The US Navy’s newest fleet system is sailing directly into the same wind that sank its final two big shipping efforts: rising costs, style chaos and shrinking credibility.
Last month, the US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) reported that despite repeated assurances of lessons learned from the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class ( DDG 1000 ) destroyer programs, the US Navy’s Constellation-class frigate ( FFG 62 ) is repeating the same acquisition missteps.
In all three scenarios, the US Navy committed to deliver design before achieving firm designs, resulting in trickling delays, soaring costs and diminished capabilities, according to the GAO’s latest findings.
Like the LCS, the Constellation-class ship began building with an exaggerated style implementation day, after revealed to be only 70 %, not 88 %. This led to a three-year wait for the prospect send and a US$ 3.4 billion devotion to inadequate models.
Like DDG 1000, where juvenile technologies and fragile requirements raised unit costs tenfold, the frigate now faces complex risks from untested propulsion and machinery control systems.
Further, the frigate’s modifications have eroded its advertised commonality with the Italian parent design, undermining the program’s original risk-reduction rationale and prompting it to sacrifice speed in compensation for weight growth — a trend that parallels the LCS and Zumwalt’s ultimate delivery of less than promised.
The GAO stresses that history will continue to repeat itself until the US Navy abandons its flawed acquisition playbook and adopts leading commercial ship design practices, such as completing functional designs before construction, which jeopardizes the fleet’s readiness and credibility.
The Constellation class was envisioned as a general-purpose naval combatant, akin to the 1970s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. A December 2024 US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report notes that the class intentionally avoids introducing new, unproven technologies and relies instead on systems already deployed across the US Navy to reduce costs.
The CRS report mentions the Aegis Combat System and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar as pre-existing systems to be used in the Constellation class, distinguishing it from the LCS, which struggled with immature systems, such as its propulsion system and multi-mission modules.
Emphasizing the need to replace the LCS, Andrew Latham argues in a February 2025 article for 1945 that even with missile upgrades, the type would be little more than a liability in a possible Pacific conflict due to a weak hull, a lack of long-range weapons, and limited endurance to contribute in a fight against China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) blue-water fleet consisting of frigates, destroyers and cruisers.
However, a May 2024 GAO report notes that the Constellation-class frigate’s design has experienced unplanned weight growth exceeding 10 % of the initial estimates due to incomplete design information and underestimations when adapting the foreign parent design to US Navy requirements.
The report mentions that growth has raised concerns about the frigate’s ability to meet its speed requirements, leading the US Navy to consider reducing the ship’s speed as a potential solution.
However, in a November 2024 article for 1945, Robert Farley notes that extra weight could make it difficult for the Constellation class to keep pace with US carriers and destroyers, and may also complicate future upgrades.
A CRS report from last month describes the operational roles of the Constellation-class frigates. The ships are designed as multi-mission platforms capable of anti-air, anti-surface, antisubmarine and electromagnetic warfare, enabling them to operate independently or as integral units within carrier strike groups, surface action groups ( SAG ) or allied naval formations.
The report states that the US Navy plans to conduct an iterative procurement of at least 20 ships, with additional ships anticipated under the long-range shipbuilding plan. Once production stabilizes, the phased delivery of these frigates will incrementally provide operational commanders with adaptable assets for both blue-water and littoral missions.
However, US shipbuilding capabilities are insufficient for the Constellation-class program’s requirements.
A January 2025 US CRS report explicitly links design instability and delays with operational-level uncertainty for fleet planning. It highlights that the FFG-62 lead ship is now facing an approximate 36-month delay, more than double the initial delay reported, due to design workforce limitations and incomplete design work before construction.
The report notes that this is part of a broader pattern across multiple shipbuilding programs, creating what it refers to as an “extraordinary situation” unseen since World War II.
According to the report, these delays and the US Navy’s inability to meet projected procurement rates undermine the access of combatant commanders to expected assets and complicate force generation planning.
Despite these challenges, the US Navy’s persistence in pursuing the Constellation class underscores the need to reconstitute its surface force to counter China’s growing naval presence and power in the Pacific.
Underscoring this point, the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report states that the PLAN is the world’s largest navy, comprising 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants.
In contrast to the Constellation class, which is still under construction, Eric Wertheim mentions in a Proceedings article from last month that China has commissioned the Luohe, the first Jiangkai III-class ( Type 054B ) frigate, signifying a notable advancement in the PLAN’s capabilities.
Wertheim notes that the frigate, built at Hudong Zhonghua Shipbuilding in Shanghai, boasts enhanced stealth, firepower and technology compared to its predecessor, the Jiangkai II class.
He says that the Type 054B, equipped with a 32-cell vertical-launch system (VLS), advanced active electronically scanned array ( AESA ) radar, and expanded antisubmarine warfare capabilities, positions China for diversified naval operations.
He notes that the Luohe has been assigned to the PLAN North Sea Fleet while additional ships are in production, underscoring a strategic emphasis on modernizing China’s naval forces.
In contrast, the Constellation class may risk becoming a symbol of US shipbuilding dysfunction and decline.
Alistair MacDonald mentions in a Wall Street Journal ( WSJ) article last month that the US Navy faces a critical challenge in shipbuilding as delays and cost overruns persist, undermining its strategic position amid intensifying global competition.
To underscore the point, MacDonald says that the Constellation-class frigate, the first of a new frigate class intended to address fleet deficiencies, remains years behind schedule and over budget despite efforts to accelerate production by adopting a proven Italian design.
He says that while US allies favor purchasing advanced American fighter jets and missile systems, American warships struggle to compete internationally due to high expenses and outdated infrastructure.
MacDonald emphasizes that with China producing naval vessels at a superior pace and cost efficiency, the US must confront systemic inefficiencies in shipbuilding to restore naval dominance.