While America’s Republican Party deals toughness on China and support for Taiwan, its presidential candidate has just , described , with more precision than ever his private inclination to allow China win Taiwan.  , Although a reputation for having a” transactional” view of foreign policy precedes him, Trump’s recent comments about Taiwan are jarring.
In a statement released by Joe Biden, who has repeatedly stated that he will give American forces to help protect Taiwan in the event of a PRC strike, Joe Biden has strained the US plan of” strategic confusion.”  , Trump has strained that legislation in the same way. Trump explained to us why he thought US intervention would be a bad idea despite not saying he would n’t send the US military to help Taiwan.  ,
David P. Goldman , wrote , in , Asia Times , on July 18 thatTrump simply” spoke common sense” . , Hardly.  ,
What Trump said has five crucial flaws.  ,
First, he said” Taiwan should pay us for defense”, adding that” they’re immensely wealthy” . , He compared the US role to that of an “insurance company”.
Trump seems to be using Taiwan censure in a different way from what he does to Japan and South Korea.  , The USA is bound by contracts to support the latter two, and Trump has long , said , they are free-riders that may give all of the cost of hosting US foundations plus an additional advanced.
But Taiwan is n’t a free-rider. Taipei pays for the arms it purchases from the USA, according to wikipedia. Taiwan is not a US ally, hosts no US bases, and does n’t even have a firm belief that US forces will intervene when necessary. The idea that Taiwan may give the US for a non-commitment is ironic. No sane man would purchase a plan like that from an actual plan company, sadly.
The following bad thought is that Taiwan” took” America’s semiconductor manufacturing company. When Trump was asked if he would wage a war against China to defend Taiwan, he responded that” they did get about 100 % of our chip business.”
This was not a one-off.  , In an August 2023 , interview, Trump’s first response to the same question was” Taiwan did take all of our chip business” . , When that interviewer asked about the consequences of China capturing Taiwan’s semiconductor fabs, Trump agreed that would be bad.  ,” But”, he said, “remember this: Taiwan took — intelligent, beautiful — they took our business apart.  , We may include stopped them”.
According to Trump, his perception that Taiwan harmed US companies in an important business market may be the most important factor in deciding whether or not to protect Taiwan against a Chinese military attack. It would be more accurate to say that American CEOs decided to offshoot production to Taiwan’s TSMC, which had a sophisticated business model and highly qualified professionals ready to put in long hours for relatively low pay.
Taiwan won the top spot in the chip industry by effectively competing in a free marketplace. This is not a valid justification for allowing Taiwan to be taken over by the PRC.
Second, Trump’s statements reveal a disregard for the less tangible and longer-term advantages of supporting Taiwan, even with the settlement of insurance premiums. Taiwan is a shining example of political reform and a beacon of hope for oppressed societies, especially in mainland China, under a democratic federal that upholds universal human rights and international legislation.
The initial island chain, which is located in Taiwan, may create choke points that would prevent China from from getting into the northern Pacific Ocean during a conflict.  , Unlike the PRC state, Taiwan is , transparent , about epidemics of infectious disease, which however are expected in the future, and is a vital part of an effective global health early-warning program.  ,  ,  ,
On the other hand, a hostile Taiwanese government would stoke Japan’s concern that its nautical supply routes and western territories were in jeopardy.  , And US withdrawal of Taiwan to spontaneous integration would signal to the Asia-Pacific place a remarkable decline, if not the finish, of US leadership in the region. Washington had thus lose its influence over the area in ways that are both advantageous to American economic interests and US security.
Fourth, Trump implied that the PRC could easily subdue Taiwan by force because China is close to Taiwan while the United States is “9, 500 miles away” . , ( Taiwan is actually 6, 700 miles from the US west coast and 7, 950 miles from the US east coast. )
” They had just attack it”, he said.  ,” They is actually just send shell” . , Assuming Trump meant “missiles”, it’s true that the Army had pepper essential government structures and military equipment with bombs.  , Missile strikes, however, do n’t win a war if the Taipei government does not choose to surrender.  ,
An American president should not and should not say that he thinks it would be too difficult for the US military to stop China from annexing Taiwan by force. Even with its advantages, capturing Taiwan would be extremely difficult and risky for the PRC, and the economic turmoil brought on by the war could put the Chinese Communist Party under serious threat of control.
China failed to seize Taiwan in most of its iterations of a well-designed series of Taiwan Strait war games managed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2023. Even if PRC observers believed that Trump intended to let the Chinese and Russians “do whatever the hell they want,” the defeatist statements could make war more likely.
Finally, Trump said the reason the PRC does n’t attempt to violently annex Taiwan is “because they do n’t want to lose all those chip plants” . , To Trump, Taiwan means semiconductors.
But to the PRC leadership, Taiwan has profound historical and political significance. It serves as a reminder of how incomplete the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War was and how much more important is the piece that Xi needed to achieve his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”
Taiwan’s semiconductor factories would have little to no impact on Beijing’s decision to launch an attack, which would depend more on the PRC government’s decision to accept the possibility of Taiwan joining the PRC peacefully had been permanently closed.  , This has been the situation since before TSMC was founded.
Some additional context makes Trump’s comments more ominous. According to reports, Trump believes that China is much more significant than Taiwan.  , John Bolton, who served as national security advisor in the Trump Administration,  , wrote , that” One of Trump’s favorite comparisons was to point to the tip of one of his Sharpies and say,` This is Taiwan,’ then point to the historic]and large ] Resolute Desk in the Oval Office and say,` This is China.'”
Trump admires Xi Jinping.  , Even after the US-China acrimony during the pandemic, Trump , says , Xi is” smart, brilliant” and” I like President Xi a lot” . , Trump very much wants an economic agreement that would reduce China’s trade deficit with the US, something Trump has complained about repeatedly.  , The , much-hyped ,” Phase One” bilateral trade deal of 2019 was an , unsuccessful , attempt.
Perhaps Trump’s most recent statements are just some spooky love, a deception that would spooky Taiwan by increasing its defense spending. It’s not out of the question that Trump might try to negotiate a new megadeal with his friend Xi using Taiwan as a bargaining chip. If so, it would make sense for Trump to psychologically prepare his followers by promoting Taiwan as an unworthy and indefensible nation.
Asia affairs analyst Grant Newsham, who strongly supports the US preparing to defend Taiwan in the event of war with China,  , said , of Trump’s comments,” The language is a little odd … but Mr. Trump will have some good advisors around him.  , He’ll get this right”.
Consider, however, that when he was president, Trump sat through four years of meetings with senior officials – such as , Mike Pompeo,  , Elbridge Colby,  , Matt Pottinger,  , Mark Esper , and , Robert C. O’Brien– who strongly supported defending Taiwan.  , They seem to have influenced him little on this issue.
A similar disconnect between the commander in chief and his top foreign policy advisors would likely be present in another Trump term.  , Project 2025, the blueprint for a second Trump Administration written by a Trump-aligned think tank,  , says ,” US defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan” . , But it is the US president, not the advisors, who decides whether or not to send US forces into a foreign conflict.
Denny Roy is a senior felllow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.