The US Navy’s Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is perilously behind schedule, raising concerns about the service’s ability to replace aging Ohio-class SSBNs on time to maintain nuclear deterrence amid rising tensions with China.
Last month, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report saying that the Columbia-class program faces significant challenges, including delays, cost overruns and performance risks that jeopardize its timeline.
The first Columbia SSBN was initially planned for delivery by April 2027 but is now expected between October 2028 and February 2029, potentially affecting its planned availability for operations in 2030, according to the GAO report.
It also points out that persistent problems like subpar construction performance, delays in work instructions and material shortages have caused significant cost overruns in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The GAO report says that the Columbia-class shipbuilder, Electric Boat, has consistently fallen short of cost and schedule targets and warns that the contractor’s optimistic recovery plan may be unrealistic.
It also says that the US Navy’s US$2.6 billion investment in the submarine supplier base, meant to accelerate production, lacks consistent performance tracking, raising concerns about its effectiveness.
The report says that despite efforts to mitigate these problems, further risks in final assembly and testing could exacerbate delays and costs. The GAO report mentions that without better oversight and revised cost estimates, the US Navy may face operational gaps in its nuclear deterrence strategy, increasing reliance on aging Ohio-class SSBNs whose service lives may now need risky extensions.
A US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from last month says that the delays in the construction of the Columbia-class SSBNs stem from multiple factors, including difficulties in assembling the boat’s modules, workforce shortages at shipyards and supply chain issues, particularly with critical components like turbine generators and the bow dome.
The think tank report notes that these parts, supplied by subcontractors such as Northrop Grumman, arrived late, further straining the schedule.
CRS says the tight timeline for constructing the Columbia-class SSBNs, exacerbated by the need to concurrently build Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN), has also exposed industrial base challenges. It notes that with US shipyards struggling to meet the demands of both programs, questions are arising regarding the ability to maintain on-time deliveries without sacrificing quality.
On that score, USNI reported last month that Newport News Shipbuilding alerted the US Department of Justice (DOJ) about suspected faulty welds in submarines and aircraft carriers, potentially made intentionally.
USNI says that the shipbuilder informed the US Navy that certain welds in both new construction and in-service vessels did not adhere to proper procedures, according to a memo from Assistant Secretary of the US Navy Nickolas Guertin.
The source says that the US Navy is investigating the extent of the issue, with early findings suggesting that some welders knowingly violated welding protocols. It mentions that Newport News, a key builder of Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines and Ford-class aircraft carriers, discovered the problem through internal quality assurance measures.
The company has claimed its workers had no malicious intent and has taken immediate corrective action, according to the USNI report. It notes that US lawmakers, led by the House Armed Services Committee, have launched an investigation demanding answers from the US Department of Defense (DOD) about the safety risks posed to US Navy sailors.
USNI mentions that the full scope of the faulty welds is still under evaluation, with re-inspections of the affected vessels expected to continue into October. It notes that the issue recalls previous welding controversies at the shipyard, including a similar investigation in the 2000s.
The CRS report mentions that the potential for cost overruns adds another layer of complexity to the skyrocketing costs of the Columbia-class SSBNs. It says procurement costs for the first boat are now estimated at $15.2 billion, partly due to design and engineering expenses.
The report also states that any further delays could impact the US Navy’s strategic deterrence capabilities, as it is necessary to ensure that the Columbia-class SSBNs can replace Ohio-class SSBNs on schedule.
These issues may be emblematic of more significant problems in the US submarine production base’s maintenance of its strategic edge amid China’s rising threat. In a 2024 American Affairs article, Jerry Hendrix notes that the US submarine fleet has dwindled from its Cold War peak of 140 nuclear-powered submarines to just 67 today, with only 49 classified as SSNs.
Due to a three-year maintenance backlog, Hendrix points out that nearly a third of these vessels are non-operational. He also says that the US Navy’s shipbuilding partners have struggled to ramp up production post-Covid, with only one new SSN planned for the fiscal year 2025.
Hendrix mentions that the submarine industrial base’s decline, exacerbated by decisions made in the 1990s to close several vital shipyards, has left the US with insufficient drydock and maintenance capacity.
In contrast to the US, Sarah Kirchberger mentions in a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China’s submarine industrial base, a key component of its naval modernization, has made significant advancements through state-led innovation focused on research and development (R&D) and upgrading shipbuilding infrastructure.
Kirchberger says that the Bohai, Wuchang and Jiangnan shipyards have modernized to meet China’s growing demand for nuclear and conventional submarines. However, she notes that despite substantial investments, weaknesses persist, particularly in propulsion systems, submarine quieting technologies and air-independent propulsion (AIP) capabilities.
To address these gaps, she notes China has leveraged political and economic ties with Russia, seeking access to advanced undersea technologies. While Kirchberger notes that China’s industrial base boasts impressive infrastructure, its reliance on foreign technology, inefficiencies caused by state monopolies, and technical shortcomings in critical subsystems hinder its ability to fully match the capabilities of more established submarine-producing nations such as Russia and the US.
Nevertheless, Kirchberger says that China’s aggressive shipbuilding trajectory, bolstered by substantial state financing, positions it as a formidable naval power with ongoing efforts to close remaining technological gaps.
Asia Times has noted that China aims to match or surpass the US in undersea warfare capabilities, with its submarine program moving faster than the US’s.
While China seeks to have a quantitative edge over the US in submarines, taking production shortcuts and a lack of leadership and knowledge in its submarine program, coupled with deeply entrenched corruption in its defense industries, may lead to setbacks such as the purported pier-side sinking of its latest Zhou-class SSN.