The US and its allies are forced to reevaluate their tactics against increasingly powerful enemies like China as a result of the emerging ultra-long-range counter-air weapons and long-range detail affect features that are poised to reinvent air superiority.
In a December 2024 report to US Congress, the Department of the Air Force said that adversaries are set to field counter-air weapons guided by space-based sensors with ranges exceeding 1, 000 miles ( 1, 600 kilometers ), creating unprecedented threats to traditional air operations.
The document highlights China’s funding in long-range detail systems, including international fast vehicles and a different army of air, land and sea-launched missiles. Those arms, supported by superior space-based targeting, pose dangers to vital assets such as ships, which have usually operated with impunity.
Additionally, according to the report, forth airbases and fixed locations will become more prone to constant precision strikes by 2050, necessitating significant modifications in US Air Force strategies. It emphasizes that counter-air threats may force sanctuaries to be used anywhere, placing a strain on sequential air supremacy and distributed abilities.
The report emphasizes the need to integrate space-based surveillance and targeting systems in order to combat the threat of adversary space-based weapons, including potential hypersonic glide vehicles ( HGV ) or nuclear-capable systems.
According to the report, the US Air Force may modernize its policies, tools, and force structures in order to remain productive and withstand these growing threats, which may greatly rely on space and information.
In March 2024, the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported that Chinese scientists have designed a surface-to-air missile ( SAM ) with a kill range exceeding 2, 000 kilometers, according to a peer-reviewed paper published by the Journal of Graphics.
The research group, led by Su Hua at Northwestern Polytechnical University, claims the missile is destination early-warning aircraft and bombers, probably altering local conflict dynamics, the SCMP report said. The weapon, measuring eight feet and weighing 2.5 tons, uses a reliable rocket engine for lateral start and a ramjet motor for upper-atmosphere locomotion.
The weapon will be guided by SCMP’s real-time satellite tracking, before moving onto its sensors for last targeting. It notes that the development is part of China’s broader “anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD )” strategy, aimed at countering US military capabilities in hotspots like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
The report adds that the missile’s design emphasizes low production costs and operational convenience, aligning with the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) requirements.
This growth, alongside another new and emerging technologies, problems historic aspects of weather superiority. In an October 2024 Finabel report, Marek Gallo mentions that the idea of air superiority, once pivotal in Western military doctrine, faces obsolescence in modern warfare as advanced air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) and electronic warfare ( EW ) reshape battlefields.
Gallo contends that in issues involving technologically advanced opponents, conventional air dominance, which is characterised by unwavering control of the skies, is becoming more and more difficult to achieve. He claims that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights this change, in which both parties maintain their dominance in the airspace through a series of “windows of chance”
He even points out that the development of the “air coast” —a contested territory from surface level to 10, 000 feet—has intensified the challenge, with robots and EW compressing the aircraft into a fiercely competitive domain.
He claims that the integration of air and ground operations through centralized command centers and joint operations, particularly in SEAD/DEAD ( Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses ) campaigns, is necessary. Gallo argues that the Ukraine war demonstrates that achieving limited, situational air superiority, rather than absolute dominance, is the future of air power.
In a September 2024 War on the Rocks article, Peter Porkka and Vilho Rantanen advocate for an air force that could support operations in contested airspaces.
Porkka and Rantanen stress the need for NATO to develop capabilities to combat air defenses against anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) tactics. They point out the limitations of air superiority in preventing battleground stalemates and the difficulties that both Russia and Ukraine face.
They suggest a change to improve joint force support in tense situations. The writers argue that NATO should prioritize investments in capabilities such as drones, satellites, long-range precision fires and EW, all of which offer significant operational benefits, rather than pursuing traditional air superiority.
Asia Times recently highlighted the risk of devastating losses for US airfields in the Pacific due to China’s advanced long-range aircraft and missile capabilities, putting the focus on risking devastating losses before a potential conflict even starts.
The PLA has significantly outperformed US efforts to harden airfield infrastructure, adding extensive runways and double its hardened aircraft shelters to over 3, 000, compared to the US’s only addition since the early 2010s. Due to this disparity, US airbases are risky of precision missile strikes, with the majority of the aircraft losses anticipated on-site.
China’s fortification efforts are intended to provide for long-range air attacks, which could be advantageous for strategic purposes. In contrast, US reliance on Cold War-era strategies and little investment in airfield resilience raises operational risks and encourages Chinese aggression.
J. Michael Dahm mentions that the US Air Force must adapt to the strategic challenge of operating capacity while being under constant fire in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
Dahm points out that the PLA has developed advanced reconnaissance and long-range precision-strike capabilities in an effort to devastate US airspace by focusing on critical infrastructure, runways, and grounded aircraft, making it necessary to make a fundamental change in airbase defense.
According to Dahm, the US must combine active defenses like layered kinetic and non-kinetic systems with robust passive measures like early warning systems, facility hardening, and quick runway repair in order to sustain effective combat sortie generation.
Moreover, he argues that adopting the Agile Combat Employment (ACE ) concept, which disperses air assets across multiple bases, could reduce vulnerabilities.
Dahm insists that the US Congress and the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) must support funding and policy clarification in order to improve airbase resilience and keep adversaries at bay.
Without these adjustments, he warns that the US Air Force runs the risk of operational paralysis, leaving US and allies vulnerable to abolition and putting in danger the world’s current balance of power.