The Middle East has been shocked by the Assad regime’s swift overthrow. The region’s energy balance has changed dramatically since the dictator’s family’s dispossession of him for more than 50 years.
Beyond Syria and its neighbors, significant ramifications exist, with Russia one of the more severely affected countries.
Back in 2015, Assad’s plan had been on the brink of collapse. A Russian treatment, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, saved it. Russia, which was established in response to the growing risk from Islamic State, gave Assad’s regime the ability to repress another rebel groups as well.
Over the years that followed, it gave Assad the ability to retake control of the city’s money, another important towns, and in particular the coastal area, where Russia had two military installations.
The future of these foundations is now questionable. Russians needed important resources to establish military power in the Mediterranean Sea and support the Kremlin’s say to Russian great-power standing, including an air basic at Khmeimim established south of Latakia in 2015, as well as the Russian naval base in Tartus, which dates back to the Soviet era.
Given how substantial investments have been made over the years to support the program and how important are the bases for Russia, Assad’s fall has a negative impact on Russia’s ability to assert reliable influence on the global stage.
Yet if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s fresh leaders regarding the future of its military installations, Moscow’s failure to save an important ally like Assad exposes crucial shortcomings in Russia’s capacity to act like a great strength rather than just talk.
There are distinct knowledge gaps that either overlooked or misinterpreted Qatar’s continued support for anti-Assad forces and Turkey’s covert support for this. These losses were then made worse by the Russian military’s ineffectiveness and ability to increase them on short notice. This is, of course, according to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.
Iran and Hezbollah, two different Kremlin allies in the region, have been given more military support, which has more complicated Assad’s situation, and this has also made the effects of Russia’s overwhelm worse. This even raises the question of whether Russia had a strategic error in interpreting the position and undervalued Syria’s risk.
Even more disturbing is the fact that Russia relies on friends who positively support a young wonderful power that lacks the means to proclaim its claim to power, as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015, as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military foundations.
Where’s China?
China is missing from this equation. Beijing had backed Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, but most of it was rhetorical. It was primarily intended to stop a Western-backed, UN-backed intervention similar to the one in Libya that caused the country’s chaos and the fall of Gaddafi since.
A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. In Beijing’s eyes at least, this appeared to be another step in the direction of the Syrian regime. However, China did nothing to save him when the situation suddenly appeared and Assad’s rule was in serious danger.
This raises a significant question about how well-versed in China is the Syrian government and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.
Despite all the talk of a never-ending partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately failed to save Russia from humiliating defeat in Syria.
China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, unlike Russia, where it needed a military presence to back up its claims to great-power status.
This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.
Putin diminished
Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow lost a significant allies to Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.
This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. Russia’s reputation and standing in the eyes of other partners is likely to be further diminished, whether they are from China or North Korea, from BRICS members or from countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.
The consequences of that are likely to be ambiguous for Ukraine, which is arguably Russia’s biggest contributor to the overstretch.
On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was removed shows that Russia has limitations and is not invincible. On the other hand, nothing but Russian resumption should be anticipated in Ukraine.
Putin requires a swift recovery to help him win both domestic and international trust. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.
Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham
The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.