In October 2024, then-presidential member Donald Trump remarked,” The one thing you never want to happen is you never want Russia and China uniting… I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that, too. I have to un-unite them”.
The recent flurry of political contacts by President Trump to Russia and the open split between Washington and Kyiv may represent the first steps in a US efforts to distance Moscow from Beijing.  ,
Despite its flaws, the idea of bringing Russia to China is carefully good. It may help Washington concentrate its resources and efforts on its conflict with China while halting what some people refer to as a “quasi-alliance” between Beijing and Moscow.
Henry Kissinger’s contribution to the Cold War, when he helped reach agreement with Beijing in the first 1970s to remove Moscow, would be in opposition.  , Existing conditions, however, make the likelihood of properly driving a wedge between China and Russia reduced and the expenses of trying higher.  ,
A different strategy, one with a story and putting increasing pressure on both Moscow and Beijing, may increase the chances of victory and lower the costs involved.  ,
Despite allergens in the marriage, Russia does not easily walk away from the advantages China provides. Beijing also has the ability to lead the country’s defense and trade partners, as well as helping it de-dollarize foreign deals without being tied to sanctions, shares surveillance and censorship knowledge, and secures a “rear” along their discussed land border.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, also, like an exceptionally strong personal connection. And while the fight in Ukraine has significantly increased Russia’s reliance on China, the two have been boosting relations since the mid-1980s and were near companions properly before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea.
Washington does, however, have a lot to give Moscow at the table in terms of sanctions relief and a ceasefire. It can also impose sanctions on Russia for imposing sanctions on Ukraine.
Russia’s position on the front lines largely guarantees that it will retain the Russian place it occupies and that Kyiv will be unable to meet NATO without a resurgent American military aid to Ukraine.  ,
Additionally, it’s unlikely that Moscow will refinance its connection with Beijing in exchange for restrictions pleasure. Should Russia be willing to break away from China, it would possibly necessitate intolerably expensive concessions, like redesigning Europe’s security structure in a way that eternally harms NATO.  ,
Some people believe that trying to entice China and Russia is a failure and should not even be attempted. Counterintuitively, however, a more aggressive approach may much status Washington to range Moscow from Beijing over the longer phrase and at a lower cost.  ,
Before Kissinger exploited their split, it was National pieces, no veggies, that contributed to the escalation of tensions between China and Russia during the Cold War. The Frank Eisenhower leadership adopted a policy of strength toward China while facing down the Soviets in Europe and the Middle East.
It vowed to defend Taiwan, continued to impose a deal ban on Beijing, and urged the Nationalists to launch attacks against Taiwan’s mainland. China’s growing needs for the Soviets were made increasingly explicit by US military and economic force, which led to growing hatred in Moscow.
Eisenhower’s pressure policy also contributed to exposing and aggravated different Chinese and Russian interests in Taiwan. Chinese President Mao Zedong reacted to Taiwan’s conflict in 1958 in piece out of anger over its lack of protection support.
Beijing’s activities, which provoked horizontal American atomic threats against China, irritated and worried Moscow. Over Taiwan, which was of no significance to Moscow, the Soviet Union feared being ensnared in a radioactive conflict with Washington.
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was forced to reevaluate both Russia’s connection with China and, crucially, the knowledge of providing Beijing military assistance as a result of the crisis.
As the issue unfolded, Moscow began to lag transferring nuclear systems to Beijing, and the next year, it reneged wholly on providing a nuclear weapon design. By 1960, all of the Soviet Union’s authorities had left China, and the Sino-Soviet conflict was already in full swing.  ,
Pressure from the US on both countries today would only serve to worsen their previously different goals in Ukraine.
This may include a reconciliation with Kyiv, double the amount of military aid it provides, and threatening increased economic sanctions against Beijing for selling human goods that have reduced Russia’s war’s burden on society.  ,
Trump might yet impose tariffs on Chinese imports based on how much Russia’s exports are drastically slashed. Doing so would make China more unwilling to provide material support while increasing Russia’s need for it.
While Putin has a major attention in the Ukraine conflict, China finds it to be uninteresting in much the same way. Beijing is interested in preventing Russia from losing, but it is reluctant to bear the high costs on Moscow’s representative.  ,
This is why China has largely avoided providing destructive support, banned sanctioned Russian power ships from its huge ports, and found novel ways to evade US sanctions, particularly against its economic institutions.
Growing tension between China and Russia may lead to tension that could be exploited at the negotiation stand in the future. A Russia that is confronted by a richly armed and unrestrained Russian military and growing extremely angry with China for withholding crucial aid would still need concessions to emancipate it from Beijing.
But the compromises required may be fewer, less important and more reasonable.  , And they could produce the kind of enormous strategic dividends in Washington’s opposition with Beijing that Kissinger’s rapprochement did in previous century’s rivalry with the Soviets.
Andrew Taffer works for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University as a research fellow with the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. This essay represents his personal views and not those of the US National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.