With subtle anti-ship missiles, the US is upgrading its aging F-16s to long-range ship killers, which raises weapons, flexibility, and significant concerns about stockpiles and survivability in a possible Pacific conflict with China.
The US Navy has made it known that it plans to add the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM) to the US Air Force F-16 fighters, significantly enhancing their ability to fire at longer ranges against well-defended ships, according to a recent article from The War Zone ( TWZ ).
According to a outsourcing notice from the Naval Air Systems Command, this work gives Lockheed Martin a Cost-Plus Set Rate Supply Buy for the missile’s integration and testing.
Advanced stealth capabilities, autonomous route planning, and terminal-phase targeting are all provided by the LRASM, which is derived from the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ( JASSM).
In light of the US government’s wider efforts to increase air-launched anti-ship capabilities as it prepares for a possible conflict with China in the Pacific, the connectivity is important.
The LRASM offers excellent efficiency over the older AGM-84 Harpoon, which is now used on US Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and Air Force B-1 aircraft. A 965-kilometer variety and sophisticated electronic support systems support the LRASM.
The decision corresponds to US concerns about munitions stockpiles and the need for versatile, distributed start platforms, which are still a priority. By bolstering allied abilities in areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, the walk will increase US corporate punishment by equipping LRASM-equipped F-16s worldwide. However, the exact date for functional implementation is still unknown.
The F-16 lacks essential characteristics that enable survivability on a military level in a contemporary aerial warfare setting. The LRASM may, however, enable widespread F-16s to match existing secrecy aircraft and long-range bombers in a coastal hit role.
Harrison Kass argues in an August 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI ) that the 50-year-old F-16 design lacks the stealth capabilities necessary for contemporary air warfare. Kass contends that the F-16 properly be limited to circumstances where air supremacy has been achieved because of improved air security and monitoring systems.
Nevertheless, the LRASM’s long range makes it possible for delivery aircraft to stay out of China’s anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) defenses, while the use of common F-16s increases the number of launch aircraft, which could increase US conventional firepower for maritime strikes.
The F-16 will continue to be the US Air Force’s low-end, multifunctional force multiplier, according to David Nahom in an April 2022 Air &, Space Forces Magazine content. According to Nahom, the US Air Force’s 600 F-16s also have between 18 and 20 years of service, and a replacement is also a long way off.
The same might never be said, however, about US LRASM supplies. Seth Jones mentions in a report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) in January 2023 that the US spent its entire inventory of 450 LRASMs in a simulated conflict over Taiwan in a two-year period, with LRASMs costing US$ 3 million per round.
The F-16’s somewhat short 860 kilometers in an air-to-surface role may prove ineffective in a Pacific operating environment with its extensive range.
Although forward basing can help to address some of these functional difficulties, a report from the Stimson Center in December of 2024 mentions that US ahead air bases in Japan, Guam, and another Pacific locations are susceptible to China’s long-range missiles, which threaten to halt US forth air operations.
According to Grieco and others, the loss of US ahead airbases could reduce the US from using flying refueling tankers, which allow the author’s fighters to attack targets without allowing them to reach the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. They also point out that a ship’s ability to fly without having underwater refueling can hinder long-range coastal strike operations.
While Greco and others point out that the US Air Force may attempt to fly aircraft from further afield, including Australia, Alaska, and Hawaii, the lengthy distances could reduce the number of missions flown every day, making it difficult to use the power effectively.
In an article this month for National Defense Magazine, Brian Clark mentions that pilots could fly 800 kilometers ( 500 miles ) further to the Taiwan Strait after completing 965 kilometers ( 1, 000 miles ) transits to get weapons into launch range.
Clark claims that this would restrict LRSAM effectiveness by making their flight paths repetitive for the enemy because maneuvering may result in them running out of fuel. This may force them to travel straight forward to reach their targets.
The post points out that it is unclear whether the US Air Force will continue with its preferred position of using B-21 or B-2 planes to overthrow China by attacking Foreign airbases on the island or concentrate on coastal strikes.
While attacking the Chinese mainland might lead to nuclear retribution, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and additional authors make mention of China in a November 2024 RAND report that they may be willing to accept some standard attacks on the island.
According to Beauchamp-Mustafaga and another, this circumstance suggests a willingness to deal with high-value targets on the continent without using nuclear signaling. They mention that China favors reducing costs by developing advanced heat threats to halt limited US strikes on the mainland’s coercion.
In line with that, Clark contends that China would not allow an amphibious abuse power to land on Taiwan if it were to lose some of its airbases on the island. He claims that using amphibious transport as goals does alter China’s math.
However, Dmitry Filipoff mentions in a March 2023 Center for International Maritime Security ( CIMSEC ) article that modern high-end warships have sophisticated layered air defenses that increase the amount of fire needed to overwhelm targets and score a hit.
Additionally, Mark Gunzinger and Stacey Pettyjohn point out in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article from July 2024 that the LRASM is also expensive to purchase in huge numbers and that the US Air Force and US DOD cannot simply purchase much to satisfy requirements, even if production is increased.
In a November 2021 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Gunzinger asserts that US inventories of legacy munitions are insufficient because many munitions are either too vulnerable, too few, or too expensive for large-scale, sustained operations against advanced adversaries. However, such a situation encourages the production of lower-cost precision-guided munitions ( PGM ) for “affordable mass.
In the meantime, he makes note of the fact that secrecy aircraft are exposed to deadly air defenses by shorter-range direct-attack munitions. He claims that the US lacks enough production capacity and stockpiles for fast wartime demand despite the cost-effectiveness of mid-range” stand-in” PGMs being suggested as a solution for stealth platforms.