The Ukraine conflict is frequently portrayed as enabling intercontinental partners to strengthen their defence cooperation and consolidation. But while this may be true in many ways, the fight has also exposed the different passions among those numerous partners.
Hidden fault lines in the current security architecture, which are mostly drawn on political and economic grounds, may very well result to a number of previously unbounded fissures that are starting to break out in the post-war time as Kiev’s ability to maintain the present line of contact becomes more weak by the day.
The relationship between the United States and its Western allies is the first significant rift. It is possible to create the argument—albeit in a somewhat sarcastic manner—that forcing Ukraine to preserve fighting instead of agreeing to confined concessions at the beginning of the war served to achieve effective returns for Washington.
The US power sector has been instantly benefited by the Russian oil and gas pipeline’s closure, which will make it the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2023, with Europe serving as the main destination.
Europe once more led the way as the top export destination ( 1. 8 million barrels per day, compared to 1.7 million for Asia and Oceania ), and this past year also set new records for US crude oil exports. This was all undergirded by one of the most significant inter- empire developments in the article- Cold War period: the damage and destruction of both Nord Stream pipelines.
The relative competitiveness of the US economy has increased as production costs have soared on the continent as a result of the rising price of energy and supply chain issues in Europe. Germany, Europe’s industrial powerhouse with a highly dependent economy and a market for manufactured goods, has precipitously fallen to become the worst-performing major developed nation in the world.
Unsurprisingly, since the start of the war, the German population has suffered from declining living standards. The International Monetary Fund predicts economic growth in the Eurozone of only .9 % in 2024, particularly measly when compared to 2.6 % predicted in Russia.
Farmers are still protesting in large parts of Europe as a result of the rise in stringent regulations passed under the umbrella of “environmental measures” as well as the flood of cheap agricultural imports from Ukraine.
When the EU decided that free trade with Kiev would start the war, local European populations suddenly saw their share of the market for agricultural goods being cut off by cheap Ukrainian alternatives. Most notably, Polish tractors continue to attempt blockades of the border with their war- torn neighbor, while further west in Brussels farmers hose down the bastions of EU bureaucracy with fresh manure.
Additionally, there have been political repercussions. The Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party is growing in both popularity and parliamentary power, causing Berlin’s Eurocentric political elite to cling on to a Liberal pretzel. Officials are still talking about banning AfD outright, stamping out any genuine dissent in the name of inclusivity and openness.
And while the displacement of the Law and Order Party ( PiS ) in Poland was undoubtedly a cause for celebration among the champions of European consolidation, there is still evidence of lingering public discontent with the general direction of things.
PiS is actually just as bellicose if not more outright anti-Russian than Donald Tusk’s Europhile Civic Platform Party, despite the fact that the Western media frequently portrays AfD as being pro-Russia and calling for the EU establishment to stop supporting war with Moscow.
In Poland, it was determined that combating “illiberalism” was necessary, much like there was with AfD. When the Tusk administration came back to power, one of the first things they did was to act against political snatchers from PiS.
Of course, there has also been a sharp divergence between the interests of individual European nations. Hungary is frequently criticized in Central Europe for hesitant to support Ukraine without réserve.
At the end of 2023, when it presented the 50 billion euro aid package to Kiev, which was funded by the EU common budget, it was among the sights of Brussels and Berlin.
Budapest had also pushed back against the rubber stamp for Ukraine’s ascension to the EU over issues with the large Hungarian minority that is currently located within the borders of Ukraine.
The group’s efforts to completely alienate Russia have also resulted in sharp divergences between Czechia and Slovakia, one of which even went so far as to refuse a typical joint cabinet meeting with the latter following a meeting with Sergei Lavrov, the top diplomat from Russia.
Further to the southeast, the Bulgarian government has generally backed the EU’s position in Ukraine. And yet, in every round of parliamentary elections that have taken place since the start of the war ( there have been five ), the two most pro- Russian opposition parties have by far made the greatest gains.
Another round of snap elections are expected to take place this summer, which suggests even more potential gains. Bulgaria and Russia have significant cultural ties, but Sofia has been subjected to a number of additional economic challenges as a result of its almost entirely reliance on Moscow for its oil and gas needs.
Meanwhile, France under the leadership of Emmanuel Macron has presented itself as an apparent leader in European security. This is undoubtedly a good thing for the United States, which has a constantly overstretched defense posture.
The current war in Ukraine has also highlighted shortcomings in America’s defense system, particularly in terms of its capacity for industrial production, despite accounting for roughly one-third of all military expenditures worldwide.
The US needs to better concentrate its limited resources abroad, and it needs to focus on refocusing on the domestic dispute’s deteriorating domestic situation.
Most importantly, however, the war has highlighted a number of divergences in national security interests among the various transatlantic partners.
Any political and economic considerations are typically ruled out by the security issue. Although that may be true, it should be made clear that having a shared NATO membership does not necessarily mean having the same kind of strategic interests, threat assessments, or approaches to international relations in general.
This is intuitive, as the variable circumstances of geography, size, population and culture lead to unique considerations of national interest. When that national interest conflicts with those of other coalition members, there is the possibility of dissension.
The Baltic countries, which view Russia as a significant threat and support the most extreme measures in confronting Moscow, are the best illustration of this.
However, the bellicosity of a nation such as Estonia ( population of about 2 million, 104th ranked economy in the world ) or Latvia ( whose officials have hinted at the need to outright destroy Russia ) raises serious questions about whether the US ( or any other country ) will be able to muster the public support necessary to send its own citizens to fight and die for foreign borders – unless one distills the complex world of geopolitics down to political talking points and moral grandstanding.
But, especially in the US, as more and more people appear to be willing to do it, things seem to be getting worse. Despite official proclamations to the contrary, Western officials are undoubtedly aware that the likelihood of seriously altering the territorial outcome of the conflict in Ukraine’s favor is, at this point, essentially zero. It therefore makes sense for the US specifically to begin seeking peace in Ukraine.
The risk of escalation is currently outweighing any potential benefit, and the more the bloodshed drags on, the worse the outcome will be for Kiev, again in the most cynical sense.
That’s not to mention exposing vulnerabilities in Western weapons systems that could reduce the effectiveness of any potential conflict. Destroyed M1 Abrams Tanks and Patriot Missile systems neither project power abroad nor instill confidence at home.
Sadly, Washington’s willingness to negotiate a deal is still largely dependent on the same ideological biases as its European counterparts.
Those who disagree with a realist assessment of the situation in Europe may cite the ascension of Finland and Sweden to NATO as proof of a strong transatlantic order. However, this still leaves out any of the underlying problems raised above.
Leaders have relied on the consent of their own national populations to carry out their idealist agendas. That quiescence can no longer be counted on as the citizenries of both the US and individual European countries begin to push back against the increasingly disconnected policy positions of their respective governments.
The divide between the two fundamental political parties that are currently in power and those who are ruled is the one that is most likely to grow in the transatlantic order after the Ukrainian war’s eventual conclusion.
A restructured security structure in Europe that allows for greater regional leadership by nations like France and Germany and the potential for even smaller sub-coalitions would increase the effectiveness of working toward shared goals and the unification of interests.
In the future, this would result in greater stability both in Europe and the world. However, such a state of affairs would also inherently be viewed as a threat to the first principles of international politics upon which the current order was erected: the multilateral over the national, the ideal over the concrete.
However, there has been evidence of a growing opposition to that order both in the US and Europe. In many ways, the opposition was at a crossroads during the Ukraine war. As the smoke clears, a period of nationalist renaissance – or nationalist regression, depending on whom one is asking – may be waiting in the breach on both sides of the Atlantic.
At Hillsdale College, Dominick Sansone is a doctoral student of political philosophy. He previously completed a Fulbright grant in Bulgaria while pursuing an education at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies ( SAIS ).
His writings on US- Russia relations have been published at , The American Conservative,  , National Interest and the , American Mind, among others.