As the US Space Force embraces directed-energy arms, jammers, and dynamic methods to combat China and Russia’s growing planetary war capabilities, the competition for space supremacy is getting worse.
General Chance Saltzman presented the room war program at the new Air &, Space Forces Association Warfare Symposium, Task &, Purpose report.
The US Space Force’s modern approach includes offensive and defensive tools for earth and planetary operations, while conventional military branches have previously explored area weaponry.
This approach makes a significant change from the firm’s primary emphasis on developing satellite networks for conversation and missile detection. For mitigating army satellites without creating dangerous debris in space, directed energy weapons like lasers and jammers are preferred.
Saltzman even made programs for a basic doctrine,” Space Force Doctrine Document One,” which may set the agency’s strategy for space operations.
Initiatives like the X-37B space plane, which are a mysterious piece of orbital control, serve to highlight this wider proper perspective. The US Space Force’s intention to expand its arsenal reflects its changing part in maintaining its proper hold on space, utilizing cutting-edge technologies to combat adversarial capabilities while reducing collateral risks.
CNN reported this month that China and Russia are violently testing offensive storage capabilities, underlining their growing room military, citing the growing abilities of near-peer adversaries.
Russia recently conducted “attack and defend tactics” in low-earth orbital ( LEO ) missions, according to the report, while China demonstrated advanced co-orbital maneuvers in December 2024.
According to the CNN report, both countries are developing technologies to disrupt or destroy enemien satellites, such as directed-energy weapons and anti-satellite missiles.
Lasers and microwaves are two examples of directed energy weapons. On satellites, lasers could overheat or melt delicate components or blind sensors. Microwaves can cause electric currents to “fry” satellite electronics, causing the satellite to disintegrate without breaking it apart.
Jamming works by flooding satellites with false signals or noise, drowning out their control signals, and temporarily making them inoperable, even though it is not regarded as a directed energy weapon.
Space is considered to be the “ultimate high ground,” according to a report from the US Congress Research Service ( CRS ) in August 2021. According to the report, close-knit countries like China and Russia have studied the concepts of warfighting and focused on space systems as a particular US vulnerability.
A new type of space warfare is born out of these developments. The concept of orbital warfare is explained in an article from the Modern Warfare Institute ( MWI ) published in February 2025. Dugger claims that orbital warfare is defined by subtle maneuvers, strategic positioning, and kinetic and non-kinetic strategies to disrupt or disable adversary assets, in contrast to terrestrial battles.
He mentions how the idea entails using technologies like directed energy, electronic jamming, and cyberattacks to establish dominance without causing debris, and controlling orbital slots.
Additionally, Jessica Getrost explains that orbital warfare involves more than two vehicles moving around each other in a podcast from June 2024 for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. According to Getrost, orbital warfare involves putting forth offensive and defensive fires to keep space’s freedom of movement.
In the same podcast, Charles Galbreath emphasizes the fundamental role of space domain awareness ( SDA ) in orbital warfare, focusing on the time it takes to prepare for attacks against space-based assets to guarantee permanent space-based support for combatants.
Further on orbital warfare, according to US Space Doctrine Publication 3-0,” a relative degree of control in space of one force over another that would permit the conduct of its operations without prohibitive interference from the adversary while simultaneously denying their opponent freedom of action in the domain at a given time.”
These conceptual changes, however, may have to be carried out in light of a structural shift in space-based military capabilities, which are now shifting from a few expensive satellites to proliferated satellite constellations.
The US Space Force is considering switching to a proliferated satellite architecture, as confirmed by Major General Stephen Purdy, according to a report released this month by Breaking Defense.
By utilizing commercial alternatives for space situational awareness and other crucial capabilities, Breaking Defense claims that this change aims to improve resilience and cost-efficiency.
The US Space Systems Command is reportedly looking into old programs, including Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability, to see if they could be merged with other programs. It makes note of the possibility that lowering stringent requirements will help with faster deployment and lower costs.
In addition to offering redundancy, resilience, and versatility, Douglas Youvan mentions the benefits of satellite constellations, which are invaluable in adversities. According to Youvan, they can offer unrestrained coverage, adjust to changing mission requirements, and reduce the chance of losing just one satellite.
However, Youvan points out that because of their small size, how many, and relatively cheap nature, they could be used in more aggressive positions, which would increase space congestion and increase the risk of unintentional escalations.
Dugan claims that ensneering military goals within civilian activities introduces strategic uncertainty, enabling state actors to operate covertly on the global stage without detection or opposition, in addition to the tactical and operational advantages provided by proliferated microsatellite constellations.
This blending of space-based military and civilian capabilities makes it possible to conduct gray zone operations in the area.
Mike Carey and Charlie McGillis mention that combining civilian and military activities in space allows states to exert influence even when there is no immediate threat of armed conflict in a July 2024 article for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Carey and McGillis point out that the US and its allies, including China and Russia, use commercial space assets to accomplish strategic goals, which complicates attribution and response.
They claim that non-kinetic strategies like hammering, spoofing, and cyberattacks weaken satellite capabilities while maintaining a falsehood. They also mention that the dual-use nature of space technology blurs the lines between military and civilian operations, which makes deterrence challenging.
The fusion of advanced technology, strategic deception, and great-power competition is making Earth’s orbit the next battlefield as the militarization of space accelerates.