Due to a potential lower threshold for nuclear weapons use over Taiwan, China’s nuclear growth has put a light on the US nuclear arsenal’s obsolete state.
This month, the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) released a report saying that the evolving nuclear dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, driven by China’s rapid nuclear modernization, increase the likelihood of nonstrategic nuclear weapons use in such a conflict.
Reverse nuclear escalation can start without actually triggering a common nuclear war, according to the report, which is a significant departure from deterrence models from the Cold War.
The study’s findings indicate that the US is ill-equipped to handle this new nuclear truth, including regarding philosophy, capabilities and ideas. Additionally, the study emphasizes the strategic significance and risk of US allies in the area, including Japan and Australia, which suggests that China might use their influence to undermine US extended punishment.
According to the CNAS report, the US should increase the level of top leadership nuclear fluency, foster dialogue with China, and develop new administrative concepts and capabilities to better integrate standard and atomic strategies. Additionally, it calls for thorough planning in collaboration with local allies to strengthen resilience against possible Chinese nuclear coercion.
The document also emphasizes the need for the US to rethink its strategy and features in response to China’s growing nuclear arsenal in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite significant downsizing and price shortfalls, the US maintains the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, with 5, 044 weapons.
In a May 2024 content for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and various artists mention that the US now has around 3, 708 atomic weapons, with about 1, 770 deployed and 1, 938 in supply. While a development project is advancing all nuclear delivery systems, 1, 336 resigned warheads are awaiting decommissioning.
According to Kristensen and individuals, the US is putting together a comprehensive nuclear development plan to replace all of its current nuclear weapons with updated versions over the coming years.
The largest hoard of weapons can be found in New Mexico and Washington, which are located in 11 US claims and five European nations.
Despite Russia’s expulsion, according to a report in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 1, 419 weapons had been reported as of March 2023, and the US appears to be abiding by the New START treaty‘s limitations.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review maintains the right to use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances and implements US modernization initiatives like the ban on the sea-launched cruise missile ( SLC M) and the retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb.
However, the project has considerable cost overruns even though Kristensen and others point out that the Minuteman III ICBMs may become replaced by the new LGM-35 Guard missiles with a implementation plan and ongoing upgrades beyond 2039.
China is developing new nuclear weapons quickly, testing new delivery methods, maybe lowering the thresholds for nuclear use and expanding its nuclear options in the event of a Taiwan conflict.
In a split January 2024 record for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Kristensen and others mention that China’s atomic arsenal has expanded tremendously, marking a key shift in global corporate dynamics.
According to Kristensen and another, China currently has about 500 nuclear weapons, with forecasts predicting that this number will rise to 1, 000 by 2030. They point out that this swift development is a part of a larger modernization initiative that includes the creation of new missile silos, SLBMs launched from submarines, and ALBMs launched from air.
As part of its wider plan to become a worldwide military strength by 2035, Kristensen and people point out that China’s growing nuclear features are a result of its growing military might and as a reaction to perceived threats from the US and its supporters.
Most damningly, they note that China’s advancements, especially in missile technologies and warhead production, problem the long-standing balance of power and raise concerns about possible shifts in nuclear strategy, including the possibility of a shift away from its standard” no second use” policy.
They point out that China’s expanding nuclear arsenal is a result of rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, where the US, especially, is concerned that China’s growing assertiveness poses a significant strategic threat.
In an Atlantic Council article from November 2023, Gregory Weaver claims that China could use nuclear weapons to deter US and allied intervention, deter US coercion by preventing the US from using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland, and deter the US from using only limited amounts of nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan.
Weaver claims that while concentrating on a Taiwan conflict, the US could use its nuclear weapons to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, deter a Chinese attack with limited nuclear weapons, and deter Russian aggression.
In a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace article from October 2023, Lauren Sukin contends that having more nuclear weapons does not always translate to greater security or strategic advantage, despite the US’s still possessing it.
Sukin points out that nuclear-capable states frequently struggle to achieve better results in conflicts because they have access to nuclear weapons and foster a reciprocal deterrence pattern. She says that the presence of nuclear weapons, even in smaller quantities, is sufficient to deter aggression, making it difficult for a state with superior nuclear capabilities to leverage its advantage.
She adds that even nuclear-superior states can easily coerce their adversaries because both parties are aware of the disastrous effects of any nuclear exchange due to the fear of mutual destruction.
Sukin challenges the conventional wisdom that enlarging nuclear arsenals improves deterrence, arguing instead that even nuclear parity or limited arsenals can stop aggression, posing a question about the justification for nuclear arms races.
In line with Sukin’s ideas, Frank Miller argues in an April 2024 article for The Economist that the US must reassess its nuclear strategy. Miller notes the current geopolitical landscape, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s rapid nuclear expansion, starkly contrasts with the era that birthed the New START treaty.
The New START treaty, set to expire in 2026, inadequately addresses today’s challenges, particularly Russia’s sizable shorter-range arsenal and China’s non-participation, Miller notes, emphasizing that deterrence, not parity, is critical.
He argues the US nuclear arsenal should be capable of targeting what its autocratic adversaries value most, i. e. their regimes ‘ bureaucratic and support structures, conventional and nuclear forces, and war-supporting industries, to prevent aggression.
He supports a comprehensive treaty that covers all nuclear weapons and allows flexibility within overall restrictions, making sure that US threats are effectively deterred and global stability is maintained.