Was the first so- called” Summit on Peace in Ukraine”, held in Switzerland on June 15 to 16, a disappointment? If you pay attention to the very upbeat responses of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his American supporters, that is undoubtedly not. And, to get honest, the conference has enabled Zelensky to maintain Russia’s war against Ukraine higher on the global agenda.
But by most other matters, the result of the mountain was unsatisfactory. Just 92 of the apparently invited 160 states and international organizations showed up, which was a mediocre level of participation. In terms of material and signatories, the ultimate communication fell short of what was anticipated.
All of this raises important issues about the prospects for a Russian-only peace process. It likewise lacks acquire- in from China, which was excluded in Switzerland, and from other important places including Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. Despite attending, none of them signed up for the ultimate communication.
Agenda minimal
On the plan were three issues addressed in the Ukrainian government’s 2022 peace strategy: nuclear health, food security and humanitarian problems. However, the final communiqué just attracted the support of 84 of the ambassadors present, and did not mention Zelensky’s program, let only his main requirement for a complete withdrawal of Russian soldiers. Perhaps even more important, no agreement was reached on when to keep a follow- up meet.
One of the issues is likely to have been caused by Kiev and its European allies ‘ conviction that Zelensky’s was the only peace program on the table. By definition, this prevented any conversation of at least seven different next- party ideas.
These include plans sponsored by China, Brazil, Indonesia and the Vatican. A group of American states led by South Africa submitted proposals in June of last year, as well as a bargain proposed in August 2023 that was supported by Saudi Arabia. Nor was the latest study by China and Brazil looked into.
All of these proposals are non-Western initiatives that are generally aimed at achieving a ceasefire. For a move is still perceived by Ukraine and its European allies as supporting Russia. A ceasefire would effectively halt the conflict at its existing frontlines and, at least partially, accept Russians ‘ regional benefits, including the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea.
Russia rising
However, Vladimir Putin has doubled down on his regional requirements. The Russian leader released a number of ramped-up demands as members made their way to Switzerland for the peace event.
Kiev must not only lose to Russia all of Ukraine’s place that Russian forces have occupied, but also the remainder of the four areas that Russia annexed in September 2022 with skewed referendums held in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Under Putin’s scenario, Russia would also get Crimea.
This is a far cry from the key point of Zelensky’s original plan and the March 2022 UN resolution, which called for a complete Russian withdrawal and the restoration of Ukraine’s full territorial integrity. In contrast to the more impressive 80 % of Ukrainians in February 2023, an estimated 58 % still support excluding any compromise on this issue.
The conference’s final communique was meant to reflect a similar position. However, what came out was at best a very diluted version that made reference to the UN charter and the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, including Ukraine.
It could be argued that Ukraine and its Western partners attempted to make the final declaration more palatable for others by not explicitly demanding a Russian withdrawal and making reference to general principles of international law.
The language does not completely exclude Kiev’s right to make territorial concessions in future negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. It also leaves room for compromise.
Even this diluted version failed to elicit the 100 delegations who were present, though. The reason for this failure is fairly obvious: the collective West – essentially the G7, NATO and the EU – has so far been steadfast in support of Ukraine and of Zelensky’s peace plan, and only of Zelensky’s peace plan.
Incoherent Western support
That support was reconfirmed most recently in the leaders ‘ communique from the weekend’s G7 summit in Puglia, southern Italy.
This specifically noted the G7’s collective” support for the fundamental principles and goals of President Zelensky’s Peace Formula.” It does, however, indicate a softening of the Western message in comparison to the G7 foreign ministers ‘ statement of November 2023 that said peace was n’t possible without Russia’s unconditional withdrawal.
But if anything, the current approach by Ukraine and the West has, at best, some way to go to adjust to the new reality. For the time being, Russia’s standing on the front lines and in international diplomacy is strong enough to withstand Western and Ukrainian demands for a war stop.
The current strategy has, at worst, plunged Ukraine into a dead end. Still, the support from the West is more rhetorical than actual. The US president, Joe Biden, did not go to Switzerland at all despite being in Europe for the G7. In fact, Canada’s premier, Justin Trudeau was the only G7 leader to stay for both days of the conference.
At the same time, the rest of the world seems to be gaining momentum in response to the recent Chinese-Brazilian peace proposal.
Even more importantly, perhaps, Ukraine is still suffering on the battlefield. The sluggish flow of Western military assistance and the restrictions it places continue to impede Ukrainian defenses.
And the country’s new conscription law is incredibly divisive and supported by fewer than half of the population in a nation with few soldiers. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s power grid has been devastated by Russian attacks.
The outcome of the Swiss peace summit, therefore, is hardly the morale booster that Ukrainians require at this time. Instead, it should be seen as a sign that Kiev and other Western capitals lack a clear path to a just and secure peace that is currently beyond Ukraine’s reach on the battlefield.
Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy, and Stefan Wolff Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.