Editors’ Note: Asia Times is following up with a two-part series looking into the politics behind the multi-billion money tragedy after publishing on Wednesday Stephen Bryen’s statement,” US Navy gives up the spirit on its failed” industrial street fighter.” The first of the two, which was first released by ProPublica, an investigative newspaper that won the Pulitzer Prize, is presented below.
The Navy’s littoral combat ship programme, which cost taxpayers billions of dollars but fell short of its promise, is the subject of this document by ProPublica.
1. In their estimates given to Congress, military officials significantly understated the costs associated with building the dispatch. The initial cost was more than doubled.
The boats were supposed to be quickly constructed by architects, in large quantities, and for a modest US$ 220 million each. The boats were partially inspired by designs for passenger or professional ferries. Prices skyrocketed as the Navy started to impose stricter standards.
2. 2. The boats were supposed to have identical weaponry so they could fight, chase submarines, and find mines. The Navy was unable to accomplish this.
Past officers claimed that the Navy’s haste to give the ships overshadowed their combat prowess. The Navy’s program to equip ships to find and destroy boats was shelved after spending hundreds of millions, but the program to search underwater mines is still being developed.
One former official claimed that the fleet was nothing more than a” field floating in the ocean” without operational weapons systems. In response to inquiries, the Navy acknowledged that the LCS was unsuitable for taking on rival nations like China. The LCS” does not offer the mortality or endurance required in a high-end fight.”
3. Numerous seafarers and soldiers worked harder to repair the boats than to sail them.
Only the most illustrious soldiers and seamen were intended to pilot the boats due to the small crew size. However, due to outages, the boats frequently spent more time at sea than in port. Because of the difficulties, some seamen sought mental health support. The LCS plan came to be associated with the demise of marine careers. The Navy gradually increased the size of the team on the LCS.
4. Seafarers and soldiers were unable to fix their own boats because the Navy relied so strongly on companies for maintenance and repair.
Due to intricate agreements with Navy companies, seamen and officers were prohibited from touching some pieces of equipment. Getting contractors on board had occasionally get weeks due to the lengthy negotiations. One former official said of his time,” An ordinary year may consist of 90 to 100 hours in harbor doing, seriously, everything.” Recently, the Navy increased the amount of upkeep that seafarers perform.
5. 5. Beginning in late 2015, a series of high-profile failures at sea revealed the limitations of the boats and their personnel.
The USS Milwaukee experienced a breakdown in soon 2015 while en route to its home port, which was comparable to an entirely new vehicle stalling as it left the factory. A team of worn-out sailors failed to carry out a regular procedure, causing the USS Fort Worth to capsize in January 2016, costing the Navy millions of dollars in repairs. The USS Freedom’s motor was destroyed by a water leak months later.
The USS Montgomery subsequently collided with a tug before breaking its hull after colliding with an impenetrable lock in the Panama Canal, followed by the U.S. Coronado, which had issues with its waters jet. A system intended to advance the Navy into a more technologically sophisticated coming was further embarrassed by each event.
6. Even when the crew and boats weren’t ready to set sail, top Navy commanders persuaded subordinates to do so.
Sailors and soldiers on the Freedom were aware that their mission was to” no fail” and that they had no desire to stay in port. The boat’s chief put one website to sea despite the fact that it was contaminated. The ship then required maintenance that took two years to finish and cost millions of dollars. One sailor on the Fort Worth lamented the” no break, no respite, simply increasing daily handling.”
7. Even as the boats sank at sea and their weapon methods malfunctioned, one Navy minister and his friends in Congress fought to construct more of them. At an estimated lifetime cost of$ 100 billion, the Navy ended up with more ships than it had intended.
Senior officials frequently expressed their worries about the ships’ ineptitude, but Congressmen, Pentagon officials, and members of the Navy continued to support them. In some instances, officers tasked with evaluating the ships’ performance experienced career derailment after disclosing their unadorned, crucial findings.
The Navy took the failures really, according to former Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, but” from what we were looking at, it did not seem to be a systemic trouble.”
8. 8. Lawmakers who had shipyards in their districts were instrumental in growing the programme and shielding it from prying eyes.
Republican John McCain, the then-ranking part of the Senate Armed Services Committee, resisted the Navy’s decision to award contracts to construct 20 coast combat ships in two says in 2010. However, a Democratic senator from Alabama, where some of the boats were being built, added an amendment to the resources that would have allowed the Navy to do so. At the time, a Shelby official said,” He made sure it happened.”
Political Michigan lawmaker Carl Levin, who had his doubts about the boats at first, agreed with the idea. He claimed that” a significant boost for the state’s economy” may result from the plan to construct 10 vessels at a shipyard in nearby Wisconsin. Congress was able to fund three more boats even after the Navy ultimately decided it just needed 32 of them.
An in-depth look at how the US Navy wasted billion on a” tiny, terrible ship” is on the way.