Kamikaze drones have been widely touted as a modern warfare “game-changer” but questions abound whether the new-age weapons are really revolutionary enough to reshape European and Asian battlefields of the future.
Last month, The War Zone reported that the US is considering the potential of kamikaze drones in its military strategy.
In a recent virtual talk hosted by the Air & Space Forces Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, US Air Force General James Hecker, commander of US Air Forces in Europe and head of Air Forces Africa and NATO’s Allied Air Command, highlighted the dual nature of kamikaze drones as both a threat and opportunity for military strategy.
Hecker pointed out that the precision and proliferation of inexpensive kamikaze drones, such as the Iranian-designed Shahed 136, have complicated defense scenarios.
The War Zone says these drones, costing anywhere between US$50,000 to $150,000 per unit, offer a cost-effective stand-off strike capability, especially for smaller NATO members and allies with limited budgets.
It states that the Ukraine war has underscored the urgency of addressing these threats, with Russia conducting one of the most significant drone attacks of the conflict using Shahed drones.
The report mentions that the US military is exploring novel approaches to counter these threats, such as Ukraine’s ad-hoc acoustic sensor network. It also says that Western defense contractors are responding to the demand for such drones, with countries like Poland acquiring them in more significant numbers.
Additionally, it mentions that the US is pursuing the development of lower-cost stand-off munitions and uncrewed systems with autonomous capabilities, blurring the lines between kamikaze drones and traditional cruise missiles.
The Ukraine war has proved to be a real-life laboratory for testing current and emerging concepts of drone warfare, with kamikaze drones proving to be devastating battlefield weapons, possibly reshaping warfighting concepts.
In a March 2023 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Dominika Kunertova says that the Ukraine war has showcased a wide range of drones, with small Class I drones (10 to 150 kilograms) drones providing crucial battlefield awareness and larger Class III drones (more than 600 kilograms) delivering firepower over long distances.
Kunertova says that kamikaze drones have altered the dynamics of warfare by offering a new method to deliver explosives, especially in contested airspaces.
She also adds that small drones have revolutionized the operational tempo of artillery, enabling rapid targeting and firing, which increases precision and conserves ammunition.
She mentions that the use of drones has led to a change in military thinking, making armed drones more politically acceptable and highlighting the need for effective anti-drone defenses.
Kunertova says that while drones have become a necessary component of modern military operations, their effects are contingent on the specific context of the conflict.
In a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Stacie Pettyjohn and other writers mention a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that the vast distances in the Indo-Pacific region present a significant challenge for drone operations, requiring long-range and high-endurance drones.
Pettyjohn and others state that China is enhancing its drone capabilities to counter US and Taiwanese defenses in a potential invasion of Taiwan. They mention that China’s objectives include establishing a foothold in Taiwan, seizing the capital, Taipei, and neutralizing the self-governing island’s air defenses.
They note that China’s diverse drone fleet, including long-range armed and kamikaze drones, will be used to target high-value assets and support missile strikes in a Taiwan war scenario. In addition, they say China plans to use drones for maritime surveillance, antisubmarine warfare and tactical support for landing troops.
Pettyjohn and others mention additional roles of China’s drones in a Taiwan invasion, such as serving as decoys, interceptors and autonomous swarms to overwhelm defenses while aiming to ensure operational success and mitigate US and Taiwanese countermeasures.
Pettyjohn and others say that Taiwan aims to disrupt Chinese ships before they reach the shore and target landing forces with kamikaze and surveillance drones.
They note that Taiwan’s “porcupine strategy” relies on numerous small, concealable weapons to make an invasion costly for China. According to them, Taiwan’s porcupine strategy plan includes using surface, undersea and aerial drones for surveillance, targeting and direct attacks.
However, they note that Taiwan’s main challenge lies in its limited domestic drone production and reliance on Chinese suppliers, which may hamper sustained defense operations akin to Ukraine’s strategy against Russia.
Pettyjohn and others say that the US plans to support Taiwan against a potential Chinese invasion by leveraging drones for several operational tasks. They note vital missions such as sinking Chinese ships, providing air support and conducting mainland strikes.
They say that the US will utilize drones like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9B SeaGuardian for surveillance and targeting and kamikaze drones for direct attacks. They note that while these drones aim to disrupt Chinese forces, they face challenges like advanced Chinese air defenses and electronic warfare.
Pettyjohn and others add that while the US considers autonomous swarming drones to enhance coordination and mass attacks, it faces significant policy and logistical hurdles.
Despite the effectiveness of kamikaze drones in the Ukraine war and their significant implications for Indo-Pacific war-fighting, they may not be the game-changing weapons they are often touted to be.
In a February 2024 CNAS report, Pettyjohn argues that their small explosive payload hinders their effectiveness, often requiring follow-on air and artillery strikes. Furthermore, she points out that surveillance and targeting missions remain more critical than drone strikes.
She notes that using drones with artillery units eliminates the need for human spotters and improves the accuracy of strikes, thus conserving ammunition by making attacks more precise and effective.
Pettyjohn says that even large numbers of drones cannot match the destructiveness of mass artillery fire, as common artillery rounds pack more explosives and can be fired rapidly in huge salvos, outmatching the firepower of a drone swarm.
She argues that drones are not a replacement for traditional air superiority, pointing out that while Ukraine has carried out long-range drone attacks on Russian airfields, these attacks have been few and far between.
Likewise, she says while Russia has used drones in suppression of air defense (SEAD) missions, it has not been able to destroy Ukraine’s air defense network.
In addition, Pettyjohn says that while drones do not have to be survivable if they are cheap and plentiful enough to be readily replaced, the military logic of reconstitution in other munitions also applies to them.
In line with that, Asia Times reported in June 2024 that while the US is planning to supply Taiwan with Switchblade 300 and Anduril ALTIUS 600M kamikaze drones, both of which have been battle-tested in Ukraine, the high cost of a Switchblade drone system at around $80,000 per unit may not be sustainable for Taiwan.
All in all, such high costs, limited firepower, relatively short range and reliance on Chinese components may limit the effectiveness of US kamikaze drones in a Taiwan conflict.