All of these things threaten US forces ‘ ability to project and engage in military warfare. Aging ships, emerging threats, rigid thinking, and indecisive decision-making.
The US Navy and US Marine Corps announced this month  that an immediate investigation has been underway to improve the US marine ship fleet’s preparation. The urgent need to carefully examine send readiness and specifications for the training and certification of send parties and the Marines who embark on them is highlighted by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti and Commandant of the Marine Corps General Eric Smith.
According to a report from the US Congressional Research Service in February 2024, Marine Corps officials have made comments in the media about how many in-service aquatic ships are not technically set due to ongoing maintenance and repair work.  ,
In order to illustrate these issues, Defense News reported in March 2023 that the US Navy proposed to retrofit three Whidbey-class marine port landing ships in their 2024 finances, citing their weak condition despite having yet to pass the planned 40-year lifespan.  ,
According to Defense News, the three ships in the Whidbey-class did not receive enough funding for maintenance, and the$ 3 billion needed to keep the ships operational could have been better spent on other vessels. Additionally, it asserts that the dismantling of these ships would open up sailors for various deployments and factories to work on more immediately needed ships.  ,
But, the bronze could not just decommission the Whidbey- group ships without replacements, as the US Navy is , mandated by law to keep a ship of 31 marine warfare ships.  ,
The CRS report also mentions instances where the military has been unable to respond to requests from US local combat commanders to keep forward existence or respond to emergencies, despite the US having 31 amphibious war ships on hands.  ,
The earthquake in Turkey and Syria in February 2023 and the non-combatant evacuation operation ( NEO ) from South Sudan in April 2023 were two examples of these events. Due to a shortage of marine warfare ships, the US was unable to respond properly.  ,
The Marine Corps has re-purposed different ships that were originally meant to carry Marine forces because of the perceived lack of marine warfare ships.  ,
Asia Times reported in January 2024 that the Corps had converted the Expeditionary Sea Base ( ESB ) and Expeditionary Fast Transport ( EPF ) to make up for the ship’s lack of amphibious warfare.  ,
But, it’s important to note that the ESB and EPF are not expressly designed for marine war activities. These large ships lack the capabilities of amphibious war ships, including aviation help, ammunition storage, and other capabilities.  ,
Christopher Owens notes in a May 2023 Marine Corps Times article that while the USMC had a minimum of 31 marine war boats in 2022, the US Department of the Navy had previously permitted as few as 28 boats.  ,
Owens says that the lack of amphibious warfare boats may be traced to the USMC’s 2019 Commandant’s Guidance, wherein the USMC’s Force Design 2030 may require different approaches considering the current threats to dispersed marine armadas.
Jack Watling and Sidharth Kaushal extensively discuss those threats , in a January 2019 Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI) article.  , They mention that anti- ship missiles, long- range fires, smart mines, and pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) capabilities make assaulting a hostile beach more challenging than ever.  ,
Watling and Kaushal estimate the firepower required to fend off an amphibious landing force. In a scenario involving Taiwan, China would need only 50 anti-ship missiles to demolish a dozen amphibious warfare ships that are trying to cross the Taiwan Strait, or 4, 500 to 9, 000 kilograms of ammunition.  ,
They also point out that an amphibious warfare ship cannot launch amphibious assault vehicles ( AAV ) until it is 20 kilometers from the beach because China’s YJ-12 and Russia’s Kh-35 anti-ship missiles have a range of about 400 kilometers. Watling and Kaushal add that as they made their way to the shore, anti-tank guided missiles ( ATGM ), smart mines, and suicide drones could decimate AAVs.
Owen points out that for these reasons, the USMC chose Force Structure 2030, which concentrated on smaller units dispersed in coastal areas and put emphasis on dispersion to reduce the risk posed by those new threats.  ,
Yasmin Tajdeh describes the thinking that led to the creation of the Light Amphibious Warship ( LAW), which is intended to transport smaller USMC units, keep a potential adversary at risk in various locations, make the distance between heavily-defended beaches and larger amphibious warships, and make enemy targeting more difficult.  ,
Tajdeh also makes the point that LAWs can only transport a small number of self-defense systems because of their small size, and that arming them with such weapons could result in higher costs, breaking the cost rationale for having numerous small ships.  ,
Also,  , Defense One reported in January 2023 , that the US Navy put the LAW acquisition on hold until 2025 to determine whether it fits with the US Navy and USMC operating concepts and requirements, given its limitations.  ,
Apart from perceived vulnerability to modern weapons, Laura Heckman notes , in an April 2023 National Defense Magazine article , that the US Navy’s “divest- to- invest” mantra may be shortchanging the USMC’s amphibious warfare capabilities, noting that the US Navy sees amphibious warfare ships as” second class” combatants while focusing on destroyers as the epitome of combat ships.  ,
That mindset, along with the perception that large amphibious warfare ships are vulnerable, may have contributed to a de-focusing on amphibious warfare ships as priority acquisitions, which would put US forces ‘ ability to advance and engage in expeditionary warfare at risk.  ,
The US Navy’s 2025 budget request, which provides a deployable force of 31 amphibious warfare ships and one Landing Platform Dock ( LPD), is still in progress despite a small business solicitation that indicated the US Navy was preparing to enter a multi-year contract to construct three San Antonio-class Flight II LPDs.  ,
In line with that,  , Naval News noted in October 2023 , that the planned USS Philadelphia is the final San Antonio- class LPD to be built at the time of writing. But despite that pause,  , USNI reported in September 2023 , that Huntington Ingalls Industries ( HII ) laid the keel of the future USS Fallujah, the fourth America- class amphibious warfare ship.  ,