The first 100 days of the second Donald Trump Administration produced upheaval in many quarters, but one policy remains steady: building a regional defense architecture to deter aggression by China.
Further movement in this direction, however, is threatened by collateral damage from aspects of the new US government’s approach to foreign policy that break with the pre-Trump era. Chief among these are the “tariff war” and alliance skepticism.
How did we get to where we are now? During the first Trump Administration (2017-2021), US policy toughened toward Beijing as Washington concluded that deep economic engagement with China was not working as planned.
Increased wealth was supposed to liberalize and pacify China. Instead, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping was increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad. The pandemic drew attention to America’s dependence on Chinese supplies of vital supplies.
Trump’s government characterized China as more of an adversary than a partner. The US imposed tariffs on some Chinese imports and began working to reroute global supply chains to reduce China’s global economic centrality. At the same time, Trump expressed contempt for US alliances, arguing that allies benefited disproportionately while underpaying for US protection.
At the same time, Trump departed from the mainstream of postwar US foreign policy in important ways. He rejected American exceptionalism, sidelined liberal values as a lodestar for US foreign relationships and expressed affinity for authoritarian state leaders such as Xi, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un.
Trump was highly critical of US global commitments, particularly the US alliances in both Europe and Asia. Instead of free trade, he touted tariffs as the solution to America’s trade deficit.
President Joe Biden (2021-2025) extended and increased some of Trump’s tariffs on China. His administration also placed restrictions on Chinese access to advanced technology and pressured other governments to do the same.
Biden, however, reversed Trump by returning to a more conventional view of alliances as force multipliers that produce a valuable if intangible strategic return on American investment.
The foreign policy of Trump II is dominated by two familiar themes from his first term: enthusiasm for tariffs and disdain for alliances. What is surprising is the intensity with which he has implemented those predilections.
The entire world is now under relatively high US tariffs (10%, compared with an average US rate of 2.5% in 2024) with the threat of much higher “reciprocal tariffs” that would kick in as soon as May.
And America has effectively abandoned NATO – by antagonizing Western Europe and Canada, by declaring that NATO members can no longer count on the US to defend them and by accommodating Russia despite Putin’s aggression against Ukraine.
The first three months of Trump II have seen Washington reaffirm its intention to strengthen a counter-China defensive military coalition. As he was dealing with the fallout of the Signal scandal, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made his first trip to Asia in March. He passed on South Korea, likely because its government was under an acting president while Yoon Suk-yeol was in impeachment proceedings.
In Japan, Hegseth said the US plans to increase joint training and cooperation in developing new weapons technologies with Japan, and will also complete the upgrade of the US military headquarters in Japan from an administrative office to a military command post, a decision first announced by the Biden Administration.
In the Philippines, Hegseth reiterated that the US-Philippine defense treaty covers attacks on Philippine government ships or aircraft anywhere in the South China Sea – an important commitment given Chinese harassment of Philippine navy and coast guard vessels in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, over which Beijing claims sovereignty.
Hegseth also announced that the US and the Philippines plan to co-produce some military systems and that the US will deploy advanced sea drones and NMESIS anti-ship missiles in Philippines territory. NMESIS indeed appeared in the Batanes Islands in the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan during a US-Philippines military exercise in April. These missiles could theoretically target Chinese warships attempting to encircle Taiwan.
The AUKUS agreement, whereby the US and the UK will help provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, is still on track, albeit somewhat shakily. On January 29, Australia made a US$500 million down payment – part of a total commitment of US$3 billion to build up the US capacity to manufacture submarines.
The shaky part includes uncertainty regarding how much Trump supports or even knows about AUKUS. On February 7, Hegseth said that “the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS” and that Hegseth himself had “hope” that the US would deliver the promised submarines on time. A few days later, asked during a press conference if he had discussed AUKUS with the visiting UK Prime Minister, Trump replied, “What does that mean?”
While the Trump White House ordered a three-month freeze of foreign aid programs upon taking office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio approved exceptions to the freeze that included US$870 million in military assistance for Taiwan and $336 million for the Philippines.
US Navy warships transited the Taiwan Strait in February and April, indicating that Washington is still willing to annoy Beijing to demonstrate an interest in Taiwan’s security.
But while the Pentagon’s agenda in the Asia-Pacific region has seen little interruption in the transition from the Biden to the Trump Administration, it is partly undercut by Washington’s larger foreign policy shifts. Not surprisingly, rent-seeking and abandonment of friends in other parts of the world are adverse to nurturing alliances.
The tariff issue is a double whammy for US allies Japan and South Korea. Trump is unhappy with both countries for two reasons. First, they have trade surpluses with the US. Second, Trump thinks they are defense free-riders.
The governments of both Japan and South Korea have said they want to keep military issues separate from trade talks with the US. Unfortunately for them, Trump extolls the idea of “one stop shopping,” which means “bringing up other subjects that are not covered by Trade and Tariffs, and getting them negotiated also.”
The tariff issue brings delegations from theoe two countries to Washington for urgent negotiations. The Japanese, who face a possible additional 24% tariff, came to town on April 16. The Koreans, hoping to avert a planned 25% reciprocal tariff, followed on April 24. Such meetings allow the Trump team to re-visit the contentious matters of how much these allies spend on defense and how much they contribute toward the cost of hosting US military bases.
Both countries have already signed multi-year host nation support agreements with the Biden Administration. Under a deal good until 2027, Japan pays US$1.7 billion per year toward the US bases, plus an additional US$3 billion this year for other costs including construction for US Marines moving from Okinawa to Guam.
South Korea pays the US a little over $1 billion annually in host nation support under an agreement valid until 2029.
Trump, however, has recently complained that the Japanese “don’t pay anything” for US protection and that the South Koreans should pay $10 billion per year. The likely result is more stress on these alliances.
Japan is especially undeserving of such treatment. Tokyo has made itself more useful to the US strategic agenda in recent years by
- working toward raising its defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP,
- signing a deal to buy 400 US-made Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles,
- accelerating plans to develop and deploy its own precision missiles that can hit ships and ground targets,
- establishing a Joint Operations Command to improve coordination among the different branches of the Japanese armed forces and
- strengthening its defenses in the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan.
In Australia, the new US government has seriously damaged confidence in US reliability as an ally. Prominent Australian policy thinkers are arguing that their country can no longer count on American help in times of danger.
The Australian public feels the same. In the middle of last year, 61 percent of Australian respondents said they could “rely on the United States for defense and national security.” Polled on that same question in April, 66 percent answered in the negative.
The disillusionment down under stems from two distinctively Trump policies. The first is Washington’s rough handling of supposed friends such as NATO member countries and Ukraine.
The second antagonizing policy is the tariffs. While Washington characterized its tariffs as a means of addressing America’s many bilateral trade deficits, the US has a trade surplus with Australia. Australians nevertheless got the same tariffs as most of the rest of the world: 10% on everything, plus an additional 25% on steel and aluminum products.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese argued that “a reciprocal tariff” in Australia’s case “would be zero.” Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong asked for an exemption from the steel and aluminum tariff, but Trump rebuffed the appeal.
The damage is not yet fatal. In an opinion piece published in an Australian national newspaper, PRC Ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian gracelessly invited Aussies to “join hands” with China to “stop the hegemonic and bullying behavior of the US.” Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles shot back, “I don’t think we’ll be holding China’s hand.”
A US grand strategy that reconciles “America First” with US leadership of an Asian security architecture is possible, but we have not seen it during Trump’s first hundred days. Until that happens the two lines of effort will work against each other.