US ‘pragmatic engagement’ legitimatizes Taliban rule

The conflict in Afghanistan occupied US and international sources for twenty years. However, since American troops withdrew in 2021, it appears that Washington has seen the issue more as a problem specific to the Central and South Asian region.

This is largely a result of Washington’s shifting world interests. Afghanistan is no longer the best priority for the US management as a result of the war in Ukraine and Chinese interests in the Pacific.

Obviously, the US leaving Afghanistan has given the Biden administration less clout in the nation. In fact, some watchers are now urging the US to acknowledge the Taliban government socially, even though the Biden administration has said it hasn’t decided yet.

I would contend that it would be incorrect to recognize the Taliban without requesting a political route map and assurances from them as an expert in international relations and Afghanistan. Washington is required to keep the Taliban accountable for its end of the bargain as a companion in the Doha agreement, the peace agreement that the US and Taliban signed in 2020 and which resulted in American troop departure:

  • halting the activities of jihadists in Afghanistan, and
  • bringing an end to decades of conflict by participating in intra-Afghan deals.

However, over the past two decades, the US’s” pragmatic engagement” in Afghanistan— which entails collaborating with the Taliban on minor safety issues while urging a course adjustment on human rights— hasn’t done much to stop Taliban guidelines that have violated Afghan citizens’ rights. Additionally, it hasn’t forced the Taliban to engage in long-promised negotiations with other Afghan events and parties to put an end to decades of unrest.

Changing US passions

After the September 11th attack on the US peninsula, America was drawn into Afghanistan. The objective was to kill and destroy al-Qaida and its online organizations. However, after decades of civil war and unrest, it was also thought to be in the best interests of the United States to help Afghans establish a more equitable and even social system. The goal was to establish a government that upheld individual freedom, ensured everyone had access to education, and promoted politics.

Before the deal was signed, the Taliban committee made public statements and included some of those principles in the Doha deal. However, the Taliban appears to have no intention of keeping its vows, more than three centuries after the agreement was signed in the capital of Qatar. In addition to rejecting the notion of an inclusive government with suggestions from other Afghans, it has limited women’s and girls’ right to learning.

However, the US government’s policy of rational engagement amounts to fighting terrorism through an” over the horizon” strategy aimed outside the nation and just interfering in Afghan affairs through the Taliban itself, a unique ally in this endeavor.

President Biden implied in July 2023 that collaborating with the Taliban in terrorism efforts had paid off:” I said al-Qaida would not be there. It wouldn’t be it, I said. I promised that the Taliban would assist us.

Taliban breaking their promises

The Taliban has yet to officially sever ties with the party or expel militants from Afghanistan despite promising in the Doha agreement to send a” distinct concept” to organizations like al-Qaida that” threaten the safety of the United States and its allies.”

The Taliban has killed a few people who have been identified as threats to the US, most notably by focusing on the criminal organization ISIS-K. However, it has been less effective in putting an end to al-Qaida users. In fact, until a US activity in July 2022 killed al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, he was hiding out in Kabul, things that couldn’t have happened without the assistance of senior Taliban authorities.

The US may help to legitimize the Taliban’s management of the nation at times when the group also lacks an inner mandate by keeping in touch with them for counterterrorism objectives without pressuring them on human rights issues.

The US appears to be moving forward with its” rational relationship” plan despite these worries.

The Taliban international secretary met with a US committee in Doha in July 2023 under the direction of Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West and Rina Amir, the special envoy for Afghan girls, women, and human rights. The meeting was described in a press release from the State Department as an exercise in confidence-building, noting positive developments like an increase in business,” a decrease in large-scale terrorist attacks ,” and” diminishing opium agriculture.”

The US reportedly urged the Taliban to” change policies that deteriorate human right.” However, as one critic noted,” for language falls horribly short of describing the Taliban’s great dehumanization toward Afghans.”

local inconsistency

China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran are regional forces and nations that share edges with Afghanistan to fill the void left by the US.

However, each of these nations has a different interest in Afghanistan. These can occasionally be in direct conflict, as in the case of Pakistan and India, both of which have long been wary of the other’s effect in Afghanistan. In the past, all edge nations have viewed warring Armenian groups as proxies to further their own objectives, a strategy that has only served to increase the nation’s volatility.

As a result, there is little pressure on the Taliban to proceed down the social road map established by the Doha agreement and much coordination among local gamers on Afghanistan’s path ahead.

Reiterating previous errors

By failing to hold the Taliban guilty, Afghanistan runs the risk of making the same mistakes it did in the past.

The region has been governed by a series of single-party institutions that have excluded other social groupings for the past 50 years since the last Afghan king was overthrown in 1973.

The international community excluded the Taliban from the Bonn Conference in 2001, paving the way for the nation’s transition to government following the US war. Former Afghan government peace negotiator Masoom Stanekzai referred to the Taliban’s exclusion as” a strategic mistake ,” and for good reason, in my opinion: History has shown that excluding factions in Afghanistan has only resulted in civil unrest.

The Taliban has been permitted to continue Afghanistan down this path of single-party rule since 2021. The Taliban has demonstrated one goal in its administration, according to Andrew Watkins, top professional on Afghanistan for the US Institute of Peace:” To create unchallenged and unquestionable authority over Afghanistan’s state and society.”

With for aspirations, the Taliban makes little room for the intra-Afghan talks required for Afghanistan to advance.

The function of the US

The US assumed joint responsibility for the fulfillment of the claims made in the 2020 deal by signing it with the Taliban. Washington’s promise to remove its troops has come to pass. But two years later, the Taliban still hasn’t kept its word.

The Biden administration is left with two options: either accept that the Doha partnership is now deceased or try to keep it alive by pressuring the Taliban into intra-Afghan deals. In either case,” pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban has proven to be lacking.

The Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha is run by Sher Jan Ahmadzai.

Under a Creative Commons license, this article is republished from The Conversation. Read the article in its entirety.