US President Joe Biden met with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at a conference in an extraordinary move with significant regional repercussions.
According to the post-summit joint statement, this first-ever multilateral discussed participation in financial development, emerging technologies, clean energy, supply chains, climate assistance and, most important, strengthening the existing relationships between the US and its two Asian security lovers.
Alongside the leaders ’ meeting, the first trilateral commerce and industry ministers ’ meeting was also held and seems to have focussed on US-Japan support for making the Philippines an upper middle-income country and combatting China ’s economic coercion.
The Peoples ‘ Liberation Army-Navy and its maritime militia continue to harass the Philippines in the South China Sea and with their increasingly hostile behavior and gray zone tactics.
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s first-ever participation in the recent US-Philippines exercise in the South China Sea is also consistent with the trilateral summit’s announcement.
The US-Japan-Philippines trilateral is part of the emerging trend of mini-contractual arrangements that have come into being in the Indo-Pacific region over the past ten years.
These include the Quad ( launched in 2007, revived in 2017 ), AUKUS ( Australia, UK, US) trilateral ( 2021 ), Colombo Security Conclave, ( initiated in 2011; revived in 2020 ), TDIO ( Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian Ocean, 2013 ), India-France-Australia Trilateral Dialogue ( 2021 ), JAI ( Japan-Australia-India trilateral, 2015 ), the 2004 Malacca Straits Patrol ( 2008 ), and Eye-in-the-Sky, among others.
This trilateral brings together the United States ( a superpower ), Japan ( a regional power ), and the Philippines ( a small power ) at a particular point of interest. This contrasts with the practice of other minilaterals, which have primarily focused on maintaining regional security balance, acting as a security provider, or establishing an issues-based local presence.
It also serves as a general trend in which rising, middle, and small powers are displaying new willingness to shoulder security responsibilities that have previously been overruled by superpowers.
Although the idea of launching a trilateral minilateral initiative is not novel, a growing sense of urgency in light of China’s hostile actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea appears to have prompted Manila, Tokyo, and Washington to take this initiative seriously.
A track two The strategic dialogue in Tokyo in September 2022 laid the groundwork for security experts and practitioners to discuss among other things how the security triangle could be put into practice in a conflict-stricken world. ” On the ground, this cooperation, particularly in the maritime security domain, has considerable potential.
Another emerging emerging trend is that the majority of these initiatives are directly or indirectly related to China and have a direct impact on Southeast Asian security. AUKUS, Quad, Eye in the Sky, the Malacca Patrol and JAI ( Japan, Australia, India ) are all directly linked to the region’s security, which has become an epicenter for great power competition.
China’s desire to emphasize its unrecognized maritime claims and the Philippines ‘ growing confidence in its right to defend its disputed territory has already led to a number of naval incidents. The most recent incident occurred on March 4 when four Filipino sailors were hurt when Chinese ships and Philippine ones collided in a disputed South China Sea area.
Despite the clear gap between China and the Philippines ’ naval capabilities, Manila’s actions are being driven by Marcos Jr’s determination to carry out his obligation to defend national sovereignty.
They may also be brought on by ASEAN’s failure to address the issue ( ASEAN leaders have consistently failed to issue a joint statement on the South China Sea disputes ) and the… growing support from the US and others around the region including Australia, India and Japan – the other three Quad members.
All members of the Quad are working together on defense cooperation, and assistance is being offered in the form of policy formulation, capacity-building, and joint patrols. India has also provided military hardware to the Philippines, such as the BrahMos ground missile system. Japan has been the third country to offer the most financial support, and both parties are negotiating a deal that would allow the deployment of military forces on each other’s soil.
Likewise facing maritime insecurities vis-a-vis China close to home, Japan has ramped up its defense strategies. Last year, China and Japan’s coast guards were locked in a confrontation in waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, where Chinese government ships spotted in the same area; record high.
The trilateral with Japan and the Philippines, according to the US, is yet another step in a bid to combat China’s assertive regional behavior while maintaining the strategic foundation.
The US-Japan-Philippines trilateral has a strategic advantage because it is close to potential flashpoints, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. It cannot be overlooked that several of Manila’s recently opened military installations are located close to these disputed areas.
In fact, the Camilo Osias Naval Base in Sta Ana, Cagayan, and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, both located at the northernmost part of Luzon, are approximately 500 kilometers from Kaoshiung, Taiwan, which some speculate could be used to supply Taiwanese forces in the event of a Chinese invasion.
However, because of the partners ‘ different priorities, transforming this trilateral into a more integrated grouping will be simpler said than done. Manila cannot be expected to conduct freedom of navigation exercises across the region or project itself as one of the region’s net security providers while the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines conducted their first full-scale exercise on April 7.
The viability of such minilateral arrangements depends on a number of factors, not the least of which are US domestic politics and the region’s changing geopolitical landscape. The US has upheld a rules-based order in South China Sea waters, which it defines as a global common, while flippantly acting under some leadership.
Different policies and priorities may emerge if Donald Trump is elected president right now. That raises questions in Taiwan and Japan, and it might have the same effect on the Philippines.
More minilaterals may be in order for the Philippines and others to engage with other Asian powers in various forms in these uncertain times.
The German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance is led by Dr. Rahul Mishra as Senior Research Fellow. Thammasat University, Thailand, and Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He tweets @rahulmishr_
Peter Brian M. Wang is in charge of the economics department at Malaysia’s National Institute of Public Administration ( INTAN ). He has recently contributed to the book “Contesting Malaysia’s Integration into the World Economy ” and has written for both domestic and international publications. ” He tweets @PBMWang