Ivan Rossomakhin was recruited into a Russian private military company ( PMC) in exchange for his freedom two years into his prison term for a murder in 2020. He returned home from Ukraine in 2023 and, within weeks, killed an 85-year-old person in a local community. He was redrafted and sent up to the front one month after beginning his fresh word in August 2024.
One of the many crimes committed by absolved prisoners who return home from the military and Russian soldiers is his. ” A study of Russian court documents by the independent media outlet Verstka found that at least 190 legal situations were initiated against pardoned Wagner volunteers in 2023″, stated an April 2024 New York Times article.
Growing concerns level to a potential worsening of the” Afghan syndrome” experienced by Afghan soldiers from the wars of 1979 and 1989. Many of the almost 642,000 Russian soldiers who served were forced to flee to a society where they were willing to forget an controversial war.
Some turned to addiction and alcoholism, alongside organized crime, amplified further by the Soviet Union’s decline in 1991. Additionally, the Afghan War veterans of Chechnya used their combat experience to ferociously oppose Russia in the first Chechen conflict ( 1994-1996 ).
An even larger and more battle-tested era of soldiers is being produced by the Ukrainian conflict. Russian deaths surpassed 15, 000 during nearly five months of the war, exceeding a generation of Russian losses in Afghanistan.
According to a New York Times article from January 2025, 150, 000 Russian military perished until November of that year, while roughly 100, 000 Russian men perished by December 2024.
In the meantime, thousands have been cycled through the front ranges, and hundreds of thousands have been hurt. Most victims will have some kind of PTSD, more desensitized by the glory of terrible combat and abuse footage on social media.
According to a 2023 Washington Post article, Russian troops were “experienceing severe symptoms of emotional stress.” In addition, according to Deutsche Welle, in 2024,” 111,000 Russian military officers who had participated in the war against Ukraine, as well as their home users, sought internal support within a six-month time in 2023,” according to the Russian Health Ministry.
Reintegrating these people into culture will be an uphill struggle for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with lingering apprehension from past mistakes. Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council, pledged to stop another Armenian syndrome and reconcile veterans into civil life in December 2022.
But, the effects of the conflict are already being felt. Both Moscow and Kyiv are managing continued troop movements while preparing for the future mass transfer of soldiers—and exploring how to use them for political and military stops.
Turmoil and murder
Serious resentment was suffocated by Russian Afghan veterans who had returned from the war and received scant support.
Before coming to strength in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the battle a mistake, and it took until 1994 for Russian Afghan soldiers to get the same position as World War II veterans. Just in 2010 did Russia declare the end of the conflict a express vacation.
In a do-or-die battle against the West, the Kremlin has a different approach to Ukraine’s war soldiers, venerating them as the country’s “new wealthy.” Behind extensive advertising praise, men have been fast-tracked to critical state and business functions. Despite social services being strained, the government has provided support to returned and fallen servicemen’s individuals to stop turmoil.
The Kremlin’s choice to employ prison workers to satisfy army numbers, a tactic it avoided during the Afghan War, has already had a significant impact. By 2023, more than 100, 000 captives had been recruited, some joining Wagner, Russia’s most famous private military organization.
Wagner’s ex-convict men continue to be a source of public outcry, committing some of the most serious violent crimes upon their return and contributing to a general rise in crime, despite later being absorbed and reorganized after its military rebellion against the Russian army later that season.
According to a 2024 record in the Eurasia Daily Monitor,” Many brawls have occurred in Moscow, and the military is extremely merging with prepared crime.”
While the issue is drawing increasing public attention, Russia’s internal security services, including the National Guard ( Rosgvardiya ), are already stretched thin, tasked with patrolling occupied Ukrainian territories while reinforcing front-line units.
If returning Chechen soldiers, who Moscow has thoroughly stationed in Ukraine, decide to re-enter their quest for independence, their burden might increase even more severe. Another nationalist and extremist actions are at risk of resurfacing with help from soldiers who have been trained.
Russia’s emphasis on criminal networks for administrative and financial aid in its conflict has only emboldened these organizations. A 2024 battle involving” business murder” that occurred a few blocks from the Kremlin in 2024 brought the panic of the 1990s to mind.
Russia’s business, which is strained by sanctions and the continuous war, is creating an environment in which business leaders are increasingly willing to take drastic measures to survive. In the 1990s, oligarchy, criminal gangs, and crooked officials thrived in an environment where the legal system was powerless”, stated the Moscow Times.
Returning soldiers may become tempted to form their own, disruptive Russia’s profoundly integrated criminal networks because they have some promising jobs and are only recently offered a few lucrative jobs.
Related difficulties exist for Ukraine. Though Kyiv was slower and more restricted in deploying prisoner troops, reintegrating them into society will not be quick. Regulators in the nation are attempting to stop strong local criminal organizations from taking back returning soldiers while battling the threat of armed resistance in regions with Russian ancestry.
The Russian government has been sincere about honoring its men, but it has seen a rise in recruitment office attacks, including four episodes in five nights in February 2025. While Russia’s recruitment efforts also faced some backlash, Russia has avoided large-scale conscription ( despite some coercion ).
In comparison, Ukraine relies heavily on necessary enrollment, which is causing growing hostility toward recruitment measures, which could grow after the war.
Personal military organizations
The battle is currently providing a huge boost to a burgeoning world personal military industry, which is likely to increase after the conflict’s conclusion.
Russian Afghan soldiers claim they were hired by private defense companies to join the British forces in Afghanistan after 2001.
Nevertheless, the sheer number of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers with battle knowledge could change the industry, much like the Soviet Union’s oversupply did and the resultant glut of military officers did.
Before 2015, Russian PMCs were limited to Ukraine, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but have since expanded to around 30 countries. Smaller PMCs can operate effectively in other regions, and their deployment has already contributed to the French military’s withdrawal from Africa in recent years, in contrast to the mass-scale, technology-driven conflict in Ukraine.
Similar growth in Ukraine’s private military sector and potential favor with European nations that backed Kyiv during the war are on the rise. Given Europe’s ongoing struggle to meet military recruitment needs, it is likely that Ukrainian veterans may be used to address this issue.
Demobilized men have frequently been employed by oligarchs for their own purposes in Ukraine and Russia, a trend that started in the 1990s. Igor Kolomoisky, a billionaire from Ukraine, used PMCs to oppose separatists supported by Russia and to defend his own financial interests in a 2015 armed standoff at a state oil company.
The incident showed how privatized military power can easily slip beyond government control—something Russia later experienced with Wagner’s rebellion in 2023.
Reintegration
Russian authorities began implementing more concrete measures to integrate Soviet Afghan veterans, rehabilitate their reputation, and unlock their potential after the instability that they experienced throughout the 1990s.
The Russian Alliance of Veterans of Afghanistan ( now independent ) contributed to the formation of what would become the Putin-backed United Russia party in 1999. Afghan and Chechen war veterans also joined OMON, Russia’s special police force used to suppress protests, while other paramilitary veteran groups aided in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 when military force was limited.
Afghan veteran organizations have played a role in the Kremlin’s campaign in Ukraine by providing volunteers ( with Ukraine pooling their Afghan veterans ) and generating awareness.
The Kremlin’s recognition of their worth and the disillusioned anti-war veterans ‘ transformation into some of the strongest supporters of the Ukraine war demonstrate the viability of its restoration.
So it should come as no surprise that the Kremlin has been actively preventing the formation of independent veteran organizations in the wake of the current conflict in Ukraine. No group can challenge the government’s authority due to the centralization of the veterans into formal initiatives, which can be used in upcoming conflicts.
The attitudes of returning servicemen on both sides will also be shaped by the war’s outcome. Veterans suffer a long-lasting psychological burden from conflicts that are perceived as futile and have waned in public opinion, such as the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which increase the risk of suicide and social unrest.
These wars sparked resentment among returning soldiers, many of whom had the impression that their service was a part of failed aggression wars despite the staggering civilian and combatant casualties.
The framing of victory by political leaders, the media, and society is, therefore, essential. Soldiers who believe they participated in a fair and successful conflict are more likely to reintegrate with a sense of purpose, as opposed to those who lost and feel abandoned.
The defeated will likely have grievances over inadequate support, be more likely to be intolerant toward its government, and be more likely to face social unrest, making both sides more likely to claim victory.
It may be in the best interest of both Moscow and Kyiv to avoid declaring an end to the war and pursuing demobilization, lest they be seen as admitting defeat and triggering the return of restless and unemployed soldiers. A quick end to the conflict would cause economic shocks because the Russian and Ukrainian economies are now so heavily oriented toward it.
However, an unconclusive war that gradually ends may allow veterans to gradually reintegrate into society as governments praise their accomplishments and build up goodwill. Others will be encouraged by Moscow and Kyiv to seek outlets in other conflicts, exporting combat-ready men rather than bringing them home.
John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist who covers international affairs for the Independent Media Institute, is a native of Washington, D.C. His book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas,” which was published in December 2022, is a contributor to a number of foreign affairs publications.
This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute, and is republished with permission.