The effect President Trump’s election will have on American foreign policy is still up for discussion, but for all practical uses, Washington will have to come to terms with a new world environment—an environment also held prisoner, in part, by the former Cold War.
The Soviet Union and its allies squared off in a largely depressive conflict during the Cold War. What was known as the” Third World,” a motley group of largely failed former colonies,  , immoral tyrannies, and failed economy, stood on the profitability of the conflict. Within this ecology, and excluding India, China stood out as large but disconnected and largely focused on its internal problems.
The Soviet Union, in its present form, was a solitary land mass that extended from the Kamchatka coast to the Elbe River, one of the distinguishing characteristics of this world ideal.
Moscow could stay in line with its children because of this. Therefore, Moscow had no logistical difficulty sending troops to quell the rebellion when the Hungarians or the Czechs sought to reclaim their freedom.
Contrary to the Soviet Union and its Russian leader, the American Empire was a worldwide initiative with far-flung problems. Both overseas bases and a big ship were needed to ensure America’s dominance.
By the 1960s, the two strong powers had reached some sort of equilibrium, and both parties had expressly acknowledged that each had a legitimate interest.
Washington avoided intermediate when countries as diverse as Hungary and Czechoslovakia attempted to seize control of the Soviets. Likewise, Washington did act, albeit through local proxy when Moscow tried to reach beyond its sphere of interest, such as in Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, while the prevailing parity was fraught with malice, it was an attempt of some form with its unspoken regulations and red ranges, real or imagined. The two power ‘ political relationship with one another did not change, despite the Soviet Union’s decline implying that Russia had lost its empire.
Russia continued to be a western power, albeit one that had lost a significant portion of its landmass. With a vast kingdom and a global impact that extended far beyond the military and economic spheres, the United States remained a world player.
But, while America’s military and economic can had no classmates. It was difficult to translate this dominance into tangible achievement, which is unfortunate, and even more difficult to do so.
Russia was on its legs during the initial years of the post-Cold War culture, China had not yet emerged as a major industrial strength, and regional tensions were largely at bay. However, there is no stopping time for past; instead, it was a series that lasted.
Now, some 35 decades after the end of the Cold War, a divided world has seen the introduction of a multitude of contestants. None of them is strong enough to actually concern the United States, but they all make it extremely challenging for Washington to establish its hegemony.
Managing the Cold War was fairly simple for Washington. All the United States had to do was accept until the USSR collapsed because the Russian system was like a troll. That time is now over. And what has emerged from the post-Cold War age is a fresh break that holds the challenges of a questionable future in addition to the ghosts of the past.
Russia, China, the Middle East, radical Islam and BRICS are the innovative problems confronting Washington’s identity. While each has its own relationships, not to mention goals, put up they correspond to a fresh break. And if this separate had to have two terminates, those would be Russia and China.
Russia, as it is perceived by the United States, is a construction, the product of an imagination that however harks to the time of the Cold War. However, if one looks impartially at the indicators, the image , they project is irrefutable.
In terms of people, population, GDP, technology, industrial manufacturing and armed forces, Russia is hardly on the map and the unanswered question is: By what subterfuge did President Vladimir Putin hill the mind of the world , into passing off his country ( setting aside its nuclear potential ) as an international heavyweight.
In the end, Washington continues to fight in Ukraine as if the outcome would alter Europe’s power balance, while Russia, in a last ditch effort, has agreed to pay for drones from Iran.
China, the opposite bookmark, has been an American fixation since the birth of the People’s Republic in 1949. For the first 20 years of its existence, the regime was subject to an embargo that had no parallel.
That was followed starting from the mid-1970s by the normalization of US-China relations based on two misconstructions: for the United States, that this would lead to “regime change” in China and, for the leaders in Beijing, that China could become part of the international system without submitting to some extent to its rules.
Actually, neither side accepted the fact that neither side could actually understand the differences between the two regimens and that a new set of guidelines had to be agreed upon prior to beginning interplay. The result is a conflicting relationship between the Chinese empire and the American empire, who seeks to” contain” China.
A complicating factor is that the economies of the two are partially interconnected, making restrictive measures taken by one relative to the other easy to become self-defeating exercises.
While America’s ongoing confrontation with both Russia and China has its own dynamics, it has complicated Washington’s projection of power in the Middle East. The United States is also confronted by militant Islam, which is embodied in a reincarnation of the Persian Empire under the name of Iran, in that country.
In reality, this implies that Washington will have to choose a path that will require two preferences that are mutually supportive. The first is to prioritize, the second to take the lead more directly from the center, rather than the front.
Given the depressing state of the Russian armed forces, it should be obvious that Ukraine is not essential to the security of the United States or even Europe. Therefore, the current conflict is likely to be less bad if Ukraine is truncated and not a NATO member. And a result like this might also sway the nations in the center of Europe to take their defenses seriously and reduce their reliance on the US.
Fragmentation of this political ecosystem has led to the formation of tactical alliances for the long term. One is a major importer of Iranian oil and another of Iranian drones, so while China and Russia are both wary of militant Islam.
Over the next , hundred years or more, China will be the real challenge. The issue here goes far beyond quotas, tariffs or embargoes. The Western and Imperial Chinese, two essentially incompatible social and production systems, can coexist and cooperate in a mutually beneficial way.
A US reversal might inspire Ukraine and Russia to reach some sort of agreement. Given that both President Putin and Russia do not have the resources to repress Ukraine, one might object to President Putin’s choice. But at least the problem wo n’t turn into a global crisis, but rather a convulsion of the Russian-Slavic ecosystem.
There is still a question mark over how the Trump administration will handle the new international environment. However, we can only hope that Washington will realize the value of continuing with business as usual or going it alone.
Alexander Casella, PhD, has taught and he has worked as a journalist for Le Monde, The Times, The New York Times, Die Zeit, The Guardian and Swiss radio and TV, writing primarily on China and Vietnam. In 1973 he joined the UNHCR, serving, among other postings, as head of the East Asia Section and director for Asia and Oceania. The International Center for Migration Policy Development’s representative in Geneva then was appointed.