China is moving forward with stealthy marine drones as the US Navy slowly appears toward carrier-based autonomous aircraft, potentially lowering the balance of power in the Pacific.
Rear Admiral Michael” Buzz” Donnelly of the US Navy’s Air Warfare Division outlined a restrained approach to Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs ) at the recent Sea Air Space symposium in Washington, DC, according to The War Zone ( TWZ ).
The Navy places the MQ-25 Stingray cargo aircraft and its functional integration above carrier-based CCAs while working with the US Air Force and Marine Corps. Donnelly noted that the Air Force is in charge of developing autonomous aircraft and that the Marines emphasize manned-unmanned pairing using the F-35B.
In contrast to its US government counterparts, the Navy concentrates on MQ-25’s insights into facilities and freedom. Despite the high possibility of CCAs, carrier-specific integration issues continue to prevent implementation.
According to Donnelly, the MQ-25’s operating victory may determine the start of CCA patterns by the 2030s. He made the point that the Navy prefers biodegradable, more cheap drones to the Air Force’s expensive, high-end CCAs. But, progress on Navy helicopter projects that are classified remains largely unknowable.
The US Navy needs to move quickly because of China’s rapid development of cunning autonomous carrier-based aircraft. Additionally, Donnelly’s notes raise questions about the F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter’s release date, which is intended to operate alongside CCAs. The difficulties reflect more difficult adaptations of autonomous systems to marine aircraft.
The Navy’s CCAs will work together with the Air Force, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine, which may increase portability. However, the particular requirements of ship operations present significant challenges.
Zixuan Liu and co-authors point out that aeroplane ship boards are more restrained, risk-prone, and complicated than land-based airports in a November 2022 content for the Drones peer-reviewed book.
They stress the importance of precise coordination between aircraft categories, support equipment, and launch-recovery sequences to lessen collision risks, which are made even worse when incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ).
Liu and colleagues point out that these restrictions will call for very automated and optimized scheduling algorithms, particularly as UAVs become more numerous and intelligent in carrier environments.
Despite these difficulties, the US Navy is making initial inclusion progress. The USS George H. W. Bush had the first Unmanned Air Warfare Center ( UAWC ) in August 2024, according to the Navy Times.
Similar improvements are being planned for the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and USS Carl Vinson, indicating a change in administrative focus to unmanned platforms.
According to Sam LaGrone in an April 2023 USNI News article, a” Stingray to the Fight” program will expand the drone’s capabilities, including the addition of an internal mission bay, following the MQ-25’s complete integration into carrier operations ( projected for 2026 ).
Rear Admiral Gregory Harris noted in a TWZ post from April 2021 that the Navy wants to have robots make up off to 60 % of its aircraft air arms.
The MQ-25 serves as the foundation for the Navy’s autonomous aircraft initiatives for the time being. Lew Callaway stresses the MQ-25’s ship function as crucial to expanding the range and resilience of carrier-based hit aircraft like the F/A-18 in a TWZ article from January 2025.
He points out that China’s advanced air defense systems and long-range missiles make conventional flying tankers and island-based recharging stations extremely vulnerable. A more enduring option is the MQ-25, which allows carriers to continue conducting aircraft operations full into Pacific regions that are contested.
Nevertheless, the MQ-25’s restrictions as a attack platform are equally important. Josh Hano explains in a July 2023 Proceedings content that the aircraft was not built for agility, stealth, or speed.
Although the aircraft’s design and operating system make it unsuitable for a frontline unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV ) development, it could theoretically house precision weapons inside.
Instead, Hano advocates that the MQ-25 should evolve into a multirole support platform capable of carrying out anti-submarine assaults ( AW), electronic warfare ( EW), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ), or even serve as a decoy launcher to obstruct enemy defenses.
Carefully, CCA growth is impacted by the F/A-XX program’s delay. It makes no strategic sense to develop a comparable autonomous wing without the F/A-XX as a guarded command plane.
The F/A-XX is intended to replace the F/A-18 and serve as the foundation of upcoming US aircraft weather wings, which are scheduled to start operating in 2030, but its timeline is uncertain.
According to a report released in March 2024, Breaking Defense claimed that the Navy had to put off about US$ 1 billion in FY2025 financing for F/A-XX research and development, citing a needed to promote existing fleet readiness. The decision reflects a wider struggle to strike a balance between long-term modernization and urgent operational needs.
A portion of the unwillingness to commit significant money may be the result of recent recruitment errors. Robert Farley makes a connection between the US Navy’s caution on the F/A-XX and a number of disturbed applications, including the Zumwalt-class warships, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and Constellation-class frigates in a December 2024 content from 1945.
These projects all experienced overcrowding, shifting requirements, and disappointing efficiency, which made policymakers hesitant to take a risky decision.
Farley also contends that philosophical concerns about the importance of aircraft carriers are a thorn in the F/A-XX’s potential. He makes use of examples from the Russia-Ukraine war, in which guarded aircraft had limited administrative impact and large warships proved resilient.
Such developments raise questions about making significant investments in a carrier-based warrior that might not have a real purpose.
The difficulties and reluctances run the risk of giving China the modern initiative. No military now integrates drones as systematically as the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), according to Loro Horta in a February 2022 Pacific Forum article.
China uses drones to make up for weaknesses in guarded platforms and provide cost-effective systems to flood adversaries as part of its combat architecture.
In contrast, US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks acknowledged in a MIT Technology Review meeting this month that the US has difficulties integrating drones into combined power operations and scaling generation to the stage China can accomplish.
China’s GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV was discovered at a Army ship testing center close to a Fujian-class aircraft in December 2023, according to TWZ.
The GJ-11 is a key component of China’s naval drone plans because of its stealthy profile, large internal bays, and versatility ( ISR, EW, and strike ). For a launch did require catapult-equipped companies like the Fujian.
According to The Maritime Executive in January 2025, PLA Navy ( PLAN ) destroyer commander Chi Jianjun confirmed that drone platforms are being used on all of China’s warships, including amphibious assault ships like Type 75 and Type 76.
This popular deployment is a result of a concerted effort to fully integrate unmanned systems into marine operations.
China’s aggressive achievement of subtle marine drones threatens to redefine carrier battle as the US Navy treads cautiously, slowed by proper prudence and administrative resistance. Without a more significant change, the US runs the risk of falling behind in a field it again dominated.