A US-Ukraine authority on a peace plan has put the notion of a negotiated close to the three-year battle on the plan, and in the arms of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But even before Moscow answers, it’s very clear where the events stand. Breaking a previous stigma against negotiations involving regional concessions, the US has suggested Ukraine must lose land in any lasting deal, whereas President Volodymyr Zelensky has stated repeatedly that he will never produce sovereignty over Ukraine’s territory.
Nevertheless, Russia has demanded that Ukraine abandon its aspiration to visit NATO and take restrictions on its defense. But at present, Kyiv looks unlikely to gain the safety guarantees it seeks from the US before contemplating for words.
What is talked about less is what the Ukrainian people are willing to embrace for peace. And while any armistice will likely be dictated by guns, regional gains and tremendous power geopolitics, it will be in big part down to common Ukrainians to form what happens afterwards. An unpleasant peace perhaps be accepted by a war-weary people. But if it has small native legitimacy and understanding, peace is likely to be untenable in the long run.
We have tracked people view in Ukraine from before the battle and during the course of the issue.
It is an inadequate exercise, most poll in military Ukraine is by cellular phone and depends upon those with services who are willing to attend. Some people, especially in the government’s south and east, do not want to answer sensitive issues out of problem for themselves and family, some in held lands and Russia.
Those who do answer may provide guarded responses. Some are wary of military repression, while others are nationalistic or wish to present themselves as such to the person calling them. However, many other Ukrainian are overseas and excluded. Also, those in Russian-occupied provinces are left out of research.
However, the actions also give insight into how ideas in Ukraine have evolved since the Russian war of February 2022. These are five important findings from comparatively recent public opinion polls that are related to any upcoming peace negotiations.
1. Almost all Russians are stressed and tired of battle
Unsurprisingly, three years of a terrible battle of brutality have created great tension among a people increasingly weary of battle.
A December 2024 surveys from the respected Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, or KIIS found that nearly 9 in 10 Ukrainian experienced at least one demanding situation in the previous year. Large shares reported stressful experiences related to bombing and shelling ( 39 % ), separation from family members ( 30 % ), surviving the death of loves ones ( 26 % ) and the illness of loved ones ( 23 % ). Only 10 % said they’d experienced no stressful situations.
In a related vein, research we conducted showed that by summertime 2024, 84 % of the population had experienced violence in some form – be that physical damage at the hands of Russian forces, movement, loss of family member and companions, or witnessing problems.
And consistent with a growing number of news reports, we found that Ukrainians were deeply worried about war weariness among their fellow Ukrainians – just 10 % reported that they did not worry about war fatigue at all.
2. More Ukrainians want negotiations, but there are red lines
As the war has gone on, several polls show that Ukrainians increasingly support negotiations. The share of the population in favor of negotiations varies depending on how the question is posed.
When given the choice between two options, a Gallup Poll from late 2024 showed that 52 % preferred that “Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible”, whereas 38 % preferred that “Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war”.
Our earlier surveys from 2022 and 2024 similarly show a growing preference for negotiations, though at a lower level – from 11 % in 2022 to 31 % in 2024. In contrast to the binary Gallup question, our surveys presented respondents with different territorial compromises for a ceasefire. While about one-third wanted an immediate ceasefire, half wanted to continue fighting until all territories, including the predominately Russian-speaking Donbas region and Crimea, are brought back under Kyiv’s control.
But survey responses make clear that the country’s political independence is a red line for the public – even if defending it comes at a very high cost.
3. Ukrainians are more open to territorial concessions
In tandem with growing support for negotiations, our surveys – in line with KIIS’s own polls – show growing willingness to cede territory. And among those most worried about war fatigue and more pessimistic about continued Western support, the willingness to cede territory is higher.
That said, most Ukrainians still want Ukraine to continue fighting until the country’s territorial integrity is restored and under Kyiv’s control, including Crimea. But that majority has diminished since the beginning of the war – from 71 % in 2022 to 51 % in 2024.
When we asked in July 2024 whether people agreed with the statement:” Russia should be allowed to control the territory it has occupied since 2022″, 90 % disagreed. As such, there is very little evidence that Russia’s territorial annexations– or an agreement recognizing these, which is what Russia wants – would have any legitimacy among Ukraine’s population.
4. Ukrainians see Russia’s war goals in existential terms
Putin inspires the trust of neither Zelensky nor most Ukrainians– hence there’s a strong preference for any agreement being accompanied by security guarantees from NATO states.
Poll findings in the past month from KIIS reveal that 66 % of Ukrainians interpret Russia’s war aims as an existential threat, comprising genocide against Ukrainians and destruction of its independent statehood. And 87 % believe Russia will not stop at the territories it already occupies. Negotiating with an enemy bent on Ukraine’s destruction appears delusional to many Ukrainians.
5. Zelensky remains popular, his endorsement matters
As a defiant wartime leader, President Zelenskyy’s popularity was very high in the immediate months after the invasion. Indeed, KIIS polls from May 2022 show that 90 % of the population expressed trust in him.
This has declined as the war has endured, but it has always remained above 50 %. Recent polling measuring his approval puts it at 63 %, an increase from 2024. Indeed, the very latest KIIS polls, from February through March of this year, show a 10-point jump in his trust rating to 67 %, a finding widely viewed as rallying in the face of U. S. criticism.
Thus Zelenskyy’s endorsement of any ceasefire and settlement will matter, though ceding territory is likely to be hazardous for him politically.
Conditions for a lasting peace
While the US-Ukraine accord on a ceasefire has put the ball in Russia’s court, it is unclear whether it will be enough to bring Putin to the table. And even if it does, given past precedent it is difficult to see him arriving as a compromiser rather than a conqueror.
What does appear clear is that whatever “peace” emerges looks set to hang more on Ukraine making concessions and accepting losses.
Such a peace can be negotiated behind closed doors. But without public support in Ukraine, whether it endures on the ground is another matter.
Gerard Toal is a professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech, JohnO’Loughlin is a professor of geography at the University of Colorado Boulder, and Kristin M Bakke is a professor of political science and international relations at UCL.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.