Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.
For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.
Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.
In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.
Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.
The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?
Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).
We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.
Military performance
Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.
To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.
However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.
These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).
Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.
This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.
Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.
For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).
By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.
Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.
Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.
Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.
Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024
Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.
According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.
Economic exploitation
Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.
Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.
Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.
Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.
Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.
However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.
Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.
Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.
Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.
Countering Wagner
Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.
The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.
Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.
In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.
To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.
Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.
Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London
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