The US Army has halted plans to replace its Patriot missile system, opting to enhance the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement ( PAC-3 MSE ) interceptor instead.
Despite being successful in battling Russian fast missiles, the PAC-3 MSE also faces challenges in retaliation for superior weapon threats and absorption attacks. The decision, announced during the Association of the US Army’s quarterly meeting, was taken due to the alternative agency’s high prices, Defense News reported.
The Integrated Air and Missile Defense ( IAMD) system, which includes the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor ( LTAMDS ) and the Integrated Battle Command System, will continue to evolve, according to the report.
It will concentrate on improving the PAC-3 MSE to withstand future challenges, including the anticipated fast and agile nuclear weapons by 2040.
According to Defense News, the US Army is considering ensuring greater integration between the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Systems in order to improve combat space management. This will allow the use of both interceptors in the face of superior threats.
The Missile Defense Agency ( MDA ) has already carried out some integration work in the Indo-Pacific theater, demonstrating the potential advantages of this strategy.
The Patriot weapon has a combined fight record in Ukraine, showing usefulness against Russian fast missiles , while also exhibiting risks.
For example, The New York Times reported that six Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles were properly intercepted over Kiev by Ukrainian-operated Patriot weapon air defense systems in May 2023.
That victory, noted by , Peter Mitchell in a May 2023 Modern War Institute article, perhaps plant from , the Kinzhal’s limits. For sustained high-speed flexibility, Mitchell claims that the Kinzhal uses a solid-fuel jet engine, but the Kinzhal uses scramjet or different sophisticated propulsion systems.
Mitchell claims that the design raises questions about its ability to maintain fast speeds throughout its journey, especially during the terminal phase, making it prone to intercept.
He mentions that professional analysis suggests Kinzhal lacks the flexibility and agility needed for hypersonic weapons, referring to it as a “giant garden arrow” with explosives rather than a powerful weapon.
However, Moscow Times, an independent Russian media outlet, reported this month that Russia had targeted and struck two US-made Patriot missile launchers, a control station and a radar integral to the system with an Iskander ballistic missile in the central Dnipropetrovsk region, specifically in Pavlohrad, Ukraine.
In an article this month for Russian state media outlet TASS, Viktor Bodrov discusses how improvements in Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex in identifying and dismantling these air defense systems, as well as Ukraine’s propensity to place them close to the front line to conceal its troops, may have led to their destruction.
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE may not be adequate defense against a lot of missiles in a saturation attack, despite having hit-to-kill capability to precisely destroy incoming missiles. Further, the Patriot PAC-3’s high cost of US$ 3.7 million per interceptor and extended production period of nearly 20 months may hinder its ability to perform in this scenario.
Jonathan Panter mentions in a Council on Foreign Relations ( CFR ) article this month that despite Israel’s support of close military allies like the US and its neutralization of Iran’s direct missile attacks in April and October 2024, the increasing sophistication and frequency of attacks may put strain on these defenses.
He makes the point that the US faces potential security conflicts because it continues to support Israel, which could have an impact on its strategic goals in other countries.
According to the Associated Press ( AP ), the US Army’s air defense forces are under strain from US Patriot missile donations to Ukraine and the recent decision to send a THAAD missile battery to Israel, which has caused delays in updating its missile systems.
These actions, according to AP, add to the strain of troop deployments because the US Army tries to ensure that troops in the continental US have enough time to rest and train. Recurrent deployments, according to the report, also make it challenging to transport these systems into depots where they can be upgraded.
In the Indo-Pacific region, where China has more missiles and technological advancements than either Russia or Iran, those issues may become even more pressing.
China operates the DF-21D” carrier killer” medium-range, road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile, designed to target ships at sea with a range of 1, 450 to 1, 550 kilometers and an accuracy of 20 meters Circular Error Probable ( CEP ).
Due to its maneuverable warhead and precision, it is a significant threat to naval assets, particularly aircraft carriers, underscoring China’s advancing anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) capabilities.
Apart from the DF-21D, China also has the DF-26″ Guam killer” intermediate-range ballistic missile ( IRBM ) with a range of 4, 000 kilometers. The missile has a range of conventional and nuclear warheads, and its modular design makes it simple to swap out components quickly. As with the DF-21D, the DF-26B variant has anti-ship capability.
In conjunction with missile attacks, China may choose to use weaknesses in the , US kill chains, and launch attacks from multiple domains such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum in conjunction with missile attacks to defeat US missile defenses, according to Asia Times ‘ report from September 2024.
Integrating various missile defense systems, such as Patriot and THAAD, might be challenging. In August 2023, Asia Times pointed out that disjointed systems might not effectively counter an enemy in a saturation attack , using various advanced weapons, such as drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons.
Given the limitations of US missile defense systems, the US and its allies may need to adopt a different deterrence strategy, focusing on the ability to respond to an adversary.
In line with that, Melanie Sisson asserts in a May 2022 Brookings article that the US should adopt a deterrence by punishment approach to stop China from using force against Taiwan.
Sisson points out that deterrence by denial, which aims to convince China it would lose a military conflict, is deemed costly and risky, potentially leading to immediate war with a nuclear-armed adversary.
In contrast, she says deterrence by punishment seeks to make China’s costs of aggression prohibitively high, leveraging economic sanctions, diplomatic measures and military support for Taiwan. According to her, the latter approach is more pragmatic, flexible and less likely to escalate into full-scale war.