Under the mass of failing ships, fewer missions, and growing servicing overflows, the US Navy’s marine ship is sinking, threatening its fight readiness and strategic advantage in the face of China’s ascending maritime energy.
The US Navy’s amphibious warfare fleet is facing significant maintenance challenges, according to a report released this month by the US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ). This could put a strain on its operational readiness and ability to support US Marine Corps missions.
According to the GAO report, half of the 32 marine ships of the US Navy are in bad condition, with several not meeting their expected service-life expectancy as a result of delayed maintenance and aging.
It further explains that the US Navy’s decision to stop ship servicing scheduled for withdrawal has made these problems worse, leaving crucial systems like diesel engines in ruin.
Further complicating repair planning is the GAO report’s claim that the US Navy and Marine Corps are yet to come to an agreement on a certain number of ships that should be operational and trained.
The US Navy’s present plans do not help making significant investments in company life extensions, which are estimated to cost up to US$ 1 billion per ship, to maintain the legal requirement of a 31-ship fleet by 2030.
The US Navy should release its maintenance procedures to avoid unnecessary cancellation of essential maintenance, and apply metrics to identify marine ship availability goals. Without these modifications, the Navy faces a risk of continuing operating lags and lessening readiness for crucial missions, it said.
The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and its F-35 warrior plane were unable to be fully deployed due to the specific issues the US marine battle fleet eyes, according to The War Zone’s report this month.
Additionally, it claims that the USS America ( LHA-6 ) Amphibious Ready Group ( ARG ) had operational gaps and missed crucial exercises due to its lack of ships.
The War Zone report states that the 2020 USS Bonhomme Richard’s ( LHD-6 ) destruction due to a port fire further reduced fleet capacity. Additionally, it states that nearly 29 years of training and rollout moment were lost by the extension of 71 % of amphibious ship maintenance periods from 2010 to 2021.
Furthermore, the report states aging vessels like the 35-year-old USS Wasp ( LHD-1 ) face obsolescence issues, such as difficulties sourcing parts for outdated steam propulsion systems.
Even more recent ships, like the USS Fort Lauderdale ( LPD-28 ), have high failure rates for critical systems like the knuckle boom crane and mechanical arms for launching boats, according to the report.
The War Zone claims that these servicing issues have led to the early retirement of some boats and a queue of delayed maintenance, challenging the US Navy’s legal duty to maintain a ship of at least 31 marine ships.
Asia Times reported in April 2024 that the US Navy’s 2024 budget plan to cancel three Whidbey-class port getting ships, despite their insufficient support life, underscores the maintenance resource shortfall.
This decision aims to reallocate US$ 3 billion to more pressing needs and free up sailors for other deployments. Decommissioning without replacements is a challenge due to the legal requirement to maintain a fleet of 31 amphibious warfare ships.
The US Marine Corps has had to repurpose other ships because they lack essential amphibious warfare equipment, such as the Expeditionary Sea Base and Expeditionary Fast Transport.
The Light Amphibious Warship’s development and US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 both aim to combat contemporary threats, but these smaller ships face limitations in terms of cost-effectiveness and self-defense.
Steve Yeadon mentions in a 2020 article for the Journal of Advanced Military Studies that the traditional US force structure of 38 amphibious warfare ships, which are essential for MEU and forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Brigades, is no longer practicable in light of new strategic priorities.
Yeadon says that calls for smaller, more numerous and risk-tolerant vessels to support distributed operations amid near-peer threats respond to the vulnerability of large, concentrated forces to precision-guided munitions.
He adds that a critical issue is training gaps, as large-scale amphibious assault training is a result of the insufficient resources for MEBs and Marine Expeditionary Forces ( MEF ) to conduct it.
Yeadon points out that the issue has grown worse as a result of US shipbuilding restrictions. Current amphibious warfare ship construction timelines—ranging from 51 to 63 months—are further strained by limited shipyard capacity and supplier constraints, making rapid wartime replacements unlikely.
He also says competing shipbuilding priorities, such as Columbia-class submarines and next-generation surface combatants, further complicate funding for amphibious warfare ship procurement.
Yeadon warns against having enough amphibious warfare ships and US maritime forces, which could result in lessening the ability to launch counterinsurgencies and distributed operations, which would put up challenges to strategic flexibility in conflicts with rival countries like China or Russia.
Contrasting sharply with the US ‘ declining amphibious warfare capabilities, Jennifer Rice mentions in the 2024 book” Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion” that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy ( PLAN ) is modernizing its amphibious fleet to support missions beyond Taiwan, reflecting a shift in China’s strategic priorities.
Rice says the PLAN’s current fleet includes eight amphibious transport docks ( LPD), two landing helicopter assault ( LHA ) ships, 30 tank landing ships ( LST ), 20 medium landing ships ( LSM) and numerous smaller landing craft.
She points out that while larger amphibious vessels like LPDs and LHAs are better suited for overseas deployments, China’s enormous shipbuilding capacity allows for a quick increase in production if necessary.
Underscoring that point, China now has the world’s largest navy, with a shipbuilding capacity 230 times larger than the US’s. This disparity means that China can build 359 oceangoing ships in a year for every ship the US builds.
Rice claims that China’s balanced force design emphasizes its dual ambitions to achieve regional dominance and global power projection in the Taiwan Strait. She explains that the PLA’s recent modernization efforts align with its wider plan to strengthen its readiness for a Taiwan invasion.
According to Rice, this strategy includes leveraging civilian vessels for logistics and amphibious landings, underscoring China’s military-civil fusion doctrine. Rice notes civilian roll-on/roll-off ( RO/RO ) ferries have participated in amphibious exercises, signaling China’s ability to mobilize commercial assets for military operations.