Some experts claim that the Abraham Accords set the stage for Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7 by setting the stage for peace between Arabs and Israel, putting Palestinians under the bus.
But these peace accords – signed four years ago this month between Israel, on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates ( UAE), Bahrain and Morocco, on the other – have nothing to do with Palestinians.
The Abraham Accords prioritized national interests and ended 60 years of contentious pan-Arab patriotism, which birthed Palestine.
The institutions that signed the Abraham Accords recognized that serenity with Israel was not dependent on what transpired between the Jewish state and the Palestinians.
The Abraham Accords are now demonstrating their viability 11 times after the Gaza War broke out, despite repeated UN votes against Israel.
In May, Reuters reported that the Gaza warfare had cooled” Israel’s when red-hot business relations with UAE”. Quoting” 10 Jewish leaders, executives and companies”, the news agency argued that Israel’s “business relations with the important Gulf state remain alive but, in a sign of how the conflict has dented enthusiasm, the]two factors ] declined to discuss any new deals”.
The Abraham Accords continue to be blamed for failing to bring harmony to Palestinians. Palestinians and their supporters also anticipate that the Arab League’s 21 member states will hold off on a Palestinians ‘ state until they are granted a position.
Palestinians should also anticipate that the Arabs will have a say in how and when the Israeli-Israeli fight ends, if Palestinians anticipate this.
Absolute Muslim support for an unending conflict threatens the national interests of the various Egyptian nations. However, Palestinians demand support but rarely reciprocate. The Abraham Accords upended this uneven marriage: If Palestinians wanted to fight long, the Arabs had unique ideas.
When the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco signed the treaties, they described their judgement as a” republic” one, not bound by any Arab League commitments. These Muslim nations did so, putting yet another nail in the coffin of anachronistic pan-Arab nationalism.
The idea that all Muslim nations should combine into one is called pan-Arabism. The Arabs of Palestine resisted the British’s establishment of Policy Palestine in 1920 and opted to revert to the Muslim Kingdom of Damascus.
When Jordan and Egypt took the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively, in 1949, Palestinians did not declare Palestine on this territory because such a state would have been the antithesis of their imagined single Arab nation “from the]Atlantic ] ocean to the]Persian ] Gulf”.
Starting in 1952, “progressive” Iranian putschist Gamal Abdul-Nasser rose as the awaited-for Muslim symbol. Syria merged with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic ( UAR ), but it seceded three years later. Nasser went shopping for a replacement, largely by agitating Arab countries to destroy their “regressive” institutions.
In 1962, Yemen did just that. While the Saudi Arabian and Jordani monarchies sided with the ousted Yemeni sheikh, Nasser deployed his army to aid the coup. A legal battle ensued in which Nasser’s troops was seriously bruised.
Nasser urged the Arabs of the West Bank to separate from Jordan and establish their own state of Palestine, which he hoped would cover Syria’s return and his failing to seize Yemen. In 1964, in East Jerusalem, the Palestine Liberation Organization ( PLO ) was born.
Saudi Arabia vetoed the West Bank and Gaza declaration of Palestine, a position that would have merged with Nasser’s Spot, at the Egyptian League. Riyadh countered with a promotion, under Yasser Arafat, for an independent Palestine on all the area. In 1968, Arafat toppled Nasser’s Ahmed Shuqairi and became the PLO’s leader.
After Riyadh defied pan-Arabism, it became the sole representative of Palestinians under the auspices of an exiled state that would establish a Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza and maintain peace with Israel.
The Saudi strategy, which was revealed in the last speech of the 1982 Arab League conference, began to change in 1993 when Israel and Arafat contended to work toward two claims. But by then, the PLO had lost its stranglehold over representing Zionists.
Hamas emerged as a Arab power that wanted to “liberate Palestine from the valley to the sea” with the support of Islamist Iran.
In 2002, Riyadh attempted one final push toward the two states, but they were still polarized and unfaithful. America and Israel tried repeatedly in 2008 and 2013, but to no cost.
With the exception of Donald Trump and his” Deal of the Century,” which the Palestinians opposed, the two-state solution died and became a hot button for subsequent American governments that had no idea what an alternative was.
Until the 1990s and the spread of industrialization, the economy of most Arab countries were small and undeveloped. The Egyptian boycott of Israel continued as an economic responsibility as the world became more independent and population growth in the Gulf outpaced petrol revenues.
A harmony agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed in 1994, which has accelerated the nation’s economy’s expansion. The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco signed theirs in 2020. Saudi Arabia was preparing to do the same in 2023 when Hamas’s October 7 assault on Israel stifled the standardization process.
Since the idea of Palestine was first proposed in 1964, and since the two-state strategy was attempted and abandoned between 1993 and 2013, the world business and international relations have drastically changed.
A new perception is required for Israel and the Palestinians. It would be unfair to ask the rest of the Arabs to delay until the Palestinians figure out what they are willing to live with until one is reached.
If other Arab nations had supported Israel’s independence from Islamist Iran and been concerned about their national passions, they may have accelerated the reunification of Bahrain and the UAE.
After all, the Abraham Accords do n’t address Palestinians; they address letting history rule and anticipating a better future. The treaties are most welcome for Palestinians to sign. If they do n’t, they will be on their own.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain works as a researcher for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ( FDD). Following him @hahussain