Donald Trump’s regional security officials have been called “hawks” in subsequent criticism who support a difficult part for the United States against China. This is incorrect and detracts from the need to put America’s regional objectives at the center of US foreign policy.
Trump’s first time in office suggest a willingness to reach out to Beijing that does not fit with the “hawks” label, the president saying he wants to , visit , China, and would prefer not to impose levies if a , “deal”  , can be struck on trade.
This should be unsurprising since Trump ‘s , appointees , include both those committed to standing up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) and those with deep economic investments in the country.
Trump’s China “hawks” include , Marco Rubio , for secretary of state,  , Mike Waltz , for national security adviser,  , Pete Hegseth , for secretary of defense,  , Peter Navarro , for business director, major advocate of the TikTok ban , Jacob Helberg , as State Department monetary policy standard, and as deputy national surveillance adviser , Alex Wong, anti-CCP Senator Tom Cotton’s past director.
But Trump’s team also includes a new constituency of advisers likely to have a say in China policy: the tech bros. Palantir CEO , Alex Karp , and , Palmer Luckey , of autonomous weapons manufacturer , Anduril , have much to gain from an open congressional spigot on defense spending and both have said the US must prepare for a possible conflict with China.
Elon Musk’s business interests, in contrast, diverge from Tesla, which accounts for a sizable portion of Tesla’s profits, as do many other leading US tech companies. The tech bros are thus divided.
In fact, there are few real “doves” on China in Washington these days. Those like SAIS professor , Jessica Chen Weiss or former deputy secretary of state James Steinberg , who reject the zero-sum language of much of the debate are far from naïve about the China challenge.
A hawks-and-doves framing neglects the real issue: not what the new administration’s China policy , might , be, but what it , should  , be. Trump should be guided by realism and restraint, an accurate assessment of the balance of power in Asia and a clear-eyed view of America’s core national interests.
A zero-sum competition framing of China, one that casts any issue in terms of military buildup/deployment or sanctions/tariffs, is unhelpful. China does pose the kind of military challenge America hasn’t faced since the start of World War II, and it has succeeded in standing up to the West in advanced manufacturing, from AI to cars.
But the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) is not an , existential , threat. We do not in America have to , like , the Marxist-Leninist one-party state the CCP is bent on defending, but we can live with it. A less expansive definition of “national security” would be a good way to clarify our definitions of China. This is a lesson that America ought to have taken away from the war on terrorism.
Despite the tensions with the PRC, questions like whether to allow TikTok to operate, whether to own US port equipment or a company like US Steel, or whether foreign-made drones or electric vehicles should be legal, all need serious scrutiny from lawmakers. However, domestic law enforcement should be kept separate from militarized understandings of national security from concerns over fears about propaganda or data theft.
Questions like whether to link TikTok’s military defense of East Asia to a zero-sum discussion of China serve as justification for a grand plan of “primacy” or the preservation of the United States ‘ military might in East Asia.
Primacy, however, is both unrealistic and unnecessary. The People’s Republic of China’s coast should not be the first place the United States should begin its defense. The United States is not responsible for protecting Japan and the nations that border South Korea and New Zealand. Washington can act as a security partner but not as a guarantee.
On Taiwan, the major imperatives are cooling tensions, maintaining the status quo, and not being sucked into a shooting war. The most effective strategy is still to remain uncommitted to the use of force in the event that the PRC attempts to conquer Taiwan.
Beijing may not like a liberal democratic Taiwan, but it can live with one, just like the US with the PRC. Washington cannot prevent Beijing from invading Taiwan, however. If Xi decided to try his hand at capturing the territory, it would not be a policy failure. These conceits of US control, which are used to criticize others for being” soft on China,” serve to reinforce primacy as the only viable strategy.
Nor should domestic investment be a prerequisite for the pursuit of primacy through competition with China. Because they promise good jobs, economic growth, and a boost to domestic innovation, leaders should want to see America at the forefront of new technologies like AI.
Secure supplies of things like critical minerals and semiconductors should, therefore, be a priority absent a peer challenger. No China threat rhetoric is required.
Finally, engagement with Beijing cannot remain off the table, however toxic the word has become. American diplomats don’t like how Beijing conducts diplomacy, in particular their reneging on promises.
However, the Chinese don’t like how America conducts business: lecturing rather than bargaining, avoiding strategic questions, and giving up little while enforcing structural changes. Yet while cheap, talk is still worth the effort.
No matter who Trump appoints —hawk, dove, or tech bro—a realistic and restrained policy attuned to America’s core interests remains the gold standard for making China policy.
David M. McCourt is an associate professor at the University of California, Davis, in the Department of Sociology. He is the author of a book titled ,” The End of Engagement: America’s China and Russia Watchers and US Strategy Since 1989″. Published with the permission of Defense Priorities.
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