In recent days, Kyiv to Seoul has been alarmed by the growing defense shaft between North Korea and Russia. In the latest development, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service ( NIS )  , reported , on Friday that some 1, 500 North Korean special forces had been sent already to the Russian Far East in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian war front.
Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, convened a security emergency meeting, stating that this poses” a major security threat” to both the international community and our nation.
Following its large shipments of weapons and ammunition, Pyongyang’s decision to send armed forces to Russia’s war effort comes from the security alliance that was sealed next June during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attend to North Korea.
What Moscow has agreed to give Pyongyang in return is revealed in more enticing ways. That, the evidence is less reliable, but it is possible to draw a conclusion that Russia has abandoned its long-standing commitments to avoid atomic use and non-proliferation.
Even more disturbing, these innovations take area amidst growing conflicts along the inter-Korean border, fueled by North Korea’s decision to officially reject the goal of peaceful unification. Otherwise, in a visit to an army headquarters on October 17, Kim Jong-un , told , forces that any use of pressure against the South had form an action against a “hostile country”, no against “fellow countrymen”.
North Korean army and arms implementation
The NIS accounts of North Korean army implementation follow many reports from Ukraine of their existence, prompting , statements , from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy about their appearance. One , report , claimed that a Russian missile strike killed some North Korean military officers. More lately, Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security , released , a picture that appears to show North Korean soldiers lining up at a Russian center in the Far East to collect clothing and other products.
So far, however, neither US nor NATO officials have independently confirmed these reports. Yoon spoke with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte about the potential deployment of North Korean forces. Rutte argued that North Korea’s deployment of troops to Ukraine would represent a significant escalation.
As , reports , have pointed out, it is hardly unprecedented for North Korea to dispatch military advisors, or even combatants, to conflicts. The North Koreans fought for the Bashar al-Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, in support of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, in Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, and recently.
There is some skepticism, however, about , reports , that the North Koreans are preparing to dispatch large numbers of forces – 10, 000 or more – to join the Ukrainian front. According to long-time Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who is currently based at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, that would only occur if Putin were looking for an “immediate and decisive victory on the battlefield.”
The logistical challenge of training, arming, and moving that many forces is daunting. In an email interview, the veteran military analyst stated,” I believe Russia cannot support such a deployment.”
Russian combativeness has already depended heavily on the support of North Korea. Although the supply of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles is estimated to vary, even at the lower end ( roughly 1 million shells ), it would make up a quarter of all the ammunition used, according to Golts. Russia’s ability to halt a Ukrainian offensive in the last year and achieve clear gains on the battlefield was viewed as crucial to the North Korean supplies.
Officials from the US and South Korea have noted recent supplies ‘ significant volumes. Robert Koepcke, US deputy assistant secretary of state for Japan, Korea, and Mongolia,  , told , a conference in Washington last month that more than 16, 500 containers of munitions had been sent from North Korea since September of last year and that Russia had launched more than 65 North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine.
Alliance, or marriage of convenience?
Some analysts believe that this military axis has reached a point where North Korean stockpiles may soon be run out, and that this axis has a limit on its reach. RAND analyst Bruce Bennett , argues , that, rather than an alliance, this is a marriage of convenience – one that may not outlive the supply of munitions. He points to evidence of China’s unease with the relationship and, in particular, with Kim’s efforts to reprise the Cold War games that his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, employed to play off Moscow against Beijing.
Whatever may occur, the Russians are indicating a commitment to this axis since the Korean War. During his June visit, Putin signed a , Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership , between the two countries, which included a mutual defense clause under which each country agreed to help the other repel external aggression. The Russian State Duma received the treaty in writing on October 14 to formally ratify it. When asked if Russia would get involved in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Kremlin , spokesman , Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the two countries would engage in” strategic deep cooperation in all areas, including ensuring security”. As to the treaty’s implications,” the wording in the agreement does not need clarification, it is quite unambiguous”, he said.
Putin’s visit and the signing of the treaty sparked a lot of discussion about the potential financial support Russia might offer North Korea, particularly the technological and military support it might provide to bolster its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs. Observers have examined Russian aircraft’s travels to and from North Korea and meetings with senior government officials in search of evidence that Russian assistance may have helped the North Koreans solve their missile testing problems.
Any Russian assistance that effectively helps North Korea perfect its nuclear delivery systems would represent a significant change from Russian policy, which was actively trying to stop any potential technology leakage and opposed to nuclear proliferation in principle.
I was among the first Western correspondents to , report , on this during my time as the Moscow Bureau Chief for , The Christian Science Monitor. The North Koreans made an effort to entice a sizable group of Russian missile developers from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau to work there after the Soviet Union was overthrown. Although some design data may have been transferred, the KGB eventually stopped the group at the airport as they were about to leave Pyongyang.
Nuclear implications
The war in Ukraine, among other things, seems to have led to a clear shift in Russian nuclear policy. Most prominently, there is increasing high-level discussion of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. On September 25, Putin , presided , over a meeting of a previously unknown organization, the Security Council Standing Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, where he talked about the need to revise the country’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression even from non-nuclear states.
This shift mirrors the , doctrinal declarations , of the North Korean regime, envisioning the use of tactical and other nuclear weapons, even in a conflict with South Korea. However, it also suggests that Russia would no longer perceive a barrier to aiding North Korea in that area.
” Russia supported non-proliferation for many years”, Golts told this writer. ” But now the situation has changed dramatically. The main objective has become the West’s intimidation.
Golts makes reference to statements Putin made when he traveled to North Korea that warned Russia might offer” sensitive” military assistance to US allies in response to the West’s supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine.
Putin , who spoke to international reporters ahead of his trip to North Korea, said,” We are thinking that if someone thinks it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to strike at our territory and cause problems for us, then why do we not have the right to distribute our weapons of the same class to those regions of the world where there will be strikes on sensitive facilities of those countries that are doing this to Russia?”
After signing the treaty with Kim, Putin , repeated , that he does” not rule out” arming North Korea with such weapons. ” From this point of view, Kim is the best possible recipient”, observes Golts. He draws attention to the instance of Russia leasing nuclear submarines to India, which could also include funding for the development of long-range missiles under the guise of aiding North Korea’s satellite launch capabilities.
Already, the level of Russian military interaction goes beyond anything seen in decades. The recent , visit , of a Russian naval vessel to Chongjin, reportedly to ferry North Korean troops to Russia, was the first such entry since 1990.
There are still many unanswered questions about the nature of the growing military axis between Russia and North Korea. However, it is clear that both these developments are escalating and that the growing threat they pose for both the Korean Peninsula’s future security and stability as well.
Daniel Sneider is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI ) and a Lecturer in International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
This article was first published by KEI’s The Peninsula. It is republished with permission.