China has always been vehemently opposed to the relationship, especially since AUKUS’ public notification three years ago. Beijing has socially attacked AUKUS and launched a coordinated strategy to challenge its legality.
China has said AUKUS is “driven by Cold War thinking”, “fuelling defense clash”, and creating “additional nuclear proliferation hazards”.
The aim of AUKUS is for the American army to get nuclear-powered boats, with Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States also collaborating on various superior military technologies.
As AUKUS naysayers have argued, it’s totally possible Australia will never get its planned nuclear-powered assault ships. The agreement might collapse due to a number of factors, including the capricious desires of a future US leader and British shipbuilding constraints.
However, if the program succeeds, even in a modified form, it’ll create a major military obstacle to China. As Kevin Rudd, the former American excellent minister and present embassy to the US, said in recent days, it’s probably now complicating China’s future political calculations.
The political picture is more crowded and distorted when Taiwanese military analysts examine it.
These are three reasons why China finds the agreement so intimidating.
1. Complicating China’s atomic plan
Nuclear weapons will not be used in AUKUS ships. But these ships could be used to harm China’s sea-based nuclear arms.
China now has six nuclear-capable and nuclear-powered boats in operation. These are based on Hainan Island, where dried outposts are present. They can immediately travel to the South China Sea’s strong waters to lessen the chance of being discovered.
One of the most crucial of the many expeditions for the AUKUS boats is likely to be monitoring China’s atomic weapons-capable ships as they leave Hainan Island.
AUKUS submarines would be able to approach the South China Sea quicker because of their faster rate, secrecy, and endurance. When there, they can be “on place” undetected for much longer.
China’s nuclear weapons-capable submarines would benefit from having better knowledge of their hydroacoustic names during peacetime, making these Chinese vessels more susceptible to identification.
Combined with the intelligence gathered by Australia’s ordinary South China Sea maritime air patrols, AUKUS submarines could eventually increase the ability of the American and allied militaries to observe and, in conflict scenarios, attack China’s sea-borne atomic deterrent.
2. a clear danger from China’s military
In connection with AUKUS, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has stated that Australia needs to be able to “hold possible adversaries ‘ troops and equipment at risk from a greater distance.”
She might not have mentioned China in the same sentence. Military managers in Beijing, like many Australians, assume that China is their most likely destination.
AUKUS submarines are most likely equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles that can strike area and are intended to attack Chinese military installations in the South China Sea and along the nation’s eastern coastline.
AUKUS submarines may also restrict China’s entry to the important financial resources for warfighting. Fuel and other sources imports from China are still heavily reliant on the Indian Ocean and East Asian shipping roads.
In conflict settings, AUKUS ships ‘ ability to travel far distances without surface or replenishing could put them at risk against China’s crucial maritime supply roads.
Beijing may also consider whether AUKUS submarines could be used to instantly assault Chinese cities in a global war. This might seem far-fetched for now, but with military preparing usually dealing with worst-case scenarios, Chinese security strategists are definitely considering this possibility.
3. Moreover, tipping the local military balance
In the next ten and a half, Australia is anticipated to purchase at least three, and maybe five, Virginia-class boats from the US.
These boats might not otherwise have entered the US ship, which would mean that the size of the US nuclear-powered submarine force may be smaller than it would have been without AUKUS until 2040 and even beyond.
The political and industrial viability of the anticipated sale of Virginia-class boats and the building of a fresh AUKUS class of boat are also a lot of the open question.
However, assuming it succeeds, AUKUS may significantly increase the number of US and US allies ‘ nuclear-powered ships starting in the 2040s, giving them a long-term underwater military advantage over China.
AUKUS may also facilitate the deployment of more high-end US and allied military platforms in the area in the near future.
Of course, this is n’t just an AUKUS story. In the upcoming times, Australia may encouraged more US bombers and fighter jets, and there will probably be more US troops, among other places, in Japan and the Philippines.
However, the US and allied defense might experience a significant increase following the establishment of Submarine Rotational Force – West in the region as a result of the AUKUS strategy. From 2027, it’s anticipated that one English and four US nuclear-powered boats will be stationed rotationally in Western Australia.
Regardless of what happens when Australia eventually receives and constructs nuclear-powered ships, this may lead to a decline in China’s equivalent underwater strength in the area.
No entirely explained in this article why China may oppose AUKUS. These three aspects alone point to the potential for Beijing to face a significant and long-term military issue.
Benjamin Herscovitch is exploration fellow, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University
This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.