A significant bilateral leap has been made by the US Space Force ( USSF ) to combat rising threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, and strengthen the US-Japan alliance as a key component of Indo-Pacific space security.
This month, US Forces Japan ( USFJ) announced that the USSF activated its sixth service component, known as the United States Space Forces-Japan ( USSPACEFOR-JPN), at Yokota Air Base.
The creation of the unit is in line with the commitments made at the Security Consultative Committee’s July 2024 meeting to improve diplomatic coordination in areas like electric and space warfare. The move aims to improve area security and long-term sustainability, keeping in mind the changing nature of contemporary warfare and the crucial role that space plays in national defense strategies.
Under US Colonel Ryan Laughton’s command, USSPACEFOR-JPN will support US Forces Japan ( USFJ) by planning, integrating and executing space security efforts in coordination with Japanese counterparts.
US Lieutenant General Stephen Jost cited Japan’s major advancements in area operations and the need for strong space expertise to improve combined warfighting capabilities. The new system would improve connectivity and resilience, according to Brigade General Anthony Mastalir, making it clear that the Indo-Pacific may be free and open.
North Korea, China and Russia are significantly in a relationship of pleasure on space assistance, driven by their shared animosity toward the Western-dominated global order and logical self-interest.
In a February 2024 post for 38 North, Sangsoo Lee mentions that North Korea’s area activities have recently intensified, as seen in the prosperous release of its first spy satellite in November 2023 following two earlier failed attempts.
Lee claims that Lee’s satellite apparently captured reconnaissance images of significant US military installations, despite the lack of any independent confirmation. He suggests that following a conference between Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un and President Vladimir Putin in September 2023, Russia perhaps have contributed to North Korea’s progress in storage technology.
In a May 2023 report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI), Kevin Pollpeter and other authors mention China and Russia’s increased strategic space cooperation, which is reflected in wider geopolitical shifts and shared opposition to US dominance.
Pollpeter and others note this agreement includes cooperation on solar and Mars investigation, weapon protection, satellite tracking and technologies transfers. Russia providing crucial abilities in a secondary function, while China’s financial and technological prowess extremely positions it as the leader in this connection.
Joint solar bases, missile warning systems, and incorporated satellite systems, which are important Chinese and Russian space initiatives, are among those that aim to combat US influence while supporting their national security and scientific objectives.
In a Council on Foreign Relations ( CFR ) article from July 2024, Sheila Smith mentions that Japan sees the growing alliance between China, Russia, and North Korea as a significant threat to regional stability.
Smith says that Japan is especially concerned about Russia’s security agreement with North Korea, which includes the delivery of advanced technology and arms to support North Korea’s missile and nuclear plans.
She points out that this alliance makes Japan’s security strategy more difficult, particularly given the possibility for North Korea to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBM ) capable of reaching the US.
Smith also mentions Japan’s concern over China’s military and diplomatic relations with Russia, which, according to Smith, could lead to deeper regional instability. She claims that Japan is strengthening its security relations with the US and South Korea in response to those dangers.
However, Kari Bingen mentions that Japan faces significant difficulties in expanding its space cooperation with the US in a March 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank article, primarily because of its lack of expertise in conducting military space operations and the need for extensive education and training.
Bingen points out that Japan’s area ecosystem has previously focused on military missions, which has led to the lack of growth of defense space systems. Moreover, she says Japan’s protection organizations and business had beat barriers related to data-sharing policies, security clearances and import regulations.
In addition, Saadia Pekkanen mentions that the US-Japan empire is the only official military alliance that extends into space in a June 2023 CSIS post.
Pekkanen points out that this relationship places a premium on protecting planetary assets that are crucial to international security, technology, and stability. She mentions important issues, such as anti-satellite arms, proximity procedures and the rising risks of orbital debris from an expanding Edward system.
Pekkanen claims that Japan has restructured its legal system, established a dedicated Space Operations Squadron, and strengthened industrial cooperation with the US through initiatives like integrating military sensors with its QZSS satellite system to address those threats.
She also mentions that the alliance concentrates on Space Domain Awareness ( SDA ) to track orbital activities and increase security against both natural and man-made threats. Pekkanen notes collaborative milestones, such as Japan’s participation in US-led Shriever space wargames and the NASA Artemis lunar exploration program, reflecting intertwined civil, commercial and military goals.
Pekkanen points out the ambiguities in international law and the ambiguity in the US-Japan security treaty of 1960, despite the development and new threats.
Further, according to Michael Mazarr and other authors, the 2022 National Defense Strategy ( NDS ) lists US allies and partners as essential players in achieving integrated deterrence in space in a RAND report released this month.
Mazarr and others mention that integrated deterrence combines US and allied capabilities across domains, such as military, economic and diplomatic, to amplify their effectiveness in deterring aggression. They emphasize how space operations—spanning intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance ( ISR ), satellite communications ( SATCOM) and missile warning—are foundational to this strategy.
The authors highlight how US allies make a significant contribution by enabling joint operations, facilitating access to shared space assets, and lowering adversaries ‘ risk calculations. However, they mention that challenges persist, including barriers to information sharing, joint defense production and integrating multinational efforts into cohesive deterrent strategies.