Evidence suggests that civilizations frequently overextended their coping methods when they are in decline.
The declining kingdom may therefore combine or clash with defense actions, infrastructure issues, and social welfare demands, accumulating costs and negative effects.
Plans aimed to improve empire—and that previously did—now destroy it. Modern cultural changes inside and outside the empire does strengthen, slow, or invert the decline.
However, when drop leads officials to claim its life, it can become self-accelerating. In the early years of dynasties, officials and the led may suppress those who stress or even notice drop.
Cultural problems may also be denied, minimized, or, if admitted, blamed on practical scapegoats—immigrants, foreign powers, or cultural minorities—rather than linked to royal drop.
The US kingdom, ingeniously proclaimed by the Monroe Doctrine shortly after two liberation wars won against Britain, grew across the 19th and 20th ages, and peaked during the years between 1945 and 2010.
The US empire’s expansion and decrease merged with one another’s. There were never any significant economic opposition or threat, but the Soviet Union did, at least, present a minimal number of political and military challenges.
The Cold War was a tense battle whose result was predetermined from the beginning. World War II devastated the US emperor’s possible financial rivals or threats in total.
Europe lost its territories in the years that followed. The exclusive worldwide position of the United States then, with its excessive place in world trade and investment, was anomalous and good untenable.
At the time of the drop, a rejection attitude was all but certain, but it has since changed to one that is now completely denial.
In its combat there in 1950-1953, the United States was unable to physically overthrow all of Korea. The US lost its following wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. None of those benefits could be altered by the NATO ally.
The US’s extensive sanctions against Russia and the US military and financial aid for Ukraine are both failures and likely will continue to be. Cuba, Iran, and China have all fallen short of US restrictions.
However, the BRICS empire counteracts US policies to protect its kingdom, including its sanctions war, with increasing usefulness.
In the realms of business, investment, and financing, we can calculate the decrease of the US empire separately. The reduction in the US dollars as a central banks reserve having is one score. Another is its collapse as a means of business, debts, and expense.
Finally, consider the US currency’s drop alongside that of dollar-denominated goods as abroad desired means of holding success. Across the Global South, countries, business, or businesses seeking business, money or investments used to go to London, Washington or Paris for decades, they now have various options. They may get rather to Beijing, New Delhi or Moscow, where they often secure more attractive words.
The region that holds the empire’s dominance has a number of advantages that lead to amazing profits for local businesses. The 19th centuries was remarkable for its never-ending conflicts and conflicts between civilizations that fought for country and, in turn, for their higher profits.
Any declines in any one kingdom may open up more opportunities for competing civilizations. If the latter grabbed those prospects, the latter’s reduction may increase. In the last century, a number of competing civilizations resulted in two world war. Another generation seems to be being driven to have worse, potentially nuclear world war in this century.
Before World War I, there were rumors that the formation of multinational corporations based on only federal mega-corporations may end or lessen the danger of war. As a natural expansion of their profit-maximizing strategies, owners and directors of exceedingly worldwide corporations may work against war between nations.
The season’s two world wars undermined those beliefs ‘ presence of truth. The fact that global mega-corporations increasingly leased government and subordinated position plans to those firms ‘ competing growth strategies also made sense.
State laws were governed by entrepreneurs ‘ opposition at least as much as the opposite. Out of their conversation emerged the warfare of the 21st centuries in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza. In addition, as a result of their discussion, rising US-China tensions have grown in the South China Sea and Taiwan.
China presents a special logical problem. Similar to those in agitating economies, where 90 % to 100 % of businesses are privately capitalist-informed, are growth imperatives in the private capitalist portion of its hybrid economic system.
The state-owned-and-operated companies comprising the other third of China’s economy exhibit various drives and desires. Revenue is less important to them than it is to personal bourgeois businesses.
Also, the Communist Party’s rule over the state—including the state’s regulation of the whole Chinese economy—introduces other goals besides income, ones that also govern business decisions.
China’s uniqueness may result in a outcome different from previous clashes of empires because it comprises the entity currently competing with the declining US empire and its major economic allies ( G7 ).
In the past, one empire often supplanted another. That may be our future with this century becoming” China’s” as previous empires were American, British and so on. However, China’s history includes earlier empires that rose and fell: another unique quality.
Could China’s hybrid economy and past have an impact on the country’s ability to transition from one empire to a truly multipolar global organization? If and when China makes that happen, will the hopes and dreams that underpin the League of Nations and the United Nations become reality?
Or will China emerge as the next global hegemon in the face of US-intensified resistance, increasing the threat of a nuclear war?
A rough historical comparison might provide some additional insight into the potential future of today’s class of empires from a different perspective. Britain was irritated enough by the country’s desire for its North American colony’s independence that it waged two wars ( 1775–183 and 1812–15 ) to stop it. Both wars failed.
Britain uncovered the valuable lesson that peaceful coexistence with some mutually beneficial planning and accommodations would enable both economies to function and grow, including in terms of trade and investment both ways across their borders. That peaceful coexistence resulted in a shift in the imperial reach of the one over the other.
Why not suggest that US-China relations will continue to develop in a similar manner over time? Except for ideologues detached from reality, the world would prefer it over the nuclear alternative.
Dealing with climate change and inequality in the distribution of wealth and income are two enormous, unwelcome consequences of capitalism, and there are projects for a US-China partnership that the world will support.
After 1815, capitalism drastically changed in both Britain and the US. After 2025, it is likely to do it once more. The opportunities are attractively open-ended.
Richard D. Wolff is visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at the New School University, New York, and professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Wolff’s weekly show, “Economic Update”, is syndicated by more than 100 radio stations and goes to millions via several TV networks and YouTube. Understanding Capitalism ( 2024 ), his most recent book, is Democracy at Work, which responds to inquiries from readers of his earlier books, Understanding Socialism and Understanding Marxism.
The Independent Media Institute’s Economy for All project produced this article. It is republished here with kind permission.