiwan looks vulnerable to a blockade. The island’s economy is highly dependent on international trade. It imports , 98 %  , of its energy. It is politically divided.
The Chinese Nationalist Party ( or KMT ), which has the most seats in any party’s legislature in Taiwan, is open to the idea that Taiwan is a part of China and supports fostering better ties with Beijing.
The PRC government could reduce the impact of a blockade by carrying out other countermeasures, including cyberattacks on infrastructure, sleeper agents inside Taiwan, and disinformation.
A blockade is an awful prospect. It would exacerbate Taiwan’s suffering and lead to a US-China conflict.  , The scale of the violence and mayhem unleashed by an attempted invasion, however, would be much worse.  ,
Even if real relief for Taiwan still persists far away, this would be a significant and welcome step if Beijing has quietly moved toward ruling out an invasion.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.