The US intends to build an underground facility to test its hypersonic weapons, allowing it to launch its submarine-launched fast weapons against China and Russia.
Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, the US Navy’s director of Strategic Systems Programs, stated at a reading of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services this quarter that the US is establishing the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed ( MACH- TB ) and an impressive Marine Check Center at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Indiana.
The underground service, in particular, marks a major step toward deploying fast capabilities from submarines, indicating a move to improve the stealth and survivability of these vital systems.
Wolfe even made a statement about a Navy and Army joint project to create and test a common fast weapon system. The partnership may benefit from a common hypersonic glide body and missile booster, as well as a solid mutual test schedule to ensure that the cutting-edge weapons adhere to stringent performance and reliability requirements.
Wolfe emphasized the crucial characteristics of hypersonic networks, which you travel more than five times the speed of sound and quickly and effectively target strongly defended high-value assets due to their speed, flexibility, and level.
The weapons are central to the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) strategic vision as outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which aims to bolster integrated deterrence, enhance campaigning capabilities and secure enduring advantages over potential adversaries.
Although budget cuts and the lack of adequate assessment facilities have hampered the work, the US recently announced its intention to place fast weapons aboard submarines.
The US Navy plans to place the Conventional Prompt Strike ( CPS) hypersonic weapon system aboard the first Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine ( SSN) equipped with the Virginia Payload Module by 2028, according to USNI News in November 2021.
In 2025, it had a change of plans due to budget cuts that prevented it from building an underground test service, but it had originally planned to do so on the four guided missile variations of the Ohio-class ships.
In terms of missile power, USNI noted in February 2020 that the add- on Virginia Payload Module has 28 more weapon tubes for 40 rockets per underwater. The report notes that the module would allow the Virginia- class SSNs to be a viable replacement for the older Ohio- class SSGNs, which have fewer missiles and are more likely to have less magazine depth and firepower concerns.
Budgetary constraints and decreased shipbuilding orders may have a significant impact on the future of the US’s planned submarine-based hypersonic arsenal. The US Navy’s 2025 order for Virginia-class SSNs was reduced from two to just one unit, according to a report from Breaking Defense.
Breaking Defense claims that the US Navy’s 2025 budget maintains the nine projected submarines and US submarine production capability for the US Navy and AUKUS despite canceling one of the planned Virginia SSNs.
A US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from February 2024 raises important questions about the operation and strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. The US has a$ 9 billion budget for building an underwater facility to test its hypersonic weapons program.
According to the CRS report, US research into hypersonic weapons receives substantial funding, but it lacks specific acquisition plans or approved mission requirements. Additionally, it asserts that there are divergent opinions regarding the cost-effectiveness of producing weapons in accurate battlefield figures.
According to the CRS report, more in-depth analyses, including cost and strategic analyses, are required to understand how US strategy uses hypersonic weapons.
In a November 2019 War on the Rocks article, Alan Cummings points out that the US can use the weapons to signal interest and resolve, leverage to pursue arms control agreements, and be flexible in its response in light of adversary counter-space operations.
Cummings points out that the low likelihood of US hypersonic weapons sends powerful signals to adversaries because they can indicate US priorities on priorities and redlines. He also makes the point that low-visibility deployments and systems that can be quickly surged and recovered might help to accomplish that goal.
In the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, the US simultaneously surfaced three Ohio-class SSGNs in 2010. This action may have revealed the disapproval of US policy in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The USS Florida at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the USS Michigan at Pusan, South Korea, the USS Ohio at Subic Bay, Philippines, and the USS Michigan at Pusan, South Korea.
Cummings claims that using hypersonic weapons as bargaining chips in upcoming arms control agreements can lessen the risks that close-knit neighbors China and Russia pose to trade or other strategic interests.
He points out that the US must develop the same capabilities it intends to limit in order for it to negotiate from a position of strength, as only then would potential adversaries begin to consider them.
However, the US may already be seriously behind in submarine- launched hypersonic missiles. Russia’s first use of its Zircon ship and submarine-launched hypersonic weapon in the ongoing Ukraine war was reported by Asia Times in February 2024.
The first flight test for the Zircon missile from Russia took place in 2015, and it will be operational in 2022. Before being deployed to the frigate in January 2023, the missile was tested by two warships, the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the Severodvinsk SSGN.
These naval vessels are currently not operating in the Black Sea. It would be unusual to launch a missile from a ship that has not yet undergone testing if it were to be launched into combat.
Cummings also mentions that using hypersonic weapons might provide alternative ways to take defensive actions in space in response to adversaries ‘ hostile actions. He claims that the US relies heavily on space-based assets for navigation, surveillance, and communication, which makes it particularly concerned about adversary threats to those assets.
He asserts that before anti-satellite weapons could be used, hypersonic weapons could enable the US to launch first-attacks against command uplinks.
He also mentions that the US might inflict damage before its space-based assets are lost because of the quick flight times of hypersonic weapons. Both are plausible responses to anti-space attacks that can deter the use of anti-satellite weapons in the first place, according to Cummings.